Ignorantia Legis
ignōrantĭa lēgis nōn excūsat · also written ignorantia legis non excusat; ignorantia juris non excusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat
Legal Latin Dictionary · Last verified November 13, 2026
Pronunciation
There is no single official pronunciation of legal Latin. What follows is how most American lawyers say the maxim, and how a Roman would have said it.
- Common US legal pronunciation: ig-nuh-RAN-shee-uh LEE-jis non ex-KYOO-sat, IPA /ˌɪɡnəˈrænʃiə ˈliːdʒɪs nɑn ɛksˈkjuːsæt/. Some say ig-nuh-RAN-tee-uh, /ˌɪɡnəˈræntiə/, and the variant with juris is said JOOR-is, /ˈdʒʊrɪs/.
- Classical Latin (restored): ig-noh-RAN-tee-ah LAY-gis nohn ex-KOO-sat, IPA [ɪɡnoːˈrantɪa ˈleːɡɪs noːn ɛksˈkuːsat]. The g of legis was always hard.
Literal translation
- ignorantia — ignorance, lack of knowledge
- legis — of the law; the genitive of lex, a law (the variant juris is the genitive of jus, law or right)
- non — not
- excusat — excuses; a form of the verb excuso
Put together: “ignorance of the law does not excuse,” or, as English speakers say it, “ignorance of the law is no excuse.”
What it means in law
The maxim states one of the oldest rules in the common law: not knowing that conduct is illegal, or misreading what the law requires, is generally no defense. A driver who did not know the speed limit, or a business that misread a regulation, is still responsible.
American courts almost always state the rule in English. No Supreme Court opinion saved for this page uses the Latin; the Court says “ignorance of the law” instead. In Cheek v. United States (1991) it called the rule deeply rooted and explained its basis: the common law treated the law as definite and knowable, and so presumed that everyone knew it. The rule is not limited to crimes. In Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich L. P. A. (2010) the Court relied in part on it to hold that a debt collector’s mistaken reading of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act was not the kind of bona fide error that excuses a violation of that Act.
The rule has limits, and the main ones include these.
When the law makes knowledge of the law an element. A legislature can require proof that the defendant knew the law. Federal criminal tax statutes do this through the word “willfully.” In Cheek the Court held that a sincere, good-faith belief that the tax laws did not impose a duty, even an unreasonable belief, can negate willfulness, though a belief that the tax laws are unconstitutional cannot. Mr. Cheek, the Court said, was free to pay and sue for a refund, or to challenge a deficiency in the Tax Court.
When due process requires notice. In Lambert v. California (1957) the Court reversed a conviction under a Los Angeles ordinance that required anyone convicted of a felony to register with the police. The defendant did not know of the duty, and her offense was wholly passive. Without actual knowledge of the duty or proof that she probably knew of it, the Court held, she could not be convicted consistently with due process. Lambert is a narrow exception, and four Justices dissented.
Mistakes of fact. The maxim concerns the law, not the facts. A person who does not know the facts that make conduct criminal may lack the guilty mind the crime requires. That is why, in Staples v. United States (1994), the government had to prove the defendant knew his weapon had the features that made it a regulated machinegun. A footnote in that opinion names the companion maxim, ignorantia facti excusat: ignorance of fact excuses.
In civil cases, some legislatures have softened the rule’s harsher effects. New York, for example, does not let a court deny relief from a mistake merely because the mistake was one of law.
Etymology
Ignōrantĭa is glossed by Lewis & Short as “want of knowledge or information, ignorance”. Lēgis is the genitive of lēx, “a law, precept, regulation . . .”, and the variant juris is the genitive of jūs, “right, law, justice”. Nōn is simply “not”. Excūsat comes from excūso, which the dictionary glosses “to excuse a person or thing”.
The dictionary notes that ignorantia is mostly a word of later Latin writers, and it does not record the maxim. Neither do the saved opinions trace it to any classical author, so this page does not attribute it to one.
Source: Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879), entries ignōrantĭa, lex, jūs, nōn, ex-cūso, via the Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University). Glosses in quotation marks are quoted from it.
In the opinions
The Supreme Court states the maxim in English. The three passages below, quoted from the official United States Reports, are its clearest statements of the rule and of one of its limits; none uses the Latin. A spaced ellipsis marks where a citation has been left out.
The general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal system. . . . Based on the notion that the law is definite and knowable, the common law presumed that every person knew the law. This common-law rule has been applied by the Court in numerous cases construing criminal statutes.
A pilot who had stopped filing tax returns argued that he sincerely believed his wages were not income. Before turning to the tax statutes’ special treatment of that claim, the Court stated the general rule. The ellipsis replaces a string of citations to earlier cases and other sources.
We have long recognized the “common maxim, familiar to all minds, that ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally.”
A debt collector argued that its misreading of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act was a protected good-faith error. The inner quotation is from Justice Story’s opinion for the Court in Barlow v. United States (1833).
We believe that actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of the probability of such knowledge and subsequent failure to comply are necessary before a conviction under the ordinance can stand.
The defendant had lived in Los Angeles for over seven years without registering as a person convicted of a felony, as a city ordinance required. The Court stressed that the ordinance punished wholly passive conduct and gave her no chance to comply.
Where it appears in the rules
No rule on this site uses “ignorantia legis” in its official text.
Two rulesets on this site deal with mistakes of law in civil cases. New York’s CPLR 3005 provides that when relief against a mistake is sought, “relief shall not be denied merely because the mistake is one of law rather than one of fact”. California’s Code of Civil Procedure § 871.1(a) protects a person who improves land “under the erroneous belief, because of a mistake of law or fact, that he is the owner of the land”.
Frequently asked questions
What does ignorantia legis non excusat mean?
“Ignorance of the law does not excuse.” Not knowing a law, or misunderstanding it, is generally no defense to breaking it. Courts usually say it in English: ignorance of the law is no excuse.
Why is ignorance of the law no excuse?
The common law presumed that everyone knew the law, on the view that the law is definite and knowable, as the Supreme Court explained in Cheek v. United States (1991). There is a practical worry too: if not knowing the law were a defense, people would have a reason not to learn it, and every prosecution would turn on what the defendant claimed to know.
Are there exceptions?
Yes, but they are limited. A statute can make knowledge of the law part of the offense, as federal criminal tax statutes do with the word “willfully.” Due process can bar punishing purely passive conduct, like a failure to register, when the person had no notice of the duty, as in Lambert v. California (1957). And some civil rules relieve parties from mistakes of law in particular settings. Outside such exceptions, the rule holds.
What is the difference between a mistake of law and a mistake of fact?
A mistake of law is being wrong about what the law requires; a mistake of fact is being wrong about the circumstances. The companion maxim, ignorantia facti excusat, says ignorance of fact can excuse, because a person who does not know the facts that make conduct criminal may lack the guilty mind the crime requires. Someone who knowingly carries a gun but does not know it has been altered into a machinegun has made a mistake of fact; someone who knows exactly what the gun is but not that the law requires it to be registered has made a mistake of law.
Does the rule apply in civil cases?
Often. In Jerman (2010) the Supreme Court quoted an 1833 statement of the maxim that covers civil and criminal cases alike, and held that a debt collector’s misreading of the federal debt-collection statute did not excuse its violation. But statutes and some civil doctrines provide otherwise; New York, for example, lets courts relieve parties from mistakes of law.