Nullum Crimen Sine Lege
nullum crīmen sĭne lēge · also written nulla poena sine lege; nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege
Legal Latin Dictionary · Last verified November 13, 2026
Pronunciation
There is no single official pronunciation of legal Latin. What follows is how most American lawyers say the phrase, and how a Roman would have said it.
- Common US legal pronunciation: NULL-um KRY-men SY-nee LEE-jee, IPA /ˈnʌləm ˈkraɪmɛn ˈsaɪni ˈliːdʒi/. Many lawyers say SIN-ay LAY-gay, /ˈsɪneɪ ˈleɪɡeɪ/, for the last two words.
- Classical Latin (restored): NUL-lum KREE-men SIH-neh LAY-geh, IPA [ˈnʊllʊm ˈkriːmɛn ˈsɪnɛ ˈleːɡɛ]. Both *u*s of nullum were short, as in put, the g was always hard, and the ī of crīmen and the ē of lēge were long.
Literal translation
- nullum — no, not any
- crimen — crime, offense
- sine — without
- lege — law (the form of lex used after sine)
Put together: “no crime without law.” The twin maxim, nulla poena sine lege, swaps in poena, punishment or penalty: “no punishment without law.”
What it means in law
The maxim states a basic limit on criminal law: no one may be punished for conduct that was not a crime, under a law already in force, when the person acted. Its twin, nulla poena sine lege, adds that no one may receive a punishment the law did not provide. The two are often joined in one phrase.
A word on usage. Among the Supreme Court opinions saved for this dictionary, the Latin appears in only one opinion, a dissent, and only in the nulla poena form. The Court’s own holdings state the principle in English, through two parts of the Constitution.
Legislatures: the Ex Post Facto Clauses. The Constitution forbids Congress and the States to pass ex post facto laws. As the Court has read them since Calder v. Bull (1798), the laws those clauses forbid include laws that make innocent past conduct a crime, aggravate a crime after it was committed, or increase its punishment. That is the maxim in its plainest form.
Courts: due process and fair warning. The Ex Post Facto Clauses speak to legislatures, not courts. In Bouie v. City of Columbia (1964) the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause gives similar protection against courts. Civil-rights demonstrators had taken seats at a drugstore lunch counter and refused to leave when asked. South Carolina’s trespass statute made it a crime to enter another’s land after notice not to enter; the demonstrators had received no such notice before entering. The state supreme court read the statute, for the first time and after the fact, to cover remaining on premises after being asked to leave, and upheld their convictions. The Supreme Court reversed. An unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory language, it held, denies the fair warning the Constitution requires; if a legislature could not pass such a law, a state supreme court cannot reach the same result by construction.
How far the protection reaches. In Rogers v. Tennessee (2001) the Court declined to carry every ex post facto rule over to judicial decisions. Tennessee’s highest court had abolished the old common-law rule that a killing was not murder unless the victim died within a year and a day, and applied the change to Rogers, whose victim died later than that. The Court upheld the conviction, holding that a court’s change to the common law violates due process only when it is unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law as it stood before the conduct. The year-and-a-day rule had never been relied on as a ground of decision in Tennessee, and its abolition was neither. Justice Scalia, dissenting, invoked nulla poena sine lege and argued that judges should not be able to do retroactively what the Constitution forbids legislatures to do.
The principle is related to, but distinct from, the vagueness doctrine. A vague statute fails to give fair warning on its face; Bouie explained that a narrow and precise statute, later stretched by a court, can be even more misleading, because it gives no reason to suspect the conduct is covered.
Etymology
Nullum is a form of nullus, “not any, none, no.” Crimen could mean, from the accuser’s side, “a charge, accusation, reproach”, and from the side of the accused “the fault complained of, a crime, fault, offence”. Sine means “Without”. Lege is a form of lex, “a law”, in the case Latin uses after sine. Poena, in the twin maxim, covers a range from payment to penalty: “indemnification, compensation, satisfaction, expiation, punishment, penalty”.
The saved entries do not record either maxim, and no saved opinion says who first put them in these words, so we do not suggest an origin. The dissent quoted below cites a criminal-law scholar for the view that the principle dates from the ancient Greeks.
Source: Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879), entries nullus, crīmen, sĭne, lex, poena, via the Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University). Glosses in quotation marks are quoted from it.
In the opinions
Both passages come from Justice Scalia’s dissent in Rogers v. Tennessee (2001), the only opinion using either Latin form among the Supreme Court opinions saved for this dictionary. They present the maxim as the dissent’s framing; the Court’s holding, described above, went the other way. Both are quoted from the official United States Reports, and a spaced ellipsis marks where a citation has been left out.
The Court today approves the conviction of a man for a murder that was not murder (but only manslaughter) when the offense was committed. It thus violates a principle— encapsulated in the maxim nulla poena sine lege—which “dates from the ancient Greeks” and has been described as one of the most “widely held value-judgment[s] in the entire history of human thought.”
The opening of Justice Scalia’s dissent, joined by Justices Stevens and Thomas, and by Justice Breyer as to one part. The two short phrases in quotation marks are the dissent quoting J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (2d ed. 1960), as its citation shows.
Bouie rested squarely upon “[t]he fundamental principle that ‘the required criminal law must have existed when the conduct in issue occurred,’ ” . . . (Nulla poena sine lege.)
The dissent argued that Bouie forbade all retroactive judicial changes to criminal law, not only unexpected ones. The quoted words are Bouie’s; the innermost quotation is Bouie quoting the same treatise by J. Hall.
Where it appears in the rules
No rule on this site uses “nullum crimen sine lege” in its official text.
The principle works through constitutional law and criminal statutes rather than through rules of civil procedure, so the civil rulesets on this site have no counterpart to point to.
Frequently asked questions
What does nullum crimen sine lege mean?
“No crime without law.” A person may be punished only for conduct that a law in force at the time made a crime. Its twin, nulla poena sine lege, means “no punishment without law.”
Is nullum crimen sine lege part of American law?
The principle is, though American courts rarely use the Latin. It works through the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clauses, which bind legislatures, and through the Due Process Clause, which the Supreme Court held in Bouie v. City of Columbia (1964) protects against an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of a criminal statute.
Can a court change criminal law and apply the change to past conduct?
Sometimes. In Rogers v. Tennessee (2001) the Supreme Court held that a court’s change to the common law of crimes violates due process only if it is unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law as it stood before the conduct. The Court upheld the retroactive abolition of the year-and-a-day rule in that case. Justice Scalia’s dissent, invoking nulla poena sine lege, would have forbidden such retroactive changes.
What is the difference between nullum crimen and ex post facto?
An ex post facto law is the kind of law the maxim forbids: one that makes past conduct a crime or increases its punishment after the fact. Nullum crimen sine lege is the broader principle behind the ban. The Ex Post Facto Clauses apply it to legislatures; due process applies a version of it to courts.
Is this the same as the vagueness doctrine?
They are related. Both rest on fair warning. A vague statute fails to tell people what it forbids. The nullum crimen principle, as Bouie applied it, also protects people when a clear, narrow statute is later stretched by a court to cover conduct it did not reach when they acted.