Malum Prohibitum
mălum prŏhĭbĭtum · also written mala prohibita (plural)
Legal Latin Dictionary · Last verified November 13, 2026
Pronunciation
There is no single official pronunciation of legal Latin. What follows is how most American lawyers and judges say the phrase, and how a Roman would have said it.
- Common US legal pronunciation: MAL-um proh-HIB-ih-tum, IPA /ˌmæləm proʊˈhɪbɪtəm/. Many lawyers say MAH-lum, /ˈmɑːləm/. The plural is MAL-uh proh-HIB-ih-tuh.
- Classical Latin (restored): MAH-loom proh-HIB-ih-toom, IPA [ˈmalʊm prɔˈhɪbɪtʊm]. The vowels of prŏhĭbĭtum were all short, so the stress fell on -hi-, the third syllable from the end.
Literal translation
- malum — an evil, a wrong; the neuter of malus, “bad,” used as a noun
- prohibitum — forbidden; the past participle of prohibeo, “to hold back, forbid”
Put together: “a wrong forbidden,” or more naturally, “a wrong because it is prohibited.” The plural is mala prohibita.
What it means in law
A malum prohibitum is an act that is wrong only because the law says so. Nothing about selling a product without the required license, filing a form late or driving on the wrong side of the road is wicked in itself; it becomes an offense because a legislature or agency has drawn a line. Its counterpart is malum in se, conduct such as murder or theft that is wrong by its nature.
Regulatory offenses and the guilty mind. Most mala prohibita are regulatory or “public welfare” offenses, and the main legal question about them has been what the government must prove about the defendant’s state of mind. In United States v. Balint (1922), the Supreme Court held that sellers of narcotics could be prosecuted under an indictment that did not charge that they knew the drugs were of the kind the statute covered, because the statute aimed at social betterment rather than punishing a wrong in itself. The case came up on an indictment the trial court had quashed; there was no conviction to review.
The Court has refused to let the label settle the matter. In Morissette v. United States (1952) it explained that what justifies dropping intent is the nature and quality of the offense, not merely its classification as malum prohibitum, and it required proof of intent for a theft-type crime against federal property. In Staples v. United States (1994), the Court required proof that a man charged with possessing an unregistered machinegun knew the features that made his rifle one. It noted that even for public welfare offenses it had generally required that the defendant know he was dealing with something dangerous, and that the early cases dispensing with a guilty mind involved light penalties, such as fines or short jail terms. Where dropping the mental element would make a crime of otherwise lawful conduct, the Court said, a severe penalty is a further sign that Congress did not mean to drop it.
So a malum prohibitum may require proof of knowledge or intent, or may require less; the statute and the courts’ reading of it decide. The label describes why the act is unlawful, not what must be proved.
Grading offenses. The pair is also one of several ways the law ranks offenses by seriousness, along with felony and misdemeanor, crimes of moral turpitude, and major and petty offenses. Justice Stevens listed them together in New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985), quoted below.
Etymology
Malum is the neuter of the adjective malus, “bad”, used as a noun; Lewis & Short gives the noun as “any thing bad, an evil, mischief, misfortune, calamity”, and in one sense as “Wrong-doing”. Prohibitum is the past participle of prŏhĭbeo, which the dictionary builds from habeo (v. a. habeo) and first glosses “to hold in front”. Its senses run from “To hold back, keep in check, to restrain, hinder, prevent, avert, keep or ward off, debar” to the one the law uses: “to forbid, prohibit” a thing.
Neither saved entry records malum prohibitum as a phrase; the pairing with malum in se is the work of later jurists, and that observation is ours, not the dictionary’s.
Source: Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879), entries mălus, prŏ-hĭbĕo, via the Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University). Glosses in quotation marks are quoted from it.
In the opinions
Three Supreme Court passages, newest first. Each is quoted from the official United States Reports; a spaced ellipsis marks where a citation has been left out.
Indeed, some courts justified the absence of mens rea in part on the basis that the offenses did not bear the same punishments as “infamous crimes,” . . . and questioned whether imprisonment was compatible with the reduced culpability required for such regulatory offenses. See, e. g., People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N. Y. 25, 32–33, 121 N. E. 474, 477 (1918) (Cardozo, J.); id., at 35, 121 N. E., at 478 (Crane, J., concurring) (arguing that imprisonment for a crime that requires no mens rea would stretch the law regarding acts mala prohibita beyond its limitations).
Explaining why a heavy penalty suggests that Congress meant to require a guilty mind, the Court surveyed early state cases. The final parenthetical is the Court’s summary of a 1918 concurring opinion by Judge Crane of the New York Court of Appeals.
Throughout the criminal law this dichotomy has been expressed by classifying crimes as misdemeanors or felonies, malum prohibitum or malum in se, crimes that do not involve moral turpitude or those that do, and major or petty offenses.
Justice Stevens, arguing that school searches should be reserved for serious misconduct, wrote that the criminal law has long separated regulatory offenses from serious violations of the peace. “This dichotomy” in his footnote is that separation.
It was not until recently that the Court took occasion more explicitly to relate abandonment of the ingredient of intent, not merely with considerations of expediency in obtaining convictions, nor with the malum prohibitum classification of the crime, but with the peculiar nature and quality of the offense.
Tracing how the Court had come to approve crimes without intent, Justice Jackson pointed to the moment it began to explain why. “Recently” refers to a 1943 decision on misbranded drugs, which the opinion quotes next.
Where it appears in the rules
No rule on this site uses “malum prohibitum” in its official text.
That is no surprise: the distinction belongs to the criminal law and its statutes, not to rules of civil procedure.
Frequently asked questions
What are examples of mala prohibita?
Typical examples include licensing, permit and registration violations, many traffic offenses, labeling and food-safety rules, and tax filing requirements. The conduct becomes unlawful because a statute or regulation forbids it, not because it is wrong in itself.
Is a malum prohibitum offense a strict liability crime?
Not necessarily. Some regulatory offenses dispense with proof of intent, but many require knowledge of at least some facts. The Supreme Court in Morissette refused to treat the malum prohibitum label as the reason intent can be dropped, and in Staples it required proof that a gun owner knew the features that brought his weapon within the statute.
Are mala prohibita always minor offenses?
No. Many are minor, and the early regulatory offenses usually carried light penalties, as the Supreme Court noted in Staples. But some regulatory crimes are felonies with prison terms, like the ten-year machinegun offense in Staples, and the Court treated that severe penalty as one more reason to require proof of what the defendant knew.
What is the difference between malum prohibitum and malum in se?
Malum in se is wrong in itself, such as murder or theft; malum prohibitum is wrong because a law prohibits it. The first would be wrong without any statute; the second is wrong because of one.