Quasi in Rem
quăsĭ in rem · also written quasi-in-rem; jurisdiction quasi in rem
Legal Latin Dictionary · Last verified November 13, 2026
Pronunciation
There is no single official pronunciation of legal Latin. What follows is how most American lawyers and judges say the phrase, and how a Roman would have said it.
- Common US legal pronunciation: KWAY-zye in REM, IPA /ˈkweɪzaɪ ɪn ˈrɛm/. Many say KWAH-zee, /ˈkwɑːzi/, or KWAY-zee, /ˈkweɪzi/; all are heard in court.
- Classical Latin (restored): KWAH-sih in REM, IPA [ˈkʷasɪ ɪn rɛm]. Both vowels of quăsĭ are short (the i as in pit), and the s between them was a plain s, not the English z.
Literal translation
- quasi — as if, as it were
- in — toward, against; with the accusative rem it points at the thing a suit is aimed at
- rem — the thing; the accusative of res
Put together: “as if against the thing.” The case looks like one against property, but it settles only the rights of the people named in it.
What it means in law
Courts traditionally sorted their power to decide a case three ways. A case in personam is about a person’s own liability. A case in rem, in the strict sense, is about a thing, and its judgment binds everyone’s interests in that thing. A case quasi in rem also rests on the court’s power over property within its territory, but its judgment affects only the interests of the particular people named in the suit.
In Hanson v. Denckla (1958) the Supreme Court described two types. In the first, the plaintiff claims an interest in the property itself and asks the court to settle it against the defendant’s competing claim. In the second, the plaintiff has a claim against the defendant personally, often one that has nothing to do with the property, such as an unpaid debt, and seizes the defendant’s property in the state, usually by attachment or garnishment, so that it can be applied to that claim.
Either way, the judgment works only on the property. As the Court put it in Shaffer v. Heitner (1977), it imposes no personal liability on the owner, who is not before the court. A plaintiff who wins a case of the second type can collect no more than the value of what was seized.
Why it mattered. Under Pennoyer v. Neff (1878), a state could not enter a personal judgment against a defendant who was not served within its borders and did not appear, but it could act on his property there. Quasi in rem jurisdiction became the way around that limit. As Shaffer recounts, a 1905 decision went so far as to treat a debt as present wherever the person who owed it happened to be, so a creditor could garnish it while that person was visiting the creditor’s state.
The modern limit. Shaffer ended that era. Delaware had seized the Delaware-situs stock of a corporation’s out-of-state officers and directors in a shareholder’s suit that had nothing to do with the stock. The Court held that every assertion of state-court jurisdiction must meet the minimum-contacts standard of International Shoe, and that property unrelated to the claim is not enough on its own. The Court expected little change where the property is the subject of the dispute, or where the claim grows out of owning it, such as a suit for an injury suffered on an absentee owner’s land, which it counted as a case of the second type. The change fell on cases like the 1905 garnishment and Shaffer itself, where the property was completely unrelated to the claim. Two Justices wrote separately to leave room for quasi in rem jurisdiction based on land: one reserved the question, and the other would not read the ruling to reach it.
Thirteen years later, in Burnham v. Superior Court (1990), every Justice agreed that California could hear a wife’s divorce suit against her New Jersey husband, served with process while visiting the state, but they divided over how far Shaffer’s reasoning reaches beyond quasi in rem cases.
The device survives in rules. Federal Rule 4(n)(2) lets a federal court that cannot obtain personal jurisdiction by reasonable efforts at service reach the defendant’s assets in the district: “Jurisdiction is acquired by seizing the assets under the circumstances and in the manner provided by state law in that district.” Any such use must still satisfy Shaffer.
Etymology
Quasi is an adverb that Lewis & Short gloss first as “as if, just as, as it were”, and in a weaker sense as “About, nearly, almost”. The preposition in they open with “in, within, on, upon, among, at; into, to, towards”; followed by the accusative rem, it points toward the thing named. Rem is the accusative of rēs, “a thing, object, being; a matter, affair . . .”.
The dictionary records the three words separately, not the legal phrase. Reading quasi in rem as “as if against the thing,” a case that only resembles one against property, is our reading of how the phrase is built.
Source: Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879), entries quăsĭ, in, rēs, via the Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University). Glosses in quotation marks are quoted from it.
In the opinions
Four Supreme Court passages: a definition, the old basis for this kind of jurisdiction, the holding that limited it, and a later separate opinion on what that holding decided. Each is quoted from the official United States Reports.
A judgment quasi in rem affects the interests of particular persons in designated property. The latter is of two types. In one the plaintiff is seeking to secure a pre-existing claim in the subject property and to extinguish or establish the nonexistence of similar interests of particular persons. In the other the plaintiff seeks to apply what he concedes to be the property of the defendant to the satisfaction of a claim against him.
In a footnote to a dispute over a Delaware trust, Chief Justice Warren sorted judgments by whose interests they affect. The footnote ends by citing the Restatement of Judgments, which is not quoted here.
The Delaware courts rejected appellants’ jurisdictional challenge by noting that this suit was brought as a quasi in rem proceeding. Since quasi in rem jurisdiction is traditionally based on attachment or seizure of property present in the jurisdiction, not on contacts between the defendant and the State, the courts considered appellants’ claimed lack of contacts with Delaware to be unimportant.
Justice Marshall described how Delaware’s courts had answered the defendants’ objection that they had no connection with the State.
For the type of quasi in rem action typified by Harris v. Balk and the present case, however, accepting the proposed analysis would result in significant change. These are cases where the property which now serves as the basis for state-court jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the plaintiff’s cause of action. Thus, although the presence of the defendant’s property in a State might suggest the existence of other ties among the defendant, the State, and the litigation, the presence of the property alone would not support the State’s jurisdiction.
Having said that cases about the property itself would usually come out the same under the new test, the Court turned to the garnishment kind, which it had illustrated earlier with the 1905 case it names here.
While our holding in Shaffer may have been limited to quasi in rem jurisdiction, our mode of analysis was not.
Writing for four Justices who agreed with the result but not the plurality’s reasoning, Justice Brennan read Shaffer’s method as general even if its holding was not.
Where it appears in the rules
The rule pages below use the phrase in their official text, almost always paired with “in rem.” They include the federal admiralty rules for such actions, the grounds for this kind of jurisdiction, how such an action is begun and served (often by publication), the courts that may not hear it, guardians for unborn persons, and what a defendant does or does not give up by appearing. Wisconsin’s section 801.07 also uses the phrase for a different job: deciding questions of status in certain actions affecting the family, with no property involved. Each link opens the rule with its full verbatim text.
17 rule pages in 9 jurisdictions use “quasi in rem” in their official text.
Federal 1
- Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. E — Actions In Rem and Quasi In Rem: General Provisions in the rule’s title
Louisiana 4
- La. C.C.P. art. 9 — Same; Quasi In Rem; Attachment in the rule’s title
- La. C.C.P. art. 4850 — Jurisdiction In Rem Or Quasi In Rem; Executory Proceedings
- La. C.C.P. art. 4850.1 — City Court of Alexandria; In Rem and Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction
- La. C.C.P. art. 4913 — Limitations Upon Jurisdiction; Nature of Proceedings; Justice of the Peace Courts
Minnesota 1
Missouri 1
- Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 54.12 — Service -- In Rem or Quasi In Rem Civil Actions. in the rule’s title
New Jersey 1
North Carolina 2
Wisconsin 5
- Wis. Stat. § 801.02 — Commencement of action.
- Wis. Stat. § 801.04 — Jurisdictional requirements for judgments against persons, status and things.
- Wis. Stat. § 801.06 — Personal jurisdiction, grounds for without service of summons.
- Wis. Stat. § 801.07 — Jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem, grounds for generally.
- Wis. Stat. § 801.12 — Jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem, manner of serving summons for; notice of object of action.
Some rules provide for the same thing without the Latin, so they are not counted above. Federal Rule 4(n)(2), quoted in the explanation, lets a federal court reach a defendant’s assets in the district, by seizing them, when personal jurisdiction cannot be obtained.
Frequently asked questions
What is the difference between in rem and quasi in rem?
Who is bound. A judgment in rem, in the strict sense, settles everyone’s interests in a thing, so it binds the whole world. A judgment quasi in rem settles only the interests of the particular people named in the case. Courts often write “in rem” loosely to cover both, as the Supreme Court said it would in Hanson v. Denckla (1958) and Shaffer v. Heitner (1977).
Can a plaintiff win more than the property is worth?
Not in a quasi in rem case. The judgment reaches only the property that supports the court’s power, so a plaintiff who seized the defendant’s property to pay an unrelated claim can collect no more than its value. To get a personal judgment for the rest, the plaintiff needs jurisdiction over the defendant in personam.
Is quasi in rem jurisdiction still allowed?
Yes, within limits. Since Shaffer v. Heitner (1977) it must meet the same minimum-contacts standard as any other assertion of state-court jurisdiction. When the lawsuit is about the property itself, the state where it sits will usually have jurisdiction. When the property is only a way to reach an unrelated claim, its presence alone is not enough, and the defendant must have other ties to the state.
If I defend a quasi in rem case, do I submit to the court personally?
It depends on the state. Some rules say so expressly. Minnesota’s Rule 4.04, for example, provides that “When quasi in rem jurisdiction has been obtained, a party defending the action thereby submits personally to the jurisdiction of the court.” The same rule adds that an appearance only to contest the quasi in rem jurisdiction is not such a submission, and Wisconsin’s section 801.06, listed below, draws a similar line. Louisiana’s article 9 looks at the question from the judgment’s side: “Unless the nonresident subjects himself personally to the jurisdiction of the court, the judgment may be executed only against the property attached.” Rules on this point differ, so the answer turns on the court’s own rules.
What is an example of quasi in rem jurisdiction?
Shaffer v. Heitner itself. A shareholder sued a corporation’s officers and directors in Delaware and, to bring them in, had the court seize their stock, which a Delaware statute treated as located in Delaware. The claim had nothing to do with the stock. The Supreme Court held that the seizure could not support jurisdiction without other ties between the defendants, the State and the lawsuit.