Ex Post Facto
ex post factō · also written ex post facto law; Ex Post Facto Clause
Legal Latin Dictionary · Last verified November 12, 2026
Pronunciation
There is no single official pronunciation of legal Latin. What follows is how most American lawyers and judges say the phrase, and how a Roman would have said it.
- Common US legal pronunciation: eks pohst FAK-toh, IPA /ˌɛks poʊst ˈfæktoʊ/. This one varies little in American courts.
- Classical Latin (restored): eks post FAHK-toh, IPA [ɛks pɔst ˈfaktoː]. The o of post was short, as in British “lost,” and the final -ō of factō was long.
Literal translation
- ex — out of, from
- post — after, afterward
- facto — the deed, the thing done; the ablative of factum, from the verb facio, “to do”
Put together: “from after the deed,” or more naturally, “after the fact.”
What it means in law
Literally, ex post facto describes anything done after the fact. In American law it almost always means one thing: a law that reaches back to punish conduct more harshly than the law did when the conduct happened. The Constitution forbids such laws twice. Article I, Section 9 bars Congress from passing them, and Article I, Section 10 bars the states. Together these are called the Ex Post Facto Clauses, or simply the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Criminal laws only. The Supreme Court settled early that the ban is narrower than the Latin. In Calder v. Bull (1798) Connecticut’s legislature had set aside a probate decree and ordered a new hearing, which changed who inherited an estate. The Justices, writing separately, agreed that this was not an ex post facto law; most reasoned that the clause concerns crimes and punishment, not civil rights to property. A retroactive civil law may still run into other limits, such as due process or the ban on impairing contracts, but not this one. Every ex post facto law is retroactive; not every retroactive law is ex post facto.
Justice Chase’s four categories. In Calder, Justice Chase listed the laws he thought the clause forbids: laws that make an innocent past act a crime; that make a past crime greater than it was; that increase the punishment after the fact; and that change the rules of evidence so that less or different proof will convict. His list has been quoted ever since.
The modern test. In Collins v. Youngblood (1990) the Court restated the rule in the form an earlier case had given it. A law is ex post facto if it punishes as a crime an act that was innocent when done, makes the punishment for a crime more burdensome after it was committed, or takes away a defense that was available when the act occurred. Put more simply, legislatures may not retroactively redefine crimes or raise their punishment. Purely procedural changes do not violate the clause just because they disadvantage a defendant. But a legislature cannot escape the clause by calling a substantive change procedural. Collins overruled two older decisions that had read the clause more broadly.
Chase’s fourth category survives. The 1925 formula that Collins quoted leaves out Chase’s category about rules of evidence, and Collins noted the gap in a footnote. In Carmell v. Texas (2000) a divided Court held that the fourth category still applies. Texas had changed a rule so that, for certain sexual offenses, the victim’s testimony alone could support a conviction where corroboration had been required; convictions for crimes committed before the change could not rest on the new rule. Ordinary rules about what evidence may be admitted, the Court added, do not violate the clause.
How it comes up. The clause binds legislatures, not courts. The usual case is a criminal defendant or prisoner arguing that a new statute — a longer sentence, a new crime, a change in parole rules — is being applied to conduct that came before it. The defendant raises the objection in the criminal case itself, on appeal, or in a petition for habeas corpus.
Two neighbors. The same clauses also forbid bills of attainder, laws that punish named people without a trial. And in everyday speech “ex post facto” can describe any after-the-fact justification. In a courtroom, the phrase usually means the constitutional ban.
Etymology
Ex is a preposition that, in Lewis & Short’s words, “denotes out from the interior of a thing”, with the gloss “out of, from.” Post is an adverb as well as a preposition; used of time it means “afterwards, after”. Factō is the ablative of factum, which the dictionary treats under the verb făcĭo: as a noun the neuter participle means “that which is done, a deed, act, exploit, achievement”.
Read word by word, ex post facto is “from what was done afterward” — a law that takes its starting point from a deed already past. That reading is ours, not the dictionary’s, and Lewis & Short does not record the three words as a fixed phrase. The Supreme Court itself has noted that the literal sense is far wider than the legal one (see the remark below).
Source: Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879), entries ex, post, făcĭo, via the Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University). Glosses in quotation marks are quoted from it.
In the opinions
Four passages from the official United States Reports: the founding definition, from 1798; the Supreme Court’s modern restatement of the clause, which quotes a 1925 definition with approval and then gives its own summary; and the Court’s later answer to the question of what that restatement left out.
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.
The Justices gave their opinions one by one, each in his own name, rather than as a single opinion of the Court. Justice Chase’s opinion came first, and in it he listed the laws he thought the clause forbids. The report is a later reprint, quoted from its text as it stands.
It is settled, by decisions of this Court so well known that their citation may be dispensed with, that any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto.
Restating the clause in 1990, the Court quoted Justice Chase’s four categories and then the summary it had given in Beazell v. Ohio (1925).
The Beazell formulation is faithful to our best knowledge of the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause: Legislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist then said what the clause means in a single sentence. A footnote on the same page notes that the 1925 formula leaves out Justice Chase’s category about rules of evidence.
Accordingly, Collins held that it was a mistake to stray beyond Calder’s four categories, not that the fourth category was itself mistaken.
Texas had let certain sexual-offense convictions rest on the victim’s testimony alone, where corroboration used to be required, and applied the change to earlier crimes. Texas and the United States argued that Collins had already cast out Justice Chase’s fourth category; by a 5-4 vote, the Court disagreed.
Where it appears in the rules
No rule on this site uses “ex post facto” in its official text.
That is what you would expect: the ban is a limit on legislatures written into the Constitution, not a rule of court procedure.
Notable remarks
Two Justices, nearly two centuries apart, on the gap between the Latin and the law.
Literally, it is only, that a law shall not be passed concerning, and after the fact, or thing done, or action committed.
Just before his four categories, Justice Chase explained why the bare words of the clause needed interpreting.
Although the Latin phrase “ex post facto” literally encompasses any law passed “after the fact,” it has long been recognized by this Court that the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by them.
The Court began its analysis by noting how much narrower the clause is than the words.
Frequently asked questions
What is an ex post facto law?
A criminal law that applies to conduct that happened before it was passed and makes things worse for the person who did it. The Supreme Court’s categories include turning an innocent act into a crime, making a crime greater than it was, increasing the punishment for a crime already committed, taking away a defense that existed at the time, and lowering the amount of evidence needed to convict. The U.S. Constitution forbids both Congress and the states to pass such laws.
Does the Ex Post Facto Clause apply to civil laws?
No. Since Calder v. Bull (1798) the Supreme Court has held that the clause applies only to criminal and penal laws. A retroactive civil law, such as one changing a tax or a property rule, is tested under other constitutional provisions instead. Courts do sometimes look past a law’s civil label to ask whether it is really punishment.
Is every retroactive law unconstitutional?
No. Many retroactive laws are valid. Some benefit the people they reach, such as a law reducing a penalty. Others are civil laws that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not cover. The clause reaches only retroactive criminal and penal laws that work to a person’s disadvantage in the ways the Court has recognized, such as creating a crime, increasing a punishment or lowering the proof needed to convict.
Can a procedural change apply to crimes committed before it was passed?
Often, yes. In Collins v. Youngblood (1990) the Supreme Court held that a change in procedure does not violate the clause just because it disadvantages the defendant. But the label is not decisive: a legislature cannot avoid the clause by calling a law procedural when it in fact changes the definition of a crime or increases its punishment.
Does the clause stop courts from changing the law?
Not by its own terms. The clause limits legislatures. When a court’s new reading of a criminal statute is applied to past conduct, the question is usually one of due process and fair warning instead, and the standards are different.