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Jus Privatum

jūs prīvātum · also written ius privatum

Legal Latin Dictionary · Last verified November 16, 2026

Quick answerJus privatum, “private right,” is the ownership of the soil under tidal and navigable waters and along the shore, as distinct from jus publicum, the public’s right to use those waters for navigation, commerce and fishing, which burdens that ownership.

Pronunciation

There is no single official pronunciation of legal Latin. What follows is how most American lawyers and judges say the phrase, and how a Roman would have said it.

  • Common US legal pronunciation: JUS prih-VAY-tum, IPA /dʒʌs prɪˈveɪtəm/. Some say pry-VAY-tum, /praɪˈveɪtəm/, or YOOS pree-VAH-tum, closer to the classical form.
  • Classical Latin (restored): YOOS pree-WAH-tuum, IPA [juːs priːˈwaːtʊm]. Latin had no English J sound, so jus begins with a Y, and its V was said like an English W. The i and the a of prīvātum are long, and the stress falls on the ā; the last u is short, as in “put.”

Literal translation

  • jus — right, law; here, a legal right
  • privatum — private, belonging to an individual; the neuter of prīvātus, agreeing with jus

Put together: “private right.” Its partner is jus publicum, “public right.”

What it means in law

English common law divided the rights in the sea, the shore below high-water mark and the tidal rivers into two parts. The jus privatum was the title to the soil, the same kind of ownership a person can have in dry land. The jus publicum was the public’s right to use the waters over that soil, for navigation, commerce and fishing. As the Supreme Court explained in Shively v. Bowlby (1894), the King held both: the title as sovereign, and the public right as the representative of the nation and for the public benefit.

The private right could be separated from the public one, but a grant of the soil did not free it of the public right. A subject could come to own part of the shore or a river bed, by royal grant or by long use. Lord Hale, whom Shively quotes at length, explained that a subject’s jus privatum was still clothed with the jus publicum: the owner held the soil, and the public kept its right to use the water.

The distinction mattered when the law asked what had passed to the colonies and then to the States. Shively recounts a New Jersey oyster-bed case of 1842, in which the Court held that the King’s charters had passed the lands under the colony’s navigable waters as part of the powers of government, to be held as a public trust, not as private property to be parcelled out and sold. A dissenting Justice argued that the jus privatum had passed as private property down to the plaintiff.

In American law both rights came to rest in the States, subject to the powers the Constitution gave the national government, including its power over navigation and commerce. Shively held that title to the soil below high-water mark is governed by the law of each State. It quoted Oregon’s highest court: each State decides how far it will keep its ownership of these lands or confer it on others. Under Oregon’s law the tidelands in that case belonged to private parties holding deeds from the State. Some colonies also gave shore owners more than English law did; in Massachusetts, Shively noted, the owner of land on tide water held title down to low-water mark, subject to the public’s rights of navigation and fishing.

Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois (1892) tested what a State could do with its own title. Illinois had granted a railroad more than a thousand acres of submerged land in Chicago’s harbor and then repealed the grant. The railroad’s lawyers argued that the State’s complaint concerned only its jus privatum, its right of property in the lake bed, not its public control of navigation. The City of Chicago’s lawyers answered that the English division had no place in American institutions. The Court held that the State holds the soil under navigable waters in trust for the people, a title different in character from its title to land meant for sale, so the grant of the harbor was revocable and the repeal valid. Justice Shiras, joined by Justices Gray and Brown, dissented, quoting a New York court’s account of the old division.

Two other terms sit close by. Jus publicum is the public right that burdens the jus privatum; its own page has the leading passages on the public trust. Publici juris, “of public right,” describes things open to everyone. In Roman and civil law, jus privatum can also mean private law, the law between individuals; the cases here use it only for title to land under water.

Etymology

Jūs is the ordinary Latin word for “right, law, justice”. One of its narrower senses fits this phrase: “Legal right, power, authority, permission”.

Prīvātus is listed in Lewis & Short under the verb prīvo, “To bereave, deprive, rob, strip of any thing”, as its participle used as an adjective (prīvātus, a, um, P. a.). In that use it means “Apart from the State, peculiar to one’s self, of or belonging to an individual, private”, and the dictionary marks it as the opposite of the word behind jus publicum: opp. publicus or communis. The legal pair inherits that opposition. The dictionary does not record jus privatum as a phrase, and the English lawyers’ use of it for title to the seabed and shore is a later, technical one; that summary is ours.

Source: Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879), entries jūs, prīvo, via the Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University). Glosses in quotation marks are quoted from it.

In the opinions

Three passages. Two are from Shively v. Bowlby, the Court’s fullest account of the English law: the first is the Court describing a dissent in an earlier case; the second is Lord Hale’s words, quoted by the Court. The third is from a dissent in Illinois Central, quoting a New York court. Each is quoted from the official United States Reports. The best-known sentence on the pair, in which Shively says the title belongs to the King as sovereign and the dominion to him for the public benefit, appears on this site’s jus publicum page.

In Martin v. Waddell, Mr. Justice Thompson unavailingly contended that the title in the lands under the navigable tide water, the jus privatum, as distinguished from the jus publicum, passed as private property from the King to the Duke, and from him to the Proprietors of East Jersey, and was unaffected by their surrender to Queen Anne, and therefore passed from them to the plaintiff, subject indeed to the public rights of navigation, passing and repassing, and perhaps of fishery for floating fish, but not to the right of planting

Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 17 (1894) · Supreme Court of the United States · opinion of Justice Gray

Justice Gray was describing the losing argument of Justice Thompson, who dissented in Martin v. Waddell (1842), the New Jersey oyster-bed case. The sentence runs on to the next page, where it ends with the right of growing and dredging oysters and with Thompson’s further argument that, if the King had held the land in trust, New Jersey could not hold it free of that trust either; the quotation stops at the foot of the page.

yet that jus privatum is clothed and superinduced with a jus publicum, wherein both natives and foreigners in peace with this kingdom are interested, by reason of common commerce, trade and intercourse.

Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 12 (1894) · Supreme Court of the United States · opinion of Justice Gray

These are Lord Hale’s words, from the part of his treatise on ports, which the Court quoted. He was speaking of a port settled by royal grant or by long custom, whose soil may belong to the King or to a subject who took it from him.

The ownership of the soil, analogous to the ownership of dry land, was regarded as jus privatum, and was vested in the crown. But the right to use and control both the land and water was deemed a jus publicum, and was vested in parliament. The crown could convey the soil under water so as to give private rights therein, but the dominion and control over the waters, in the interest of commerce and navigation, for the benefit of all the subjects of the kingdom, could be exercised only by Parliament.

Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 466 (1892) · Supreme Court of the United States · Justice Shiras, dissenting opinion

Justice Shiras, joined by Justices Gray and Brown, was quoting the New York Court of Appeals in Langdon v. New York City. The New York court went on to say that in this country both rights are vested in the State.

Where it appears in the rules

No rule on this site uses “jus privatum” in its official text.

Title to the beds and shores of navigable waters is a question of property law decided by statutes, grants and court decisions, not by rules of procedure.

Frequently asked questions

What is the difference between jus privatum and jus publicum?

Jus privatum is ownership of the soil under the water or along the shore. Jus publicum is the public’s right to use the water over it, for navigation, commerce and fishing. In English law the Crown held both, and when a private person acquired the soil, the public right stayed with the land as a burden on it.

Could a private person own land under tidal water?

In English law, yes, by grant from the Crown or by long use, but always subject to the public right. In the United States, often yes too. Shively v. Bowlby (1894) held that each State’s own law governs title to the soil below high-water mark, and that each State decides how much of that land it keeps and how much it grants to others; a private owner who takes it holds it subject to the public’s rights. But Illinois Central (1892) held that a State holds the soil under navigable waters in trust for its people: it may grant parcels, such as land for wharves and piers, but it may not give up its control of a whole harbor. Whether a particular stretch of shore or bed is private depends on that State’s law and the grants made under it.

Does a private owner of the shore have to let the public use the water?

Traditionally, yes, as far as the public right reaches. Lord Hale, quoted by the Supreme Court in Shively v. Bowlby (1894), said a subject’s private right is clothed with the public right of commerce. What the public may do on a particular shore today, and where the line between public and private falls, depends on the law of the State.

Did the Supreme Court follow the old English division?

Partly. Shively explained it as the background of American law. In Illinois Central, the railroad relied on it to argue that the State’s complaint concerned only the State’s private right of property in the lake bed, and the City of Chicago’s lawyers answered that the division had no place in American institutions. The Court decided the case on the State’s public trust. The dissent quoted a New York court that used the old division and said that in this country both rights belong to the State.

Does jus privatum also mean private law?

In writing on Roman and civil law it can: jus privatum is the law between private persons, as against jus publicum, the law of the state. In American cases on tidelands and navigable waters it means the narrower thing explained on this page, the title to the soil.

This page explains a legal term. It is legal information, not legal advice, and it cannot tell you how the law applies to your situation. Who owns the bed or shore of a particular body of water, and what that owner may do with it, depends on the law of the State where it lies and on the grants made over the years. If the outcome matters, talk to a lawyer or your court’s self-help center.