Ferae Naturae
fĕrae nātūrae · also written feræ naturæ; animals ferae naturae
Legal Latin Dictionary · Last verified November 14, 2026
Pronunciation
There is no single official pronunciation of legal Latin. What follows is how most American lawyers and judges say the phrase, and how a Roman would have said it.
- Common US legal pronunciation: FEER-ee nuh-TOOR-ee, IPA /ˈfɪri nəˈtʊri/. Many say FAIR-eye nah-TOOR-eye, /ˈfɛraɪ nɑˈtʊraɪ/, and some FEH-ree nah-TOO-ree.
- Classical Latin (restored): FEH-rye nah-TOO-rye, IPA [ˈfɛrae̯ naːˈtuːrae̯]. The Romans said the ending -ae like the English word “eye,” and the e of ferae was short, as Lewis & Short marks it.
Literal translation
- ferae — wild, untamed; the genitive of the adjective ferus, agreeing with naturae
- naturae — of nature, of disposition; the genitive of natura
Put together: “of a wild nature.” The full expression is “animals of a wild nature,” and lawyers usually leave out the word for animals.
What it means in law
The law has long sorted animals by their nature. Some are tame or domestic, and they are generally owned like other goods. Others are wild by nature: ferae naturae. The second group raised a question that ownership of land and goods did not. Who owns a deer in the woods or a bird in the air?
Roman law answered that a wild animal belonged to no one, and so became the property of the first person to take it. The Supreme Court quoted that rule from the Digest, Justinian’s collection of Roman legal writings, in Geer v. Connecticut (1896). English common law, as Blackstone described it in the passages the Court also quoted, gave the captor only a qualified property. A person could own a wild animal while he held it, and someone with the privilege of hunting in a given place had a passing property in the game there while it stayed. Once the animal escaped, or left that place, the ownership ended.
Geer also traced a second idea through Athens, Rome, France and England: the right to take wild animals had always been subject to the control of the lawgiver. In America that power passed to the States. The Court described the State’s control as held in common for its people and exercised as a trust for their benefit, and it upheld a Connecticut law that made it a crime to possess game birds, lawfully killed in the State, for the purpose of shipping them out of the State.
That last holding did not last. In Hughes v. Oklahoma (1979), the Court struck down an Oklahoma law that barred shipping natural minnows out of the State for sale, and it expressly overruled Geer. The Court called state ownership of wild animals a 19th-century legal fiction. Challenges under the Commerce Clause to state laws on wild animals, it held, are judged by the same general rule as state laws on other natural resources. The Court also said that the overruling of Geer does not leave the States powerless to protect and conserve wild animal life within their borders. Their interest in conservation remains legitimate, but a law that discriminates against interstate commerce on its face invites, at a minimum, the strictest scrutiny. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting with Chief Justice Burger, still used the Latin phrase; the Court’s opinion spoke of wild animals.
A note on spelling. Older reports print the phrase in italics with joined letters, as feræ naturæ. The official scan of Geer that this page relies on reads those joined letters wrongly in every sentence that contains the phrase, so the passages quoted below are ones that explain the idea in English. We do not correct the scanned text.
Etymology
Ferae is a form of fĕrus, “wild, untamed”. The entry marks its opposite (opp. cicur) as cicur, the Latin word for tame, and quotes Cicero marvelling at quae vero et quam varia genera bestiarum vel cicurum vel ferarum! (Cic. N. D. 2, 39, 99), which we would translate: how many and how varied are the kinds of beasts, tame or wild! Used as a noun, the feminine fĕra, with the word for beast understood (sc. bestia), means “a wild animal, wild beast”.
Natura begins as “birth” and comes to mean “The nature, i. e. the natural constitution, property, or quality of a thing”. In ferae naturae both words are in the genitive, describing the animals by the quality they share: they are animals of a wild nature. That reading of the grammar is ours; Lewis & Short does not record the legal phrase.
Source: Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879), entries fĕrus, nātūra, via the Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University). Glosses in quotation marks are quoted from it.
In the opinions
Three passages from Geer v. Connecticut (1896), two of them the Court quoting older authorities, and the passage from Hughes v. Oklahoma (1979) that overruled Geer. Each is quoted from the official United States Reports. None of the Geer passages uses the Latin, for the reason given above, and the Hughes majority speaks only of wild animals; each passage explains what the phrase describes.
Thus, all the animals which can be taken upon the earth, in the sea, or in the air, that is to say, wild animals, belong to those who take them.
The Court quoted this rule, in English, from Justinian’s Digest, after noting that Roman law classed wild animals among things common to all because they had no owner.
Here he has a transient property in these animals usually called game so long as they continue within his liberty, and may restrain any stranger from taking them therein ; but the instant they depart into another liberty, this qualified property ceases.
These are Blackstone’s words from his Commentaries, which the Court quoted. “He” is a person with the privilege of hunting, taking and killing wild animals in a given place to the exclusion of others; his “liberty” is the place where that privilege runs. The space before the semicolon is in the official report.
Whilst the fundamental principles upon which the common property in game rests have undergone no change, the development of free institutions has led to the recognition of the fact that the power or control lodged in the State, resulting from this common ownership, is to be exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not as a prerogative for the advantage of the government, as distinct from the people, or for the benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public good.
After tracing government control of hunting from ancient times to the American colonies and States, the Court described how a free government holds that power.
We now conclude that challenges under the Commerce Clause to state regulations of wild animals should be considered according to the same general rule applied to state regulations of other natural resources, and therefore expressly overrule Geer.
Oklahoma had relied on Geer to defend its ban on taking natural minnows out of the State for sale. The Court rejected the old approach.
Where it appears in the rules
No rule on this site uses “ferae naturae” in its official text.
Hunting, fishing and the keeping of wild animals are governed by statutes and agency regulations, not by the rules of court collected on this site.
Frequently asked questions
Who owns a wild animal?
Under the old common-law rule, no one, until someone captures it. Roman law gave the animal to the first person to take it, and the common law, as Blackstone described it, gave the captor a qualified property that lasted only while the animal was held. In Geer v. Connecticut (1896) the Supreme Court described the States as holding wild game in common for their people. In Hughes v. Oklahoma (1979) it called that idea of state ownership a legal fiction, while recognizing the States’ real interest in conserving wildlife.
Does a hunter own the animal he catches?
Under the common-law rule, yes, but only in a limited way. Blackstone, quoted in Geer, wrote that wild animals belong to the first person who takes them only while he holds possession of them, and that a person with the privilege of hunting in a place has only a passing property in the game there, which ends the moment the animals leave. Today, hunting and fishing laws also decide who may take an animal at all, and when.
Can a State stop wild game from leaving the State?
Generally not by a law that discriminates against interstate commerce on its face; such a law faces, at a minimum, the strictest scrutiny. Geer upheld a Connecticut ban on shipping game birds out of the State, but Hughes overruled Geer in 1979 and struck down Oklahoma’s ban on exporting natural minnows for sale. The Court said States may still protect and conserve wildlife, by means consistent with the Commerce Clause.
Why is the phrase sometimes spelled feræ naturæ?
Older printers joined the letters a and e into a single character in Latin words, so reports such as Geer print the phrase with joined letters. Both spellings name the same phrase.
What is the opposite of ferae naturae?
Tame or domestic animals, which the law generally treats as their owner’s property like other goods. The classical Latin word for tame was cicur, the word Lewis & Short sets against ferus.