Ex Vi Termini
ex vī termĭnī
Legal Latin Dictionary · Last verified November 16, 2026
Pronunciation
There is no single official pronunciation of legal Latin. What follows is how American lawyers usually say the phrase, and how a Roman would have said it.
- Common US legal pronunciation: eks vee TER-mih-nye, IPA /ɛks viː ˈtɜːrmɪnaɪ/. Some lawyers say vye for the middle word, /vaɪ/, or end the last word -nee, /niː/; all are heard.
- Classical Latin (restored): eks wee TEHR-mih-nee, IPA [ɛks wiː ˈtɛrmɪniː]. Latin v was said like English w, the ī of vī is long, and the stress of termĭnī falls on its first syllable because the middle ĭ is short.
Literal translation
- ex — from, out of; also “according to”
- vi — by the force, the power (the form of vīs, “force,” used after ex)
- termini — of the term (the possessive form of terminus, a boundary or limit, and in later usage a word or term)
Put together: “from the force of the term,” or more naturally, “by the very meaning of the word.”
What it means in law
Some words carry more than they say. A grant of power to “discount” a note carries the power to take interest in advance, because that is what discounting is. An obligation under a contract is a debt, because that is what a debt is. When a court reaches a conclusion of that kind, it may say the conclusion follows ex vi termini: from the force of the term itself, without any further words in the statute or contract and without any proof outside it.
The phrase is not a rule or a test. It is a way of saying where a conclusion comes from. A court that uses it is telling the reader that the result rests on the ordinary meaning of a word, not on legislative history, custom or a policy choice. That makes it a tool of interpretation, used in reading statutes, charters and contracts.
Two Supreme Court cases show two ways it is used. In Evans v. National Bank of Savannah (1919), Georgia’s Supreme Court had held that a state bank that took the highest lawful interest rate in advance committed usury. A national bank had done just that when it discounted short-term notes. The Supreme Court held that federal law, not Georgia’s rule on advance interest, decided what counted as usury; Georgia law supplied only the maximum rate. The National Bank Act let national banks discount notes, and to discount, the Court said, means by definition to reserve the interest in advance. So the bank could take the highest rate Georgia allowed, in advance, without usury. Three Justices dissented only as to the transactions made after that Georgia decision.
The second use works with the rule against surplus words. In Richardson v. Harmon (1911), an 1884 statute limited a shipowner’s individual liability to his share of “any or all debts and liabilities.” A barge had struck a railway bridge, and the bridge owner argued that the statute reached only obligations arising from contracts. The Court answered that a contract liability is already a debt by the force of the word, so the added words “and liabilities” would repeat themselves unless they reached something more. It read them to cover claims that admiralty did not reach on its own, such as damage the barge did to a structure on land, and held that the owners could limit their liability for it.
The phrase also marks a limit. If a conclusion truly follows from the meaning of a word, a court need not look further. If it does not, the phrase cannot do the work, and the court must find the answer in the rest of the text, its context or other sources. The same point can be made in English, by saying that a word includes something “by definition.”
Ex vi termini is easily confused with ipso facto, “by the fact itself.” Ipso facto describes a consequence that follows automatically from an event; ex vi termini describes a meaning that follows from a word.
Etymology
The phrase is three ordinary Latin words. Ex is the preposition Lewis & Short gloss “out of, from”; the dictionary also gives it a sense used to state a measure or rule, “according to, after, in conformity with which any thing is done”, which fits a phrase about what follows from a word.
Vī is the form of vīs that follows ex. The dictionary’s first gloss is “strength, physical or mental; force, vigor, power, energy, virtue”. More to the point, it records a transferred sense for abstract things, “force, notion, meaning, sense, import, nature, essence”, and quotes Cicero’s vis verbi, the force or sense of a word.
Terminī is the possessive form of termĭnus, which Lewis & Short gloss first as “a boundary-line, boundary, bound, limit” and then, in a transferred sense, as “a bound, limit, end, term”. Neither gloss covers the later sense of terminus as a word or term of speech, which is the sense the legal phrase uses. Our reading is that a word was thought of as marking the bounds of a meaning, but that link is ours, not the dictionary’s.
Source: Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879), entries ex, vīs, termĭnus, via the Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University). Glosses in quotation marks are quoted from it.
In the opinions
Three Supreme Court passages: two that use the phrase to explain a result, and one in which the Court, quoting an earlier opinion, says the same thing in English. Each is quoted from the official United States Reports.
Associations organized under the National Bank Act are plainly empowered to discount promissory notes in the ordinary course of business. To discount, ex vi termini, implies reservation of interest in advance; and, under the ancient and commonly accepted doctrine, when dealing with short-time paper such a reservation at the highest interest rate allowed by law is not usurious.
Closing the Court’s opinion, Justice McReynolds explained why a national bank that took interest in advance at Georgia’s top rate did not commit usury. The dissent begins later on the same printed page; these words come before it.
True, a liability may arise out of a contract as well as from a tort. But a liability ex contractu is included ex vi termini, and the addition of the words “and liabilities” would be tautology unless meant to embrace liabilities not arising from “debts.”
The Court explained why a statute limiting a shipowner’s liability for “any or all debts and liabilities” reached more than contract claims.
It has always been supposed, that an authority to discount, or make discounts, did, from the very force of the terms, necessarily include an authority to take the interest in advance.
These are not the Court’s own words: the Court was quoting Justice Story’s opinion in Fleckner v. United States Bank, 8 Wheat. 338, whose “from the very force of the terms” is the English of ex vi termini.
Where it appears in the rules
No rule on this site uses “ex vi termini” in its official text.
Rules of procedure state what they mean directly, so the phrase has little work to do in them. Courts meet it when they read statutes, charters and contracts.
Frequently asked questions
What does ex vi termini mean in plain English?
It means “by the force of the term,” or “by definition.” A court uses it to say that a conclusion follows from the meaning of a word itself, so the statute or contract did not need to spell it out.
Is ex vi termini a rule of statutory interpretation?
Not by itself. It does not tell a court how to choose between two readings; it names one kind of reason for a result, the ordinary meaning of a word. It often works alongside other rules, such as the presumption that every word in a statute adds something. In Richardson v. Harmon (1911) the Court used both: debts already include contract liabilities by the force of the word, so the added word “liabilities” had to reach further.
How is ex vi termini different from ipso facto?
Ipso facto means “by the fact itself” and describes a consequence that follows automatically from something that happened, such as a right ending when a condition occurs. Ex vi termini describes what follows from the meaning of a word. One is about events, the other about language.
Is the phrase still common?
Less so than the idea behind it. The Supreme Court passages on this page date from the early twentieth century, and the same idea is easy to put in English: a word includes something “by definition.” Whatever the wording, the idea is a familiar part of reading statutes and contracts. In Evans itself the Court quoted an 1823 opinion that said it in English, “from the very force of the terms.”