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Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius

expressĭo ūnīus est exclūsĭo altĕrīus · also written expressio unius; expressio unius exclusio alterius

Legal Latin Dictionary · Last verified November 13, 2026

Quick answerExpressio unius est exclusio alterius is a rule of interpretation meaning “the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another”: when a law lists some things of a kind, a court may infer that things of the same kind left off the list were left off on purpose.

Pronunciation

There is no single official pronunciation of legal Latin, and lawyers usually shorten this maxim to its first two words. What follows is the common American pronunciation and the restored Roman one.

  • Common US legal pronunciation: ek-SPRESH-ee-oh yoo-NY-us est ek-SKLOO-zhee-oh al-TEER-ee-us, IPA /ɛkˈsprɛʃioʊ juˈnaɪəs ɛst ɛkˈskluːʒioʊ ælˈtɪəriəs/. Many lawyers say YOO-nee-us, /ˈjuːniəs/, for the second word; both are heard.
  • Classical Latin (restored): eks-PRES-see-oh oo-NEE-oos est eks-KLOO-see-oh al-teh-REE-oos, IPA [ɛksˈprɛssɪoː uːˈniːʊs ɛst ɛksˈkluːsɪoː altɛˈriːʊs]. Roman poets sometimes shortened the i of unius and alterius, which moves the stress back a syllable.

Literal translation

  • expressio — a pressing out; here, an expressing or mentioning
  • unius — of one; a form of unus, “one”
  • est — is; a form of the verb sum, “to be”
  • exclusio — a shutting out, an exclusion
  • alterius — of the other; a form of alter, “the other”

Put together: “the expression of one is the exclusion of the other.”

What it means in law

When a law lists things, the list can be read in two ways. It may be a set of examples, with others left to the reader. Or it may be complete, so that anything missing was meant to be left out. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, usually shortened to expressio unius, is the canon that points toward the second reading. If a statute lets a court excuse a late filing for illness or a death in the family, the canon suggests that other excuses, however sympathetic, were not meant to count.

The Supreme Court uses the canon, but with care. It applies only when the items named form an “associated group or series,” so that leaving something out looks like a deliberate choice rather than an oversight. In Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co. (2003), the Court said it will not read the naming of one case to exclude another unless it is fair to suppose that Congress thought about the unnamed possibility and meant to say no to it. A case the drafters never thought of is not the same as a case they excluded.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal (2002) shows the canon failing. The Americans with Disabilities Act says that an employer’s job qualifications “may include” a requirement that a worker not pose a direct threat to others. A job applicant argued that by naming threats to others, Congress meant to exclude any defense based on a threat to the worker’s own health. The unanimous Court disagreed. The “may include” wording offered an example, not a closed list, and there was no established series linking threats to others with threats to oneself from which the omission could signal a choice. The Court upheld a federal regulation that allows employers to consider the threat to the worker.

The canon also reaches the rules of procedure. In Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit (1993), a lower court had required plaintiffs suing a local government under the federal civil-rights statute to plead their claims with extra detail. The Supreme Court noted that the Federal Rules demand particularity only for the matters Rule 9(b) lists, fraud and mistake, and that civil-rights claims against municipalities are not among them. A different rule, it said, would have to come from amending the Rules, not from judicial interpretation. Sometimes the Court reaches the same result without the canon: in Crosby v. United States (1993), it held that the criminal rule’s words “except as otherwise provided” made its list of exceptions exclusive on their own.

The canon is often paired with ejusdem generis, but the two work differently. Ejusdem generis narrows general words at the end of a list to things like the items listed. Expressio unius draws an inference from what a list leaves out. Courts use both for statutes and rules, and also, as one aid among others, for contracts and other documents.

Etymology

Lewis & Short marks expressio as post-Augustan, that is, found only in writers later than the age of Augustus, and gives it the first meaning “a pressing or squeezing out.” Its only sense tied to language is “vividness”, not “mention”; the legal sense of expressing or naming one item is a later development, and that observation is ours. Unus means “one, a single”. Est is a form of sum, “to be, exist, live”. Exclusio is “a shutting out, exclusion”, a word the dictionary calls very rare; one of its examples is a lawyer’s line from Justinian’s Digest (Dig. 44, 1, 2), exceptio est quasi quaedam exclusio, which in our translation says that a legal exception is a kind of shutting out. Alter means “the other of two, one of two, the other”. The dictionary does not record the maxim; it was put together later from these classical words.

Source: Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879), entries expressĭo, ūnus, sum, exclūsĭo, alter, via the Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University). Glosses in quotation marks are quoted from it.

In the opinions

Three Supreme Court passages: two that explain when the canon applies, and one that applies it to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Each is quoted from the official United States Reports; a spaced ellipsis marks where a citation has been left out.

We do not read the enumeration of one case to exclude another unless it is fair to suppose that Congress considered the unnamed possibility and meant to say no to it. . . . As we have held repeatedly, the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply to every statutory listing or grouping; it has force only when the items expressed are members of an “associated group or series,” justifying the inference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.

Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) · Supreme Court of the United States · opinion of Justice Souter

Coal companies argued that because a federal benefits statute let the Social Security Commissioner correct mistaken assignments of retired miners, it implicitly barred her from making late first assignments. The inner quotation, “associated group or series,” is from United States v. Vonn (2002).

Just as statutory language suggesting exclusiveness is missing, so is that essential extrastatutory ingredient of an expression-exclusion demonstration, the series of terms from which an omission bespeaks a negative implication. The canon depends on identifying a series of two or more terms or things that should be understood to go hand in hand, which is abridged in circumstances supporting a sensible inference that the term left out must have been meant to be excluded.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 81 (2002) · Supreme Court of the United States · opinion of Justice Souter

Having found that the statute’s “may include” wording did not suggest a closed list, the Court gave its second reason for rejecting the canon’s inference.

Thus, the Federal Rules do address in Rule 9(b) the question of the need for greater particularity in pleading certain actions, but do not include among the enumerated actions any reference to complaints alleging municipal liability under § 1983. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) · Supreme Court of the United States · opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist

The Court had just quoted Rule 9(b), which then required that “the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake” be stated with particularity, and it drew the inference from what the rule left out.

Where it appears in the rules

No rule on this site uses “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” in its official text.

That is to be expected: the canon is a tool for reading rules, not a term they use. Leatherman applied it to the list in what is now Federal Rule 9(b), which still provides that “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake”.

Notable remarks

Two comments from the Supreme Court on the canon’s limits.

The rule is fine when it applies, but this case joins some others in showing when it does not.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80 (2002) · Supreme Court of the United States · opinion of Justice Souter

Introducing the job applicant’s argument, the Court described the canon and then, in one dry sentence, its limits.

Accordingly, the Government contends, Crosby’s position rests not on the express provisions of Rule 43, but solely on the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. . . . We disagree. It is not necessary to invoke that maxim in order to conclude that Rule 43 does not allow full trials in absentia.

Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 258 (1993) · Supreme Court of the United States · opinion of Justice Blackmun

The government argued that the defendant’s reading of the criminal rule on a defendant’s presence at trial rested only on the maxim; the Court said the rule’s own words were enough. The omitted words cite the government’s brief.

Frequently asked questions

What does expressio unius mean in plain English?

“Naming one thing leaves out the others.” When a law lists certain things, a court may conclude that similar things not on the list were meant to be excluded. A law that lets a court extend a deadline “for illness or military service” would, read this way, give no extension for other reasons, however good.

When does the canon apply?

Only when the circumstances support the inference. The Supreme Court asks whether the items listed form an associated group or series, so that the missing item would naturally have been considered along with them, and whether it is fair to suppose the drafters thought about the unnamed case and meant to exclude it. If the list is offered as examples, such as one introduced by “including” or “may include,” the inference usually fails.

What is the difference between expressio unius and ejusdem generis?

Both read lists. Ejusdem generis limits general words that follow a list, such as “and other vehicles,” to things like the items named. Expressio unius treats the items that are missing from a list as deliberately left out. One shrinks a catch-all; the other gives meaning to a silence.

Is expressio unius binding on courts?

No. It is a canon of construction, a guide to what the words probably mean, not a rule of law. Courts weigh it against the text as a whole, the statute’s purpose and other canons, and the Supreme Court has said it applies only in the right setting.

Has the Supreme Court applied it to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?

Yes. In Leatherman v. Tarrant County (1993), the Court reasoned that because Rule 9(b) requires particular pleading only for fraud and mistake, federal courts could not impose a heightened pleading standard on civil-rights claims against local governments. The Court’s later decisions on the general pleading standard of Rule 8 are a separate matter.

This page explains a legal term. It is legal information, not legal advice, and it cannot tell you how the law applies to your situation. Whether a court draws this inference from a particular list depends on the text, its context and the court’s other tools of interpretation. If the outcome matters, talk to a lawyer or your court’s self-help center.