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Cessante Ratione Legis, Cessat Ipsa Lex

cessante rătĭōne lēgis, cessat ipsa lēx · also written cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex

Legal Latin Dictionary · Last verified November 16, 2026

Quick answerCessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex is the common-law maxim that when the reason for a legal rule no longer exists, the rule itself no longer applies; courts invoke it mainly when deciding whether an old judge-made rule should still govern.

Pronunciation

There is no single official pronunciation of legal Latin. What follows is how American lawyers commonly say the phrase, and how a Roman would have said it.

  • Common US legal pronunciation: seh-SAN-tee ray-shee-OH-nee LEE-jis SESS-at IP-suh LEKS, IPA /sɛˈsænti ˌreɪʃiˈoʊni ˈliːdʒɪs ˈsɛsæt ˈɪpsə ˈlɛks/. Some lawyers say rah-tee-OH-nee for the second word.
  • Classical Latin (restored): kess-SAHN-teh rah-tih-OH-neh LAY-gis KESS-saht IP-sah LAYKS, IPA [kɛsˈsantɛ ratɪˈoːnɛ ˈleːɡɪs ˈkɛssat ˈɪpsa ˈleːks]. Latin c was always hard, like k, and the g of lēgis is hard as in get.

Literal translation

  • cessante — ceasing; the present participle of cesso, “to cease, stop”
  • ratione — the reason; the ablative of ratio
  • legis — of the law; the genitive of lex
  • cessat — ceases
  • ipsa — itself
  • lex — the law

The first three words form what grammarians call an ablative absolute, a phrase that sets the circumstances: “the reason of the law ceasing.” Put together, and in plainer English: “when the reason for a law ceases, the law itself ceases.” One form, used in a dissent quoted below, adds et, “also”: cessat et ipsa lex, “the law itself also ceases.”

What it means in law

Legal rules exist for reasons. The maxim says that a rule should not outlive its reason. If a rule was adopted to meet a particular problem, and the problem is gone, the rule should not go on being applied as if nothing had changed.

One English source often cited for it is Sir Edward Coke’s Institutes. In a 2001 dissent, Justice Scalia described the passage in which Coke used it and gave it in English: the reason of the law ceasing, the law itself ceases. Justice Scalia read Coke’s use narrowly. Coke, he wrote, was discussing an exemption from military service tied to land that abbots and mayors enjoyed; if they conveyed the land to an ordinary person, the new owner owed the service. On that reading the maxim describes a rule that stops applying because the facts no longer fit it, not a court’s power to change the rule.

Modern courts have often used the maxim more broadly, to explain why a common-law rule should be abandoned. The case in which Justice Scalia wrote, Rogers v. Tennessee, shows the idea at work even where the Latin is not used by the majority. The Tennessee Supreme Court had abolished the common-law year-and-a-day rule, which barred a murder conviction unless the victim died within a year and a day of the defendant’s act, after finding that the original reasons for the rule no longer existed. It then applied that decision to the defendant. The Supreme Court held that applying the change to him did not violate due process; Justice Scalia’s dissent, which discussed the maxim, argued that it did.

The maxim has an important limit, which Justice Stevens put plainly in a 1984 dissent: it applies to judge-made law, not to statutes and treaties. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., the Court held that the Warsaw Convention’s limit on an airline’s liability for lost cargo was still enforceable even though the United States had repealed the law that set an official price of gold, which had been used to convert the treaty’s gold-based limit into dollars. Justice Stevens, the only dissenter, argued that the Court had in effect rewritten the limit rather than enforcing it, but he agreed that courts must keep enforcing the treaty as written while the political branches adhere to it. As he put it, the maxim does not govern judges applying positive law, meaning statutes and treaties. When the reason behind a statute fades, the remedy is for the legislature to change it.

The maxim is sometimes confused with stare decisis, the duty to follow precedent. The two pull against each other: stare decisis favors keeping settled rules, while the maxim asks whether a rule’s reason survives. Courts weigh both when deciding whether to overrule an old decision.

Etymology

Each word of the maxim is ordinary Latin. Cesso, the verb behind cessante and cessat, is glossed in Lewis & Short as “to cease from, stop, give over”, with a note that it implies blamable slackness, and the dictionary derives it from cedo ([1. cedo]). Ratio begins as “a reckoning, account, calculation, computation”, and among its later senses is “The reasonable cause of a thing, a ground, motive, reason”, which is the sense the maxim uses. Lex, whose genitive is lēgis, is in its general sense “a law, precept, regulation, principle, rule, mode, manner”. Ipsa is the feminine of ipse, “self”, agreeing with lex, which is feminine.

That last point explains a small oddity in the opinions. Justice Scalia’s dissent in Rogers prints the maxim as cessat ipse lex, with the masculine form; the usual form, and the one Justice Stevens’s dissent uses, is ipsa. The passages below quote each opinion exactly as printed.

Source: Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879), entries cesso, rătĭo, lex, ipse, via the Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University). Glosses in quotation marks are quoted from it.

In the opinions

Two Supreme Court passages on the maxim, both from dissents; no opinion of the Court reviewed for this page uses it. Each is quoted from the official United States Reports; a spaced ellipsis marks where a citation has been left out.

At the point at which it appears in the Institutes, Coke was discussing the exception granted abbots and mayors from the obligation of military service to the King which attached to land ownership. Such service would be impracticable for a man of the cloth or a mayor. But, said Coke, “if they convey over the lands to any naturall man and his heires,” the immunity “by the conveyance over ceaseth.” . . . In other words, the service which attached to the land would apply to any subsequent owner not cloaked in a similar immunity. It was in describing this change that Coke employed the Latin maxim cessante ratione legis, cessat ipse lex. It had to do, not with a changing of the common-law rule, but with a change of circumstances that rendered the common-law rule no longer applicable to the case.

Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 474 (2001) · Supreme Court of the United States · Justice Scalia, dissenting opinion

Arguing that judges had not traditionally claimed power to change the criminal common law, Justice Scalia, dissenting, explained where Coke used the maxim. The words inside the quotation marks are Coke’s, and ipse is printed as in the official report.

Nevertheless, though application of the Warsaw Convention’s liability limitation is anachronistic in today’s world of aviation, we are obliged to enforce it so long as the political branches of the Government adhere to the Convention. The maxim that cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex, applicable to the common law, does not govern the judiciary in cases involving application of positive law.

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 273 (1984) · Supreme Court of the United States · Justice Stevens, dissenting opinion

Dissenting alone, Justice Stevens argued that the Court had not enforced the Warsaw Convention’s liability limit but rewritten it; courts, he said, must enforce the treaty as written, however dated, so long as the political branches adhere to it.

Where it appears in the rules

No rule on this site uses “cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex” in its official text.

That is to be expected: the maxim is about how judges treat their own rules, not a rule of procedure.

Notable remarks

One Justice’s comment on why lawyers like the Latin form.

Take, for instance, Lord Coke’s statement in the Institutes that “the reason of the law ceasing, the law itself ceases.” This maxim is often cited by modern devotees of a turbulently changing common law—often in its Latin form (cessante ratione legis, cessat ipse lex) to create the impression of great venerability. In its original context, however, it had nothing to do with the power of common-law courts to change the law.

Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 474 (2001) · Supreme Court of the United States · Justice Scalia, dissenting opinion

In the same dissent, just before the passage above, Justice Scalia commented on how the maxim is used today. The English words in quotation marks are Coke’s.

Frequently asked questions

What does cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex mean?

It means “when the reason for a law ceases, the law itself ceases.” It expresses the idea that a legal rule should not keep being applied once the reason it was created no longer exists.

Where does the maxim come from?

One English source often cited for it is Sir Edward Coke’s Institutes, a classic treatise on English law. Justice Scalia, dissenting in Rogers v. Tennessee (2001), described the passage in which Coke used it, about a land-based duty of military service. The sources on this page do not say who first wrote the maxim down.

Can a court ignore a statute because its reason is outdated?

Generally no. The maxim is a tool of the common law, the law judges make. When a rule comes from a statute or a treaty, courts apply it until the legislature or the treaty-makers change it. Justice Stevens made that point in his dissent in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp. (1984), and the Court in that case also held that the treaty still bound American courts.

Does the maxim let judges change the common law?

That is debated. Many courts have relied on the idea when abandoning outdated common-law rules. Justice Scalia argued that in Coke’s original usage the maxim described a rule ceasing to fit changed facts, not a court’s power to rewrite the rule. Either way, courts that change the common law must still respect limits such as due process when they apply the change.

Is it ipse lex or ipsa lex?

The usual form is ipsa lex, because lex is feminine in Latin and ipsa is the feminine form. One Supreme Court dissent prints ipse lex; this page quotes it as printed.

This page explains a legal term. It is legal information, not legal advice, and it cannot tell you how the law applies to your situation. Whether a court may set aside or narrow an older rule because its reason has gone depends on whether the rule is judge-made or written in a statute or treaty, and on that court’s own law of precedent. If the outcome matters, talk to a lawyer or your court’s self-help center.