Stare Decisis
stāre dēcīsīs
Legal Latin Dictionary · Last verified November 12, 2026
Pronunciation
There is no single official pronunciation of legal Latin. What follows is how most American lawyers and judges say the phrase, and how a Roman would have said it.
- Common US legal pronunciation: STAR-ee dih-SY-sis, IPA /ˈstɑːri dɪˈsaɪsɪs/. Some lawyers say STAIR-ee, /ˈstɛəri/, for the first word, and a few say dih-SEE-sis, /dɪˈsiːsɪs/.
- Classical Latin (restored): STAH-reh day-KEE-sees, IPA [ˈstaːrɛ deːˈkiːsiːs]. The C was always hard, like a K, and the stress falls on the long ī of -cīs-.
Literal translation
- stare — to stand; here, to stand by or abide by (the infinitive of stō)
- decisis — things decided; a plural form of dēcīsus, the past participle of dēcīdō, a verb that meant to cut off and, by a figure, to decide
Put together: “to stand by things decided.”
What it means in law
Stare decisis is the reason the law holds still long enough to be learned. When a court decides a question of law, its answer becomes a precedent, and later courts facing the same question are expected to give the same answer. The point is not that the first court was surely right. It is that people can plan their lives, contracts and lawsuits around rules that do not change with each new judge.
The doctrine runs in two directions.
Vertical stare decisis is the duty of a lower court to follow the decisions of the courts above it. A federal district court follows its court of appeals and the Supreme Court; a state trial court follows its state’s higher courts on questions of state law. This duty is close to absolute. A lower court may say that a precedent is wrong, but it still applies it and leaves any change to the court that made it.
Horizontal stare decisis is a court’s respect for its own earlier decisions. At a court of last resort, such as the Supreme Court or a state supreme court, it is a strong presumption rather than a command. The Supreme Court calls it a principle of policy and has overruled its own cases many times, but it asks for more than a belief that the earlier case was wrongly decided. The things it weighs include whether the old rule has proved unworkable, whether it was badly reasoned, whether later decisions have worn away its foundations, and how much people have relied on it. Reliance counts most in property and contract law and least for rules of procedure and evidence. Many intermediate appellate courts are stricter with themselves: in the federal courts of appeals, one three-judge panel is generally bound by an earlier panel’s decision until the full court or the Supreme Court changes it.
The kind of law matters too. When the Supreme Court has interpreted a statute, Congress can change the result by amending it, so the Court is especially slow to overrule itself. When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, correction by legislation is practically impossible, and the Court has said the doctrine applies with less force.
Only the part of an opinion needed to decide the case binds later courts. That part is the holding, sometimes called the ratio decidendi. Side remarks, called obiter dicta, may persuade but do not bind, though lower courts give the Supreme Court’s considered dicta great weight. Decisions from other states, and from courts that do not review the deciding court, are generally persuasive only, with one big exception: on questions of state law, federal courts follow the state’s highest court.
Stare decisis is often confused with res judicata. Res judicata binds the parties to a particular judgment, right or wrong, and stops them from suing again over what it settled. Stare decisis binds no one to a judgment. It shapes how courts decide the next case on the same legal question, between anyone at all, and it can give way.
Etymology
Stāre is the infinitive of stō, which Lewis & Short gloss first as “to stand”. Among its extended senses is “to stand firm, persist, persevere; to rest, abide, adhere to, continue” in a thing, and the dictionary’s examples of that sense come close to the legal phrase. It cites Cicero (id. Fin. 1, 14, 47) for stare oportet in eo, quod sit judicatum, which we translate as “one must abide by what has been judged,” and it lists the Digest’s rei judicatae (ib. 42, 1, 32) among the things one may be said to stand by: a matter already adjudged. The dictionary files that use under the heading With dat., and dēcīsīs in the maxim is itself a dative plural; that grammatical reading is ours.
Dēcīsīs comes from dēcīdō, whose literal sense is “to cut off”. Used figuratively, the dictionary says, it means “to decide” a disputed matter, as if to cut the knot, and also “to determine, settle, terminate, put an end to”. A decision, on this picture, is a cut that ends an argument; that image is the dictionary’s, and the reading of the whole phrase as “stand by what has been cut short and settled” is ours.
Source: Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879), entries sto, dē-cīdo, via the Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University). Glosses in quotation marks are quoted from it.
In the opinions
Four passages from the Supreme Court, newest first, that explain why courts follow precedent and when they will not. Each is quoted from the official United States Reports; a spaced ellipsis marks where a citation has been left out.
What is more, stare decisis carries enhanced force when a decision, like Brulotte, interprets a statute. Then, unlike in a constitutional case, critics of our ruling can take their objections across the street, and Congress can correct any mistake it sees.
Writing for the Court in a dispute over royalties on a Spider-Man toy, Justice Kagan explained why the Court is slow to overrule its readings of statutes, such as the patent-royalty precedent it was being asked to discard.
Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. . . . Adhering to precedent “is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right.” . . . Nevertheless, when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, “this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.”
Asked to stand by two recent decisions barring victim-impact evidence at capital sentencing, the Court first set out why precedent usually controls, quoting Justice Brandeis’s 1932 dissent in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co. and a 1944 decision of its own; it then overruled both decisions in large part. (Its footnote 2 left standing a separate holding of one of them, on family members’ opinions about the crime, the defendant and the sentence.) Payne’s copy of the Brandeis sentence leaves out one word that his dissent, shown below, includes; each passage is given exactly as printed.
Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it “is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.” . . . This is particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such cases “correction through legislative action is practically impossible.” . . . Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved, . . . the opposite is true in cases such as the present one involving procedural and evidentiary rules.
On the next page the Court explained that the doctrine’s force varies with the kind of case. It quoted an earlier decision of its own (from 1940) for the first quoted phrase and Justice Brandeis’s Burnet dissent for the second.
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.
Dissenting from a decision that kept a tax-immunity precedent alive, Justice Brandeis explained why courts usually leave settled rules alone even when they doubt them.
Where it appears in the rules
No rule on this site uses “stare decisis” in its official text.
That is expected: stare decisis is a doctrine about how courts treat their own decisions, and it lives in opinions rather than in rules of procedure. Rules do touch on precedent indirectly. Wisconsin’s rule on publishing appellate opinions, Wis. Stat. § 809.23, for example, tells the court of appeals not to publish an opinion when “The issues are decided on the basis of controlling precedent and no reason appears for questioning or qualifying the precedent”.
Notable remarks
Stare decisis is not, like the rule of res judicata, a universal, inexorable command.
One page earlier, Justice Brandeis set the two Latin doctrines side by side.
Overruling precedent is never a small matter. Stare decisis—in English, the idea that today’s Court should stand by yesterday’s decisions—is “a foundation stone of the rule of law.”
The Court put the phrase into English in its own words, then called the doctrine “a foundation stone of the rule of law,” quoting one of its own decisions from 2014.
Frequently asked questions
What is the difference between stare decisis and res judicata?
Res judicata is about a judgment: it stops the same parties from relitigating a claim or issue that a court has already decided between them, even if the decision was wrong. Stare decisis is about a rule of law: it guides how courts decide later cases that raise the same legal question, whoever the parties are. Res judicata is close to absolute; stare decisis is a strong presumption that a court of last resort can, for good reason, set aside.
Can the Supreme Court overrule its own precedent?
Yes. Stare decisis is a principle of policy, not an absolute rule, and the Supreme Court has overruled its own decisions many times. It looks for a reason beyond disagreement, such as a rule that has proved unworkable or rested on reasoning that later cases undercut. In Payne v. Tennessee (1991), quoted above, the Court overruled, in large part, two of its decisions from the previous four years.
Does a lower court have to follow a precedent it thinks is wrong?
Generally, yes. Under vertical stare decisis a lower court must apply the precedents of the courts above it, even when it disagrees. It may explain its disagreement in its opinion, and the losing party can ask the higher court to reconsider, but only the higher court can overrule its own precedent.
Do state courts have to follow federal court decisions?
On questions of federal law, state courts must follow the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Decisions of the lower federal courts generally do not bind state courts, though many state courts give them weight. On questions of state law, it runs the other way: a state’s highest court has the final word, and federal courts deciding state-law issues follow it.
Are unpublished opinions precedent?
Usually not. Many appellate courts, including the federal courts of appeals, issue some decisions as unpublished or nonprecedential, which means they do not bind later panels. Whether and how such opinions may be cited varies from court to court, so the local rules matter.
Does stare decisis apply to everything a court says in an opinion?
No. Only the holding, the reasoning needed to decide the case, binds later courts. Comments that were not needed for the decision, known as dicta, can be persuasive but are not binding.