Jus Tertii
jūs tertĭī · also written ius tertii
Legal Latin Dictionary · Last verified November 13, 2026
Pronunciation
There is no single official pronunciation of legal Latin. What follows is how most American lawyers say the phrase, and how a Roman would have said it.
- Common US legal pronunciation: JUSS TER-shee-eye, IPA /ˈdʒʌs ˈtɝʃiaɪ/. Some say the second word TER-shee-ee, /ˈtɝʃii/, or TER-tee-eye, /ˈtɝtiaɪ/.
- Classical Latin (restored): YOOS TER-tee-ee, IPA [juːs ˈtɛrtɪiː]. Latin had no English J sound, and the t of tertii stayed hard.
Literal translation
- jus — a right, the law
- tertii — of a third; the genitive of tertius, “third,” here meaning a third person
Put together: “the right of a third person,” that is, a right that belongs to someone who is not a party to the lawsuit.
What it means in law
Most lawsuits turn on the plaintiff’s own rights. Jus tertii names the exception: a litigant who asks a court to rule in his favor because a law or an act violates someone else’s rights. Courts today usually call the question third-party standing.
The starting rule is restrictive. A party generally must assert his own legal rights and cannot rest his claim on the rights of others. The idea is that the person who holds a right is usually the best one to decide whether to press it, and the best one to argue it.
The rule is not absolute, and Craig v. Boren (1976) is the leading example of an exception. Oklahoma barred the sale of 3.2% beer to men under 21 but to women only under 18. A licensed vendor challenged the law on behalf of the young men she could not sell to. The Supreme Court let her do it. The law’s duties fell directly on her, so she had her own injury, and vendors in her position had long been allowed to speak for the customers a law kept from them. The Court also said the limit on asserting others’ rights comes from judicial self-restraint, not from the Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement, which is why it could relax it. The Court has since questioned how these limits should be classified, so that 1976 label may not be the last word.
The modern test comes from Kowalski v. Tesmer (2004), which uses the English name rather than the Latin. Beyond showing an injury of his own, a party seeking third-party standing must show a close relationship with the person who holds the right and some hindrance to that person’s ability to protect his own interests. Kowalski applied the test against two Michigan lawyers who challenged a limit on appointed appellate counsel for indigent defendants. They had no existing clients affected, only hypothetical future ones, and the defendants themselves could raise the issue in the state courts. The Court also noted that it has been more forgiving of these criteria in some settings, such as First Amendment cases and cases in which enforcing a law against the litigant would indirectly violate a third party’s rights.
Jus tertii is easy to confuse with two other ideas. First Amendment overbreadth, discussed in Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co. (1984), lets a litigant attack a law that chills other people’s speech without the usual showing that those people cannot sue for themselves. And a lawsuit brought in a representative capacity, such as one by a trustee or a guardian, is a suit on the represented person’s own claim, not an attempt to borrow someone else’s rights.
Etymology
Jūs is the Latin word for law and right. Lewis & Short give its general sense as “right, law, justice”, and its sense as a personal entitlement as “Legal right, power, authority, permission”. It is that second, personal sense that the phrase uses: a right that someone holds.
Tertii is the genitive of the ordinal tertĭus, glossed “the third”, which the dictionary connects with ter, three times ([ter]). The dictionary does not record the legal phrase; reading the genitive as “of a third person,” a stranger to the dispute, is ours.
Source: Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879), entries jūs, tertĭus, via the Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University). Glosses in quotation marks are quoted from it.
In the opinions
Three passages from Craig v. Boren (1976), the Supreme Court’s leading opinion that uses the Latin name, and one from Munson (1984), all quoted from the official United States Reports. The Court’s modern statement of the test, in Kowalski v. Tesmer (2004), does not use the Latin and is described above instead. The Munson sentence that follows the one quoted is left out, because the official text layer runs two of its words together.
our decisions have settled that limitations on a litigant’s assertion of jus tertii are not constitutionally mandated, but rather stem from a salutary “rule of self-restraint”
Oklahoma had never objected in the lower court to the vendor’s reliance on her customers’ rights. The Court explained why that mattered; the sentence goes on to say the restraint is meant to keep courts out of vague and speculative constitutional questions.
Accordingly, vendors and those in like positions have been uniformly permitted to resist efforts at restricting their operations by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or function.
Having found that the beer law injured the vendor herself, the Court explained why she could also speak for the young men it kept from buying.
In both Eisenstadt and here, the challenged statutes compel jus tertii claimants either to cease their proscribed activities or to suffer appropriate sanctions.
In a footnote the Court said it made no difference that Baird, in Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), had broken the law and been convicted, while the vendor here sued in advance.
Where practical obstacles prevent a party from asserting rights on behalf of itself, for example, the Court has recognized the doctrine of jus tertii standing.
Maryland’s Secretary of State argued that Munson, a professional fundraiser rather than a charity, should not be heard to say that the state’s limit on charities’ fundraising costs violated the First Amendment. The Court noted that the usual limit on raising others’ rights is sometimes relaxed, and gave an example.
Where it appears in the rules
No rule on this site uses “jus tertii” in its official text.
That is expected, because third-party standing is a doctrine of constitutional litigation, not a rule of procedure. The nearest procedural rule addresses a different question, who must bring the suit: Federal Rule 17(a) provides that “An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest”, meaning the person who holds the right being enforced.
Frequently asked questions
What does jus tertii mean?
“The right of a third party.” In law it describes a litigant’s attempt to win by relying on a right that belongs to someone else, such as a seller arguing that a law violates its customers’ rights.
Is jus tertii the same as third-party standing?
Yes, in practice. Jus tertii is the older Latin name; modern opinions, including the Supreme Court’s in Kowalski v. Tesmer (2004), usually say third-party standing.
When can a party rely on someone else’s rights?
Only in limited circumstances. In federal court the party must first have an injury of its own. Under Kowalski, it must then generally show a close relationship with the person whose rights it asserts and some hindrance to that person’s ability to protect them. The Supreme Court has applied these limits more loosely in some settings, including First Amendment cases and cases where a law is enforced directly against the litigant, as with the beer vendor in Craig v. Boren (1976).
Can a lawyer raise the rights of a client?
Sometimes. In Kowalski the Supreme Court said it had recognized an attorney-client relationship as close enough in two earlier cases involving existing clients. It refused standing to lawyers who relied on hypothetical future clients, with whom they had no relationship at all.
How is jus tertii different from overbreadth?
Overbreadth is a First Amendment doctrine. It lets a litigant challenge a law that may chill other people’s protected speech, and in Munson (1984) the Supreme Court allowed that without regard to whether those people could sue on their own. Ordinary third-party standing requires more, including a hindrance that keeps the right-holder out of court.