Hostis Humani Generis
hostis hūmānī gĕnĕris · also written enemy of all mankind; enemy of mankind
Legal Latin Dictionary · Last verified November 14, 2026
Pronunciation
There is no single official pronunciation of legal Latin. What follows is how most American lawyers and judges say the phrase, and how a Roman would have said it.
- Common US legal pronunciation: HOSS-tis hyoo-MAN-eye JEN-er-iss, IPA /ˈhɑstɪs hjuˈmænaɪ ˈdʒɛnərɪs/. Many say hyoo-MAY-nye, /hjuˈmeɪnaɪ/, and some use a more Latin-sounding hoo-MAH-nee, /huˈmɑni/.
- Classical Latin (restored): HOSS-tis hoo-MAH-nee GEH-neh-riss, IPA [ˈhɔstɪs huːˈmaːniː ˈɡɛnɛrɪs]. The g of generis was always hard, and both of its e vowels were short, as Lewis & Short marks them.
Literal translation
- hostis — enemy (in early Latin, a stranger or foreigner)
- humani — human; the genitive of humanus, agreeing with generis
- generis — of the race, of the kind; the genitive of genus, a word for birth, and so for a race or kind
Put together: “enemy of the human race,” or more loosely, “enemy of all mankind.”
What it means in law
The phrase began as a name for the pirate. Piracy happened on the high seas, outside any one nation’s territory, and it was treated as a crime against the law of nations, the body of rules that all nations shared. A pirate attacked everyone’s ships and everyone’s trade, so the law treated him as the enemy of every people at once.
That idea had practical effects. Any nation that caught a pirate could try him. In Gamble v. United States (2019), the Supreme Court explained why, in the early Republic, an acquittal for piracy in one nation’s court was said to bar a second prosecution anywhere else: piracy offended one law common to all nations, so a second trial would be for the same offense. That point helped the Court reject an argument against the rule, which Gamble reaffirmed, that a State and the federal government may each prosecute the same conduct under their own laws. In a footnote, quoted below, the Court quoted the eighteenth-century English jurist William Blackstone, who in turn relied on Sir Edward Coke, calling the pirate hostis humani generis.
In the Supreme Court’s modern cases the phrase appears mainly in suits under the Alien Tort Statute, a law first passed by the First Congress that lets federal courts hear civil suits by foreign nationals for torts committed in violation of the law of nations. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004), the Court held that the statute itself only grants jurisdiction and creates no new causes of action. It was passed on the understanding that the common law would supply a cause of action for a modest number of violations of international law, and federal courts may still recognize such claims within narrow limits. The Court found no basis to think that the First Congress had in mind any torts beyond those matching the three offenses against the law of nations that Blackstone named: violating safe conducts, infringing the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. Federal courts, it concluded, should not recognize claims for violations of any international norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than those historical models. The Court cited, as consistent with that limit, a 1980 federal appeals court decision that had called the torturer, for purposes of civil liability, an enemy of all mankind like the pirate and the slave trader. Alvarez-Machain’s own claim failed: the Court held that a single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by a prompt arraignment, did not violate a norm that definite.
The label does not by itself open American courts. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (2013), the Court held that the presumption against applying American law to conduct abroad governs claims under the Alien Tort Statute. Pirates, the Court said, were fair game wherever found because they generally operated outside any nation’s territory, and they may be a category of their own. Four Justices, concurring only in the judgment, would have taken a different approach, asking among other things whether an important American interest was at stake, including the interest in not becoming a safe harbor for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.
The phrase, in short, describes why some wrongs concern every nation. Who may be sued or prosecuted for them, and where, is decided by statutes and by the Court’s tests, not by the Latin.
Etymology
Hostis has an unexpected history. Lewis & Short’s first gloss is “a stranger, foreigner”, and only afterwards, by transfer, “an enemy”. The dictionary quotes Cicero on the change: Hostis enim apud majores nostros is dicebatur, quem nunc peregrinum dicimus (Cic. Off. 1, 12, 37). In our translation: among our ancestors, the man we now call a foreigner was called hostis. In its main classical sense the word means “An enemy in arms or of one’s country”, and the entry contrasts it with inimicus, a private enemy. A pirate was the first kind of enemy, not the second. The dictionary even records hostis “Of an adversary in a suit, in a parody of the law of the Twelve Tables”.
Humanus is “of or belonging to man, human”. Genus begins as “birth, descent, origin” and widens to a race or kind. Lewis & Short quotes Cicero’s ex infinita societate generis humani, where generis humani is rendered “of the human race” (Cic. Lael. 5, 20). The legal phrase puts the same two words in the other order. The dictionary does not record hostis humani generis itself; the literal translation above is ours.
Source: Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879), entries hostis, hūmānus, gĕnus, via the Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University). Glosses in quotation marks are quoted from it.
In the opinions
Three Supreme Court passages: a footnote in Gamble, which quotes the phrase from Blackstone; the Court’s opinion in Sosa, which quotes it from a lower court; and a concurrence in the judgment in Kiobel that puts the same idea in English. Each is quoted from the official United States Reports; a spaced ellipsis marks where a citation has been left out.
Piracy was understood as a violation of the law of nations, which was seen as common to all. That is why any successive prosecution for piracy, being under the same law, would have been for the same offense. . . . See also 4 Blackstone 71 (“[T]he crime of piracy, or robbery and depredation upon the high seas, is an offence against the universal law of society; a pirate being, according to Sir Edward Coke, hostis humani generis [enemies of mankind].
The footnote follows the Court’s discussion of an 1820 case in which the Court had said that an acquittal for piracy in any civilized nation would bar a second prosecution elsewhere. The words inside the quotation marks are Blackstone’s, from his Commentaries, which the Court is quoting; Blackstone credits the label to Sir Edward Coke, and the bracketed translation is the Court’s. The ellipsis omits a citation to an 1820 piracy case, and the quotation from Blackstone runs on past the point where this excerpt stops.
Whatever the ultimate criteria for accepting a cause of action subject to jurisdiction under § 1350, we are persuaded that federal courts should not recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted. . . . This limit upon judicial recognition is generally consistent with the reasoning of many of the courts and judges who faced the issue before it reached this Court. See Filartiga, supra, at 890 (“[F]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become— like the pirate and slave trader before him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind”)
In Part IV of the Court’s opinion, Justice Souter set the limit on claims federal courts may recognize under the Alien Tort Statute. The words in the inner quotation, including the Latin and its translation, are the Second Circuit’s in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (1980), which the Court is quoting; the ellipsis omits a citation to an 1820 piracy case.
Unlike the Court, I would not invoke the presumption against extraterritoriality. Rather, guided in part by principles and practices of foreign relations law, I would find jurisdiction under this statute where (1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.
Writing for four Justices who agreed with the result but not with the Court’s reasoning, Justice Breyer set out when he would allow suits under the Alien Tort Statute. His next words cite Sosa and repeat its quotation calling the torturer hostis humani generis.
Where it appears in the rules
No rule on this site uses “hostis humani generis” in its official text.
That is expected. The phrase belongs to international and criminal law, and the statute in whose cases the Supreme Court has used it in modern times, the Alien Tort Statute, is a jurisdictional statute rather than a rule of civil procedure.
Frequently asked questions
Who counts as hostis humani generis?
Historically, the pirate. The 1980 appeals court line the Supreme Court cited in Sosa placed the torturer beside the pirate and the slave trader, and in Kiobel (2013) four Justices, concurring only in the judgment, counted perpetrators of genocide among today’s pirates. There is no official list. The phrase is a description that courts apply by comparison with piracy, not a legal category with fixed members.
Does calling someone an enemy of mankind let any court try them?
Not by itself. The old idea was that any nation could punish a pirate, and the Supreme Court has said pirates were fair game wherever found. But whether a particular court can hear a particular case depends on the statute that gives it jurisdiction and, for civil suits under the Alien Tort Statute, on the limits the Court has set, beginning with Sosa (2004) and Kiobel (2013). Later decisions narrowed these suits further.
Why was piracy the model case?
Because it happened on the high seas, outside the territory of any one nation, and was treated as a violation of the law of nations shared by all. In Gamble (2019) the Supreme Court explained that, for that reason, a prosecution for piracy anywhere was understood to be for the same offense, under the same law.
Why do the translations differ?
Because each comes from a different writer. In Gamble the Court quoted Blackstone, who called the pirate hostis humani generis, and inserted its own translation in brackets; that translation is plural, enemies of mankind, though the Latin noun is singular. In Sosa the Court quoted a lower court that had translated the phrase as an enemy of all mankind. The literal translation on this page, enemy of the human race, is our own, built from the dictionary entries for each word.