De Jure
dē jūre · also written de iure
Legal Latin Dictionary · Last verified November 12, 2026
Pronunciation
There is no single official pronunciation of legal Latin. What follows is how most American lawyers and judges say the phrase, and how a Roman would have said it.
- Common US legal pronunciation: dee JOOR-ee, IPA /diː ˈdʒʊri/. Many say day JOOR-ay, /deɪ ˈdʒʊreɪ/, and some mix the two (dee JOOR-ay); all are heard in court.
- Classical Latin (restored): DAY YOO-reh, IPA [deː ˈjuːre]. Latin had no English J sound, so jūre begins with a Y, and its first vowel was long.
Literal translation
- de — from, about, in respect of
- jure — right, law; the ablative of jus
Put together: “from the law,” or more naturally, “by right” or “as a matter of law.”
What it means in law
De jure means by law or by right. It names a status that exists because the law creates or confers it: a de jure officer holds a valid appointment, a de jure corporation was properly formed, a de jure government has lawful title to rule. The phrase rarely travels alone. Courts use it almost always in contrast with de facto, “in fact,” to mark the difference between what the law recognizes and what simply exists.
Offices and officers. The pairing grew up in the law of public office. A de jure officer is one whose election or appointment is valid. A de facto officer holds the office openly but under a flawed title, and the public may generally rely on what that officer does. Both ideas depend on a third: there must be a de jure office. In Norton v. Shelby County (1886) the Supreme Court held that when a county board was never lawfully created, no one could be either kind of officer of it. Its members were usurpers, and their acts did not bind the county.
Segregation. In the twentieth century the pair moved into constitutional law. In school cases, de jure segregation means separation brought about by official action taken with a purpose or intent to segregate. Segregation that cannot be traced to that purpose is called de facto. Keyes v. School District No. 1 (1973) made intent the dividing line and held that proof of intentional segregation in a meaningful part of a school district creates a presumption that segregation elsewhere in the district is intentional too. The school board then bears the burden of proving otherwise. A finding of de jure segregation matters because it triggers a duty to desegregate.
In statutes and rules. De jure often appears in a fixed pair, “de jure or de facto,” meant to cover both cases at once. California’s quo warranto statute, Code of Civil Procedure § 803, reaches “any corporation, either de jure or de facto”, that unlawfully exercises a franchise. Arbitration statutes in California and Georgia deal with an arbitrator who “becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform his or her functions” (Code of Civil Procedure § 1297.141; O.C.G.A. § 9-9-35). Incapacity alone does not end the arbitrator’s mandate: it ends if the arbitrator withdraws or the parties agree, and in Georgia a party may otherwise ask a court to decide. The point of the pair is that the kind of incapacity, legal or practical, does not matter.
Spelling. American courts print the phrase with a j, as Lewis & Short spells the noun (jūs). Writers who follow classical spelling, more common in international law and in Europe, write de iure. The meaning does not change.
De jure is not a synonym for good or fair. It says only that the law, as written, supports a status. Whether that law is valid is a separate question, and when it is not, as in Norton, nothing de jure is left.
Etymology
Dē usually means “from” or “about,” but one of its senses in Lewis & Short fits this phrase especially well: used of the standard an act follows, it means “according to, after”. Jūre is the ablative of jūs, which the dictionary glosses “right, law, justice”; in its literal sense, it says, jus is “that which is binding or obligatory; that which is binding by its nature, right, justice, duty”. The entry traces the word to an idea of binding; its note reads kindred with Sanscr. yu, to join; cf. ζεύγνυμι, jungo, qs. the binding, obliging.
Read with that sense, de jure is “according to law”: measured against the rule that binds, not against what people happen to do. Choosing that sense of dē for the phrase is our reading; the dictionary gives no entry for de jure as a set expression, and the habit of pairing it with de facto came from later lawyers.
Source: Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879), entries dē, jūs, via the Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University). Glosses in quotation marks are quoted from it.
In the opinions
Four Supreme Court passages, oldest first: two on de jure offices and officers, one on de jure segregation, and one in which the Court used the classic pairing. Each is quoted from the official United States Reports.
But the idea of an officer implies the existence of an office which he holds. It would be a misapplication of terms to call one an officer who holds no office, and a public office can exist only by force of law.
Rejecting the argument that a county board created by an unconstitutional act could still have officers whose acts bound the county, Justice Field explained what the idea of an officer presupposes.
It is not necessary his election or appointment should be valid, for that would make him an officer de jure.
The Court was quoting Justice Manning of the Supreme Court of Michigan, writing in Carleton v. The People, who had just described what makes a person an officer de facto.
Applying these principles in the special context of school desegregation cases, we hold that a finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system, as in this case, creates a presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious. It establishes, in other words, a prima facie case of unlawful segregative design on the part of school authorities, and shifts to those authorities the burden of proving that other segregated schools within the system are not also the result of intentionally segregative actions.
Writing for the Court in a case about Denver’s schools, Justice Brennan held that proof of intentional segregation in part of a district shifts the burden to the school board. A few sentences later the Court named purpose or intent to segregate as the factor that separates de jure from de facto segregation.
Ball later moved in arrest of judgment challenging the sentence imposed upon him by the assigned judge after the death of the resident judge, but this Court held that the assigned judge “was judge de facto if not de jure, and his acts as such are not open to collateral attack.”
Reviewing its earlier cases, the Court described its 1891 decision in Ball v. United States, about a district judge assigned to sit in another district who sentenced a defendant after the judge he replaced had died; the words in quotation marks are the Court’s own words from Ball.
Where it appears in the rules
The rule pages below use the phrase in their official text. In each one it appears in the pair “de jure or de facto,” which covers both cases at once. Each link opens the rule with its full verbatim text.
3 rule pages in 2 jurisdictions use “de jure” in their official text.
California 2
Notable remarks
A Justice who joined the Court’s opinion in the Denver school case but wrote separately to question the label itself.
These latter acts are often said to create de facto as contrasted with de jure segregation. But, as Judge Wisdom observes, each is but another form of de jure segregation. I think it is time to state that there is no constitutional difference between de jure and de facto segregation, for each is the product of state actions or policies.
Justice Douglas, joining the Court’s opinion but writing separately, argued that a school board’s own choices about boundaries, sites and assignments are state action, so the segregation they produce is de jure too.
Frequently asked questions
What is the difference between de jure and de facto?
De jure describes what exists by law or by right; de facto describes what exists in fact. An officer with a valid appointment holds office de jure. One who holds it openly under a flawed appointment holds it de facto. The two usually coincide, and lawyers reach for the pair when they do not.
What is de jure segregation?
Segregation brought about by official action taken with a purpose or intent to segregate. The classic examples were laws requiring separate schools, but the term also covers deliberate choices by school officials, such as drawing attendance zones to separate students by race. In Keyes v. School District No. 1 (1973) the Supreme Court held that intent is what distinguishes de jure segregation from de facto segregation.
Is it spelled de jure or de iure?
Both spellings are correct. Classical Latin had no separate letter j, and writers who follow classical spelling print iure. American courts, statutes and rules almost always print jure, as Lewis & Short does. The pronunciation in American courtrooms follows the j spelling.
Can someone be a de facto officer if the office does not exist de jure?
No. The de facto officer doctrine protects the acts of someone who holds a real office under a flawed title. In Norton v. Shelby County (1886) the Supreme Court held that when the office itself was never lawfully created, there is nothing to hold, and the people claiming it are usurpers whose acts do not get the doctrine’s protection.
Does de jure mean the same as legal?
Close, but not quite. De jure means that a status rests on law or right. It is usually used to contrast that status with a de facto one, and it says nothing about whether the arrangement is fair or wise. A status can be de jure under a statute that a court later strikes down, and then it loses that footing.