(a) If an arbitrator becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform his or her functions or for other reasons fails to act without undue delay, the arbitrator’s mandate terminates if he or she withdraws from office or if the parties agree on the termination. Otherwise, if a controversy remains concerning any of these grounds, any party may request that the court specified in Code Section 9-9-27 decide on the termination of the mandate, which decision shall not be subject to appeal.
§ 9-9-35.Inability of arbitrator to carry out or perform functions; termination of mandate
Chapter 9. Arbitration · Article 1. General Provisions · Last amended 2012 · Last verified July 17, 2026
In one sentenceThis section ends an arbitrator’s mandate when the arbitrator becomes unable, legally or practically, to do the job, or fails to act without undue delay, whether by withdrawal or party agreement, with the court settling any remaining dispute in a final decision — though withdrawal or agreement does not concede the underlying grounds were valid.
Full Text of § 9-9-35
(b) If, under this Code section or subsection (b) of Code Section 9-9-34, an arbitrator withdraws from office or a party agrees to the termination of the mandate of an arbitrator, this shall not imply acceptance of the validity of any ground referred to in this Code section or subsection (b) of Code Section 9-9-33.
Plain-English Summary
Sometimes an arbitrator cannot finish the job — illness, a conflicting commitment, or something else that keeps the person from acting. Subsection (a) covers both the legal inability (de jure) and the practical inability (de facto) to perform, along with the separate problem of an arbitrator who stops acting without undue delay. The mandate ends cleanly if the arbitrator withdraws or the parties agree it should end.
If neither happens and the parties still disagree about whether the arbitrator should be replaced, subsection (a) sends the dispute to the court specified in Code Section 9-9-27, and that court’s decision on the question is final, with no appeal available.
Subsection (b) protects everyone involved from an awkward inference. An arbitrator who withdraws, or a party who agrees to end the mandate, has not thereby admitted that the underlying claim of inability or delay — or a challenge ground under Code Section 9-9-33(b) — was valid. Stepping aside is treated as a practical resolution, not a concession.
Frequently Asked Questions
What does it mean for an arbitrator to be “de jure” or “de facto” unable to perform under this section?
The section covers both a legal inability to perform (de jure) and a practical, factual inability (de facto), as well as an arbitrator who fails to act without undue delay for other reasons.
How does an arbitrator’s mandate come to an end here?
By the arbitrator withdrawing from office or by the parties agreeing to the termination.
What happens if the parties disagree about whether the arbitrator should be replaced?
Subsection (a) lets any party ask the court specified in Code Section 9-9-27 to decide on the termination of the mandate.
Can that court’s decision be appealed?
No. Subsection (a) states the decision “shall not be subject to appeal.”
If an arbitrator voluntarily withdraws, does that mean they admit there was a real problem?
No. Subsection (b) makes clear that withdrawal or agreement to termination does not imply acceptance of the validity of the underlying grounds.
Amendment History
Code 1981, § 9-9-35, enacted by Ga. L. 2012, p. 961, § 1/SB 383.
Source & verification. Section text and amendment history are
reproduced verbatim from the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, published by the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Georgia Code Revision Commission / LexisNexis. Last verified July 17, 2026.
· Official source
Also known as: OCGA 9-9-35 arbitrator mandate terminationarbitrator unable to perform georgiade jure de facto arbitrator incapacityterminate arbitrator mandate international codereplace incapacitated arbitrator georgia