Autrefois Acquit
autrefois acquit · also written auterfoits acquit; autrefois acquit and autrefois convict
Legal Latin Dictionary · Last verified November 16, 2026
Pronunciation
There is no single official pronunciation, and lawyers say this one more than one way.
- Common US legal pronunciation: OH-truh-fwah uh-KWIT, IPA /ˈoʊtrəfwɑː əˈkwɪt/, which keeps something of the French in the first word and says the second as the English word acquit. The first word is often anglicized further, and no one form is standard.
- No classical form: Autrefois acquit is Law French, the French once used in English courts, not Latin, so there is no restored Roman pronunciation to give.
Literal translation
- autrefois — formerly; at another time
- acquit — acquitted; cleared of the charge
Together: “formerly acquitted.” Autrefois acquit is not Latin. It comes from Law French, the language of English courts and lawyers for centuries after the Norman Conquest; the Etymology section below gives the dictionaries behind this reading. Its companion is autrefois convict, “formerly convicted,” the plea of a defendant who has already been convicted of the same offense.
What it means in law
At common law a defendant facing an indictment could do more than plead guilty or not guilty. He could enter a special plea in bar: a plea that the prosecution could not go forward at all, whatever the truth of the charge. Autrefois acquit was one of these. The defendant said, in effect, “I have already been tried for this offense and found not guilty.” If he proved it, the case ended there.
The plea had a twin. A defendant who had been convicted of the same offense pleaded autrefois convict. Both rested on one idea, which Blackstone called a universal maxim of the common law of England: no one should be put in jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offense. Justices of the Supreme Court have traced the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause to these two pleas, and the Court’s opinion in Green v. United States (1957) begins its account of the protection with Blackstone’s description of autrefois acquit.
For the plea to work, the earlier acquittal had to be real and final, and it had to be for the same offense. Blackstone’s fuller statement, quoted in the dissent in Green, spoke of an acquittal by a court having competent jurisdiction of the offense. A defendant who had been tried for a different crime generally could not use the plea, even if the two charges grew out of the same events.
The plea also raised the question of which governments count as the same. In Bartkus v. Illinois (1959), a man acquitted in federal court of robbing a federally insured savings and loan was then tried by Illinois for the same robbery under a state statute. The Illinois trial court rejected his plea of autrefois acquit, and the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. It held that the Constitution’s due process guarantee did not forbid the state trial, relying on the long line of cases holding that the federal government and a state are separate sovereigns, each of which may punish a breach of its own laws. Bartkus was decided under the Fourteenth Amendment because the Double Jeopardy Clause did not then bind the States. It has since been applied to them, and in Gamble v. United States (2019) the Court, noting that change, declined to overturn the separate-sovereigns rule: it held that the rule follows from the Clause’s own words, because an offense is defined by a law and each law by a sovereign, so two sovereigns make two offenses.
Today American courts rarely use the old names except when they discuss the history. The protection itself comes from the Double Jeopardy Clause and from state constitutions and statutes, and a defendant usually raises it by a motion to dismiss before trial rather than by a formal plea, though some states’ criminal codes still list a plea of former acquittal or former jeopardy. The modern doctrine reaches further than the old plea in some ways. In Green v. United States the Court held that a man charged with first-degree murder, whom the jury convicted only of second-degree murder as an included offense, could not be tried again for first-degree murder after he won a new trial on appeal; four Justices dissented.
Autrefois acquit is often confused with res judicata. The two share a purpose, ending a dispute once it has been fairly decided, but res judicata is mainly a civil doctrine about the effect of judgments, while autrefois acquit was a criminal plea protecting a person from a second prosecution.
Etymology
Autrefois acquit is Law French, the French that English lawyers and courts used for centuries after the Norman Conquest. Its first word is an adverb of time. The Anglo-Norman Dictionary, the standard dictionary of the French written in medieval England, lists autrefois and autrefez among the spellings of autrefeiz, and one of its senses is “(in the past) formerly, previously”. The entry does not record the legal plea itself. Robert Kelham’s Dictionary of the Norman or Old French Language (1779), compiled for readers of the old statutes and law books, glosses autrefez as “at other times”.
The second word is the verb that gave English “acquit.” The Anglo-Norman Dictionary’s entry acquiter has many senses, from paying a debt to setting a person free, and among them is “to acquit of a charge, exonerate”. We found no entry for the verb in Kelham, but he lists a related noun, aquitantz, as “acquittance”.
Put together, autrefois acquit means “formerly acquitted,” which is exactly what the defendant claimed. That combined reading is ours; neither dictionary gives the phrase.
Sources: Robert Kelham, A Dictionary of the Norman or Old French Language (1779), entries Autrefez (p. 26), Aquitantz (p. 16), from the scan at the Internet Archive; and the Anglo-Norman Dictionary (Aberystwyth University), entries autrefeiz, acquiter, which is described here in our own words except for the few words quoted. Glosses in quotation marks are quoted from these sources.
In the opinions
Four passages: two from Green v. United States (1957), which ties the plea to the Double Jeopardy Clause in the Court’s opinion and in Justice Frankfurter’s dissent for four Justices (labelled), and two from Bartkus v. Illinois (1959), a case in which a defendant actually entered the plea. Each is quoted from the official United States Reports; a spaced ellipsis marks where a statutory citation has been left out of a Bartkus passage.
The constitutional prohibition against “double jeopardy” was designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense. In his Commentaries, which greatly influenced the generation that adopted the Constitution, Blackstone recorded: “... the plea of auterfoits acquit, or a former acquittal, is grounded on this universal maxim of the common law of England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offence.”
Writing for the Court, Justice Black began his account of the double jeopardy protection with Blackstone’s Commentaries; the words inside the quotation marks are Blackstone’s, with his spelling auterfoits; the opening ellipsis is the Court’s.
The origin of this constitutional protection is found in the common-law pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict.
Dissenting for four Justices, Justice Frankfurter disagreed with the Court’s result but began from the same history.
The case was tried to a jury and resulted in an acquittal. On January 8, 1954, an Illinois grand jury indicted Bartkus. The facts recited in the Illinois indictment were substantially identical to those contained in the prior federal indictment. The Illinois indictment charged that these facts constituted a violation of Illinois Revised Statutes, 1951, c. 38, § 501, a robbery statute. Bartkus was tried and convicted in the Criminal Court of Cook County and was sentenced to life imprisonment under the Illinois Habitual Criminal Statute. . . . The Illinois trial court considered and rejected petitioner’s plea of autrefois acquit.
Bartkus had been tried in federal court for robbing a federally insured savings and loan association in Cicero, Illinois; the Court described what happened next.
The significance of this historical background of decisions prior to Fox is that it was, taking a position most favorable to advocates of the bars of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict in cases like that before this Court, totally inconclusive.
After surveying early American decisions on whether a state and the federal government could each prosecute for the same acts, the Court summed them up.
Where it appears in the rules
No rule on this site uses “autrefois acquit” in its official text.
The rules on this site are mostly civil, and the criminal rules that touch the subject use English. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(f), for example, lets a defendant appeal “the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal proceeding on grounds of former jeopardy”.
Frequently asked questions
What does autrefois acquit mean?
It is Law French for “formerly acquitted.” It names the old plea in which a defendant answered a criminal charge by showing that he had already been tried for the same offense and found not guilty, so the new prosecution had to stop.
What is the difference between autrefois acquit and autrefois convict?
They are the two halves of the same protection. Autrefois acquit was the plea of a defendant who had been acquitted of the offense before; autrefois convict was the plea of one who had already been convicted of it. Either one, if proved, barred a second trial for the same offense.
Is autrefois acquit the same as double jeopardy?
Not exactly. Autrefois acquit was a common-law plea. Double jeopardy is the broader constitutional protection that grew out of it and its companion plea, set out in the Fifth Amendment and in state constitutions. Four dissenting Justices in Green v. United States (1957) called the old pleas the origin of the clause, and the Court’s opinion in the same case grounds the protection in Blackstone’s account of the plea, but the modern doctrine has its own tests and covers situations the old plea did not.
Does an acquittal in federal court stop a state prosecution?
Not by itself. In Bartkus v. Illinois (1959) the Supreme Court held that due process did not forbid Illinois from trying a man for a robbery after a federal jury had acquitted him of robbing the same institution. The Double Jeopardy Clause now applies to the States, and in Gamble v. United States (2019) the Court reaffirmed under the Clause itself that a state and the federal government are separate sovereigns, so each may prosecute the same conduct under its own laws. Whether a particular second prosecution is allowed can still depend on the state’s own law.
Is autrefois acquit still used?
The idea is; the name mostly is not. American defendants now raise a former acquittal under the Double Jeopardy Clause or a state provision, usually by a motion to dismiss before trial, though some states’ criminal codes still list a plea of former acquittal or former jeopardy. Judges still use the Law French names when they explain where the protection came from.
Why is it in Law French and not Latin?
Because English courts used French for their pleadings for centuries after the Norman Conquest, and many of the names of pleas stayed French. Autrefois is an Anglo-Norman word meaning “(in the past) formerly, previously”, and acquit is the source of the English word.