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Animus

ănĭmus · also written discriminatory animus; retaliatory animus

Legal Latin Dictionary · Last verified November 13, 2026

Quick answerIn American law, animus means hostility or ill will toward a person or group: an improper motive that can make a law unconstitutional, prove discrimination or support a retaliation claim, if it is shown to have driven the decision.

Pronunciation

There is no single official pronunciation of legal Latin, and animus is now an ordinary English word. What follows is how most American lawyers and judges say it, and how a Roman would have said it.

  • Common US legal pronunciation: AN-ih-muss, IPA /ˈænɪməs/. This one varies little.
  • Classical Latin (restored): AH-nih-muss, IPA [ˈanɪmʊs]. Every vowel is short, the final u is like the u in put, and the stress falls on the first syllable.

Literal translation

  • animus — the mind or spirit; in Latin also a feeling or passion, a disposition toward someone, and the will or intention

The modern legal word keeps one strand of that range: a hostile disposition toward a person or group. It is an English word of Latin origin, not a Latin phrase, but courts use it as a term of art, so the dictionary covers it.

What it means in law

In American opinions, animus means hostility or ill will, usually toward a group, and usually as the reason behind a decision. It names a motive, not an act. The law cares about it wherever the reason for an action, not only the action itself, decides whether it was lawful.

Equal protection. Most laws that treat groups differently survive if they bear a rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose, even when they seem unwise. Romer v. Evans (1996) shows the exception. Colorado voters had amended the state constitution in 1992 to forbid any state or local measure protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination. The Supreme Court held that the amendment failed even that lenient test. It was so broad, and so far removed from the reasons offered for it, that it seemed explicable only by animus toward the class it affected. Repeating an earlier decision, the Court said a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot be a legitimate government interest.

Employment discrimination. In a discrimination case built on circumstantial evidence, the employee first proves a prima facie case. In Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981) the Court held that the employer then need only produce evidence of a lawful reason, enough to let the factfinder conclude that the decision was not motivated by discriminatory animus. That is a burden of producing evidence, not of persuading. The employee keeps the burden of proving intentional discrimination and may try to meet it by showing that the stated reason is not the true one. Later decisions refined how much such a showing proves on its own.

Retaliation. A person who claims that an official punished him for protected speech must show that the official’s retaliatory animus caused the injury, as the Supreme Court has said, repeating an earlier decision. In Nieves v. Bartlett (2019) the Court said the motive must be a but-for cause: the official would not have acted without it. For arrests, it held that probable cause generally defeats the claim. As Nieves put it, there is a narrow exception for a plaintiff who offers objective evidence that people in a similar position who had not engaged in the same kind of speech were not arrested; later decisions have refined what evidence can meet it.

Agency. In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth (1998) the Court noted the view of several courts of appeals that a supervisor acting out of gender-based animus may not be acting to serve the employer, which matters to whether the employer is liable for the supervisor’s acts.

How it is proved. People rarely admit animus. Courts usually infer it, or refuse to, from the circumstances: a law’s breadth, the weakness of the reasons given, or how others in the same position were treated.

Confused terms. Mens rea and scienter describe a person’s mental state toward an act, such as knowledge or intent. Animus is a motive directed at people. Older Latin phrases also use animus in its sense of intention, such as animus testandi, the intention to make a will; those phrases are not covered on this page.

Etymology

Animus is one of the richest words in Latin, and Lewis & Short give it many senses. Its general meaning is “the rational soul in man”, set against the body. Among the specific feelings the word could name, the dictionary lists “Violent passion, vehemence, wrath” and a “Disposition toward any one”. It also gives the sense “The power of willing, the will, inclination, desire, purpose, design, intention”.

The modern legal sense, hostility toward a person or group, draws on the passion and the disposition senses; the older legal phrases use the will and intention sense. Those readings are ours, not the dictionary’s.

Source: Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879), entry ănĭmus, via the Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University). Glosses in quotation marks are quoted from it.

In the opinions

Five Supreme Court passages: two from the leading equal-protection case, one on employment discrimination, one on an employer’s liability for a supervisor and one on retaliation. Each is quoted from the official United States Reports.

Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) · Supreme Court of the United States · opinion of Justice Kennedy

The Court gave two reasons why Colorado’s Amendment 2 failed the most deferential form of equal-protection review; this is the second.

A second and related point is that laws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) · Supreme Court of the United States · opinion of Justice Kennedy

Turning to a related point, the Court explained what a law of this kind suggests about its purpose.

We have stated consistently that the employee’s prima facie case of discrimination will be rebutted if the employer articulates lawful reasons for the action; that is, to satisfy this intermediate burden, the employer need only produce admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus.

Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257 (1981) · Supreme Court of the United States · opinion of Justice Powell

The court of appeals had required the employer to persuade the court that its reasons were real; the Supreme Court held that the employer bears only a burden of producing evidence.

As Courts of Appeals have recognized, a supervisor acting out of gender-based animus or a desire to fulfill sexual urges may not be actuated by a purpose to serve the employer.

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998) · Supreme Court of the United States · opinion of Justice Kennedy

Asking when an employer answers for a supervisor’s harassment, the Court relied on decisions of the federal courts of appeals, which it cited next, to explain why such conduct is often outside the scope of employment.

To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must establish a “causal connection” between the government defendant’s “retaliatory animus” and the plaintiff’s “subsequent injury.”

Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398 (2019) · Supreme Court of the United States · opinion of Chief Justice Roberts

Setting out what a plaintiff must prove in a First Amendment retaliation claim, the Court quoted three phrases from its earlier decision in Hartman v. Moore; the citation to Hartman that follows the sentence is left out.

Where it appears in the rules

One rule page uses the word in its official text: Virginia’s rule on when a juror may testify about deliberations. Each link opens the rule with its full verbatim text.

1 rule page in 1 jurisdiction uses “animus” in its official text.

Jurors generally may not testify about what was said in the jury room, but Virginia’s Rule 2:606 makes an exception for statements showing that “a racial/national origin stereotype or animus was a significant motivating factor in the juror's vote”, where they also cast serious doubt on the fairness of the deliberations or the verdict.

Notable remarks

A dissent in Romer that argued over what the word itself should cover.

But I had thought that one could consider certain conduct reprehensible—murder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to animals—and could exhibit even “animus” toward such conduct. Surely that is the only sort of “animus” at issue here: moral disapproval of homosexual conduct, the same sort of moral disapproval that produced the centuries-old criminal laws that we held constitutional in Bowers.

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) · Supreme Court of the United States · Justice Scalia, dissenting opinion

Writing for three Justices, Justice Scalia objected to the majority’s use of “animus” and “animosity,” and argued that moral disapproval of conduct is a different thing. The case he names at the end is Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), which upheld Georgia’s sodomy law; the Court overruled Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), so the remark describes law that no longer stands.

Frequently asked questions

Is animus the same as intent?

Not quite. Intent is a decision to do something, or to bring about a result. Animus is the hostility that may lie behind a decision: dislike of a person or group. A decision can be fully intentional without any animus, as when an employer means to fire someone for a reason that has nothing to do with who that person is.

Does a law fail just because some supporters disliked the group it affects?

Not necessarily. Courts usually ask whether the law can be explained by a legitimate purpose. In Romer v. Evans (1996) the Supreme Court struck down a Colorado amendment because its breadth was so far removed from the reasons offered that it seemed explicable only by animus. Most laws reviewed for a rational basis are upheld.

How does a plaintiff prove animus?

Usually with circumstantial evidence, since few decision-makers admit it. In an employment case the employee may show that the employer’s stated reason is not the true one, or that others in the same position were treated better. Courts look at the whole record.

Does retaliatory animus alone make an arrest unlawful?

No. In Nieves v. Bartlett (2019) the Supreme Court held that the motive must be a but-for cause of the injury, and that probable cause generally defeats a claim of retaliatory arrest. Nieves described a narrow exception for a plaintiff who offers objective evidence that similarly situated people who had not engaged in the same kind of protected speech were not arrested. Later decisions have refined what evidence can meet that exception.

Does animus mean the same thing in older Latin phrases?

No. In phrases such as animus testandi, the intention to make a will, animus carries its Latin sense of will or purpose, with no hint of hostility. This page covers the modern American sense.

This page explains a legal term. It is legal information, not legal advice, and it cannot tell you how the law applies to your situation. Whether animus can be proved, and what it does to a claim, depends on the kind of claim, the governing law and the evidence in the particular case. If the outcome matters, talk to a lawyer or your court’s self-help center.