In Terrorem
in terrōrem
Legal Latin Dictionary · Last verified November 13, 2026
Pronunciation
There is no single official pronunciation of legal Latin. What follows is how most American lawyers say the phrase, and how a Roman would have said it.
- Common US legal pronunciation: in teh-ROR-em, IPA /ɪn təˈrɔːrəm/. Some say in tair-OR-um, /ɪn tɛˈrɔːrəm/.
- Classical Latin (restored): in ter-ROH-rem, IPA [ɪn tɛrˈroːrɛm]. The double r was sounded twice, and the stress falls on the long ō.
Literal translation
- in — into, toward; with a noun in the accusative it marks a goal or purpose
- terrorem — fear, dread; the accusative of terror
Put together: “into fear,” or more naturally, “for the purpose of frightening,” “by way of a threat.”
What it means in law
Something done in terrorem works by threat. It is meant to make people behave, not to measure or repair a loss. Courts use the phrase in three main settings.
Contract penalties. Parties to a contract may agree in advance on the damages for a breach. Courts enforce such a clause when it is a fair and reasonable attempt to fix compensation for a loss the parties expected, judged under the traditional test as of the time they signed; some modern statutes and decisions also look at the loss that actually occurred. They refuse to enforce a clause that is only a spur to performance, because that is a penalty. In Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States (1947), a government contract for dried eggs charged the supplier “liquidated damages” if the eggs were not inspected and ready by a set date, even though delivery was not due until later and the supplier delivered on time. The Supreme Court held the clause a penalty: it could apply only where no damage was possible, and its claimed in terrorem effect was an admission that it was there to threaten, not to compensate.
Wills and no-contest clauses. A will may say that a beneficiary who challenges it loses the gift. Older equity courts often treated such a condition as only in terrorem, a warning they would not enforce against someone with good reason to litigate. In Smithsonian Institution v. Meech (1898) the Supreme Court quoted that traditional rule, and its limit: when the will gives a contesting beneficiary’s share to someone else, the condition takes effect. The will left legacies to the sister and brothers of the testator’s late wife on condition that they accept it, and gave the share of anyone disputing it to the residuary legatee. They disputed it, and the Court held that they could not take their legacies. Today the enforceability of no-contest clauses is a matter of state law, which varies.
Deterrent laws. Judges also speak of the in terrorem effect of a statute: the pressure it puts on people before anyone is prosecuted or sued. In Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown (1957) the Court weighed that effect of criminal obscenity laws against a civil injunction procedure. In Pinter v. Dahl (1988) it read the Securities Act’s civil liability as designed to deter, and so read the word “seller” to reach some people who solicit securities purchases without passing title themselves.
The phrase is easy to misread. It has nothing to do with terrorism; the shared root is simply the Latin word for fear. And the label is a conclusion, not a test. A court calls a clause in terrorem after deciding that its real job is to threaten.
Etymology
In is the common Latin preposition; with the accusative, Lewis & Short gloss it “into, to, towards”. Terrōrem is the accusative of terror, which the dictionary glosses “great fear, affright, dread, alarm, terror” and whose entry points to the verb terreo, to frighten (that gloss of the verb is ours). In another sense the word means “an object of fear or dread, a terror”. The dictionary does not record the legal phrase; reading in terrorem as “for the purpose of frightening” is ours.
Source: Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879), entries in, terror, via the Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University). Glosses in quotation marks are quoted from it.
In the opinions
Four passages from the official United States Reports, one for each setting described above. The second is a treatise the Court quoted, not the Court’s own words, as its context line explains. A spaced ellipsis marks where citations have been left out.
It might, as respondent suggests, have an in terrorem effect of encouraging prompt preparation for delivery. But the argument is a tacit admission that the provision was included not to make a fair estimate of damages to be suffered but to serve only as an added spur to performance. It is well-settled contract law that courts do not give their imprimatur to such arrangements.
The government argued that its liquidated-damages clause, though it covered a default that could cause no loss, still pushed suppliers to have their eggs ready on time. The Court answered that argument.
When legacies are given to persons upon conditions not to dispute the validity of, or the dispositions in wills or testaments, the conditions are not in general obligatory, but only in terrorem.
These are not the Court’s own words. The Court was quoting an English treatise on legacies for the traditional rule, together with the treatise’s next point: a condition stops being merely in terrorem when the will gives the contesting legatee’s share to someone else, as this will did.
One would be bold to assert that the in terrorem effect of such statutes less restrains booksellers in the period before the law strikes than does § 22-a.
Booksellers argued that New York’s procedure for enjoining the sale of obscene books was a prior restraint. The Court compared it with ordinary criminal obscenity laws, such as California’s, and upheld it.
In order to effectuate Congress’ intent that § 12(1) civil liability be in terrorem, . . . the risk of its invocation should be felt by solicitors of purchases.
The question was who counts as a seller liable to a buyer under the Securities Act of 1933. The ellipsis replaces the Court’s citations to two law review articles.
Where it appears in the rules
No rule on this site uses “in terrorem” in its official text.
The phrase belongs to contract law, the law of wills and the reading of statutes, not to procedure. One rule touches the problem the older no-contest cases dealt with, a contest brought for good reason. In a probate action, New Jersey’s Rule 4:42-9(a)(3) allows the court, even when the will is admitted to probate, to make a fee allowance to both sides out of the estate if “the contestant had reasonable cause for contesting the validity of the will or codicil”.
Frequently asked questions
What is an in terrorem clause?
The name is most often given to a no-contest clause in a will or trust: a provision that a beneficiary who challenges the document loses what it gives him. The same label fits any provision whose purpose is to deter by threat, such as a contract clause that imposes a penalty rather than a fair estimate of damages.
Are no-contest clauses enforceable?
It depends on the state. The traditional equity rule, which the Supreme Court quoted in Smithsonian Institution v. Meech (1898), treated such conditions as often only in terrorem, so a beneficiary with probable cause to litigate did not forfeit the gift. That rule did not protect a beneficiary whose share the will gave to someone else upon a contest. Modern state statutes and decisions differ, so the answer depends on where the will is probated and how the clause is written.
What is the difference between liquidated damages and a penalty?
Liquidated damages are an agreed, reasonable estimate of the loss a breach will cause, traditionally judged as of the time the contract was made; courts enforce them, and under that test a later showing that the actual loss was smaller is not fatal. Some modern statutes and decisions also weigh the loss that actually occurred. A penalty is a sum meant to punish or to force performance; courts will not enforce it. Priebe & Sons (1947) is the Supreme Court’s example: a clause that could apply only when no damage was possible was a penalty.
What do courts mean by the in terrorem effect of a statute?
The deterrence a law exerts on people’s choices before it is ever enforced against them. The phrase appears in free-speech cases such as Kingsley Books (1957), where the fear of prosecution bears on what booksellers will offer, and in cases like Pinter v. Dahl (1988), where the Court read a liability provision broadly because Congress meant it to deter.
Does in terrorem have anything to do with terrorism?
No. Both words come from the Latin terror, fear, but the legal phrase means only “by way of a threat.” It describes ordinary pressures like penalty clauses and forfeiture conditions.