§ 19-11-46.Liability of obligor in state not dependent on obligee’s presence
Chapter 11. Enforcement of Duty of Support · Article 2. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act · Last amended 1958 · Last verified October 9, 2026
Full Text of § 19-11-46
Plain-English Summary
This one-sentence section answers a basic question in Georgia’s old reciprocal support system: can a person in Georgia avoid a Georgia support duty because the person owed support lives somewhere else? No. When Georgia law supplies the duty — and § 19-11-49 decides that by looking to the law of any state where the obligor was present during the period for which support is sought — the duty binds an obligor present in Georgia, regardless of the presence or residence of the obligee. Under the article’s definitions in § 19-11-42, the obligor is the person who owes support and the obligee is the person to whom it’s owed.
The section works hand in hand with § 19-11-49. That section picks the governing law; this one makes clear that the obligee’s absence from Georgia doesn’t undo a Georgia duty. Together they let a Georgia court, acting as the responding state, hold an obligor present here to Georgia support law even though the case began in another state.
This page sits in Article 2 of Chapter 11, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA). Article 2 is closed to new cases. Under § 19-11-40.1, no new petition may be filed and no proceeding of any kind may be started under it on or after January 1, 1998, and its provisions apply only to proceedings pending before that date. The General Assembly meant anything filed on or after that date to be governed by Article 3, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), which begins at § 19-11-100. Article 3 covers the same ground its own way: under § 19-11-122, a Georgia responding tribunal determines the duty of support and the amount under Georgia law and Georgia’s support guidelines, except as Article 3 otherwise provides.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does a Georgia support obligation go away if the person I owe lives in another state?
Not under this section. When Georgia law supplies the duty of support under § 19-11-49, that duty binds an obligor who is present in Georgia regardless of where the obligee is or lives. Keep in mind that this article governs only proceedings pending before January 1, 1998; newer interstate cases fall under Article 3, where § 19-11-122 has a Georgia responding tribunal set support under Georgia law and guidelines.
What do “obligor” and “obligee” mean here?
Section 19-11-42 defines both terms for this article. The obligor is any person owing a duty of support. The obligee is any person to whom a duty of support is owed — a child, a spouse, or anyone else the law entitles to support from the obligor.
How did a Georgia court decide which state’s support law applied under URESA?
It looked to § 19-11-49. The duties of support that apply are those imposed or imposable under the laws of any state where the obligor was present during the period for which support is sought. The obligor is presumed to have been present in the responding state during that period until otherwise shown. This section then confirms that a Georgia duty, once it applies, binds an obligor present in Georgia.
Can I start a new case under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act in Georgia?
No. Section 19-11-40.1 says no new petition may be filed, and no proceeding of any kind may be started, under this article on or after January 1, 1998. The article applies only to proceedings that were pending before that date. The General Assembly intended later filings to be governed by Article 3 of this chapter, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, starting at § 19-11-100.
Does this section reach an obligor who lives outside Georgia?
This section speaks only of an obligor “present in this state.” For an obligor elsewhere, the article worked through the other state’s court: a Georgia court acting as the initiating state certified a sound petition and sent it to a court in the responding state that could obtain jurisdiction over the respondent or the respondent’s property, as § 19-11-55 describes.
Amendment History
Laws 1958, p. 34, § 4.