Massachusetts causes of action

The claims filed most often in Massachusetts trial courts. Each page covers what the claim is, where the right comes from, what a plaintiff has to prove, how long they have to file, what has to happen before filing, who can be sued, what the defenses are and what the claim actually pays.

• Breach of contract in Massachusetts — six years, twenty under sealG.L. c. 260, §§ 1, 2; G.L. c. 231, § 6C; G.L. c. 259, § 1; Singarella v. City of Boston, 342 Mass. 385 (1961)Six years to sue from the breach — twenty if the document was executed under seal. No attorney's fees unless the contract or a statute provides them, but 12 percent statutory interest runs from the date of breach.
• Account stated and consumer debt collection in Massachusetts — Rules 8.1 and 55.1Mass. R. Civ. P. 8.1, 55.1; G.L. c. 260, § 2; G.L. c. 93, § 49; 940 CMR 7.00Debt buyers file more Massachusetts civil cases than any other plaintiff, and most end in default. Rules 8.1 and 55.1 require them to attach proof of the debt and the chain of assignment before a judgment can enter.
• Unjust enrichment and quantum meruit in Massachusetts — the claim you plead when there is no contractBoswell v. Zephyr Lines, Inc., 414 Mass. 241 (1993); J.A. Sullivan Corp. v. Commonwealth, 397 Mass. 789 (1986); G.L. c. 260, §§ 2, 2AQuasi-contract fills the gap where no enforceable agreement covers the subject — and fails where one does. The limitations period is three years or six, depending on what the claim most resembles.
• Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in MassachusettsAnthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Associates, 411 Mass. 451 (1991); G.L. c. 260, § 2Every Massachusetts contract carries it, and it protects the bargain you made rather than one you wish you had made. Six years to sue, contract damages only, and it cannot create a right the contract never gave you.
• Chapter 93A § 9 in Massachusetts — the consumer claim with mandatory feesG.L. c. 93A, §§ 2, 9; G.L. c. 260, § 5ASend a 30-day demand letter first. Then a finding of liability makes attorney's fees mandatory, a willful or bad-faith finding doubles or trebles the judgment, and the floor is $25 even where actual damages are small.
• Chapter 93A § 11 in Massachusetts — the business claim, with no demand letterG.L. c. 93A, §§ 2, 11; G.L. c. 260, § 5ABusiness-to-business 93A needs no demand letter, requires a loss of money or property, and can be defeated by showing the conduct did not occur primarily and substantially in Massachusetts — a defence the defendant has to prove.
• Negligence in Massachusetts — three years, a 51 percent bar, and a $20,000 charity capG.L. c. 260, § 2A; G.L. c. 231, §§ 6B, 85, 85K; G.L. c. 258, § 4Three years to sue. Being partly at fault reduces recovery but does not bar it until you pass 50 percent. And if the defendant is a charity, a 1930s statute may cap your damages at $20,000.
• Motor vehicle negligence in Massachusetts — PIP first, then the $2,000 thresholdG.L. c. 90, § 34M; G.L. c. 231, § 6D; G.L. c. 260, § 2A; G.L. c. 231, § 85Your own insurer pays the first $8,000 regardless of fault. To sue for pain and suffering you must clear the § 6D threshold — $2,000 in reasonable medical expenses, or death, disfigurement, lost sight or hearing, loss of a body member, or a fracture.
• Premises liability and slip-and-fall in Massachusetts — including snow and icePapadopoulos v. Target Corp., 457 Mass. 368 (2010); G.L. c. 84, §§ 15, 18, 21; G.L. c. 260, § 2ASince Papadopoulos in 2010, Massachusetts landowners owe the same duty of reasonable care for natural snow and ice as for anything else. The 30-day notice statute still applies — but missing it is not the automatic bar most people assume.
• Medical malpractice in Massachusetts — the tribunal, the bond, and the $500,000 capG.L. c. 231, §§ 60B, 60D, 60H, 60L; G.L. c. 260, § 4; G.L. c. 231, § 85KEvery claim goes before a screening tribunal, and an adverse finding means posting a $6,000 bond to continue. Non-economic damages are capped at $500,000 with real exceptions, and a seven-year repose period cuts off late claims absolutely.
• Wrongful death in Massachusetts — the estate sues, and punitive damages start at $5,000G.L. c. 229, §§ 1, 2, 6; G.L. c. 231, § 60H; G.L. c. 258, § 4Only the executor or administrator can bring the claim. Damages cover the fair monetary value of the decedent to the survivors, and reckless or grossly negligent conduct carries punitive damages of not less than $5,000 — the main exception to the Massachusetts rule against punitive awards.
• Fraud and deceit in Massachusetts — three years, Rule 9(b), and a treble-damages statuteG.L. c. 260, §§ 2A, 12; G.L. c. 231, § 85J; Mass. R. Civ. P. 9(b)Three years, extended by the discovery rule and by fraudulent concealment. Fraud must be pleaded with particularity under Rule 9(b) — and where the fraud was in the sale of personal property, a Massachusetts statute makes treble damages mandatory.
• Negligent misrepresentation in Massachusetts — careless information, and the economic loss ruleG.L. c. 260, § 2A; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552, as applied in MassachusettsNo intent to deceive required — carelessness with the truth is enough. Three years to sue, pecuniary loss only, and it is the recognised exception to the economic loss doctrine that bars most tort claims for pure financial harm.
• Conversion in Massachusetts — three years, and demand mattersG.L. c. 260, § 2A; G.L. c. 247 (replevin); G.L. c. 231, § 6BSomeone took your property and treated it as their own. Three years to sue, damages measured by value at the time of conversion — and where possession began lawfully, you generally have to demand it back before the claim exists.
• Breach of fiduciary duty in Massachusetts — and the close corporation ruleDonahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578 (1975); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842 (1976); G.L. c. 260, § 2AMassachusetts gives minority shareholders in a close corporation more protection than almost any state: partners in a small company owe each other the utmost good faith and loyalty. The majority's answer is a legitimate business purpose — and the minority's reply is a less harmful alternative.
• Tortious interference in Massachusetts — improper motive or improper meansBlackstone v. Cashman, 448 Mass. 255 (2007); G.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. Falmouth Marine, Inc., 410 Mass. 262 (1991); G.L. c. 260, § 2ACompetition is not interference. Massachusetts requires improper motive or improper means — and where the defendant is the plaintiff's own manager or a corporate official, the plaintiff must show actual malice.
• Defamation in Massachusetts — three years, and the anti-SLAPP riskG.L. c. 260, § 4; G.L. c. 231, §§ 59H, 93; Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hospital, 477 Mass. 141 (2017), 483 Mass. 200 (2019)Three years to sue. Opinion is protected, falsity is your burden, and if any part of what you are suing over was petitioning activity, the anti-SLAPP statute can end the case and make you pay the defendant's legal fees.
• Insurance bad faith in Massachusetts — c. 176D through 93A, and the multiplier on the judgmentG.L. c. 176D, § 3(9); G.L. c. 93A, §§ 9, 11; G.L. c. 260, § 5AChapter 176D has no private right of action — you reach it through 93A. The standard is failing to settle once liability is reasonably clear, and the multiplier attaches to the underlying judgment, which is what makes these claims dangerous for insurers.
• The Massachusetts Wage Act — mandatory treble damages, and no way to cureG.L. c. 149, §§ 148, 148B, 150; G.L. c. 151, §§ 1, 1A, 20A; Reuter v. City of Methuen, 489 Mass. 465 (2022)Treble damages are mandatory and liquidated, fees are mandatory, and Reuter v. City of Methuen holds that an employer who pays late owes triple the late wages — not triple the interest — even if it pays before you sue.
• Employment discrimination in Massachusetts — chapter 151B, and the 300-day clockG.L. c. 151B, §§ 4, 5, 9; Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., 417 Mass. 580 (1994)You cannot start in court. A charge must go to the MCAD within 300 days of the discriminatory act, and chapter 151B is the exclusive remedy — it preempts the common-law claims most people want to add to it.
• Summary process in Massachusetts — eviction, and the notice that has to come firstG.L. c. 239; G.L. c. 186, §§ 11, 12, 31; Uniform Summary Process RulesA notice to quit is not an eviction. Only a court order and a constable can remove a tenant — and since April 2023 a residential non-payment notice must carry an official state form or the court cannot accept the case for filing.
• Security deposits in Massachusetts — three violations treble, and the rest only forfeitG.L. c. 186, § 15B; G.L. c. 260, § 5ASection 15B(7) trebles damages for exactly three failures — no separate account, no transfer on sale, no return within 30 days. Every other violation costs the landlord the right to keep the deposit, and nothing more.
• The warranty of habitability in Massachusetts — bad conditions, and what a tenant can doBoston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184 (1973); G.L. c. 239, § 8A; G.L. c. 111, § 127L; 105 CMR 410.000Rent buys a habitable home, and a landlord who breaches that owes the difference between the rent agreed and what the apartment was worth. Withholding rent is a defence with escrow risk, not a right to live rent-free.
• Quiet enjoyment and illegal lockouts in Massachusetts — three months' rent, minimumG.L. c. 186, § 14; G.L. c. 260, § 5A; Blackett v. Olanoff, 371 Mass. 714 (1977)Shut off the heat, change the locks, or move a tenant's belongings out, and c. 186 § 14 sets the floor at three months' rent plus mandatory attorney's fees — with a criminal penalty attached. Owing rent is no defence.
• Tenant retaliation in Massachusetts — the six-month presumptionG.L. c. 186, § 18; G.L. c. 239, § 2A; G.L. c. 260, § 5AReport a code violation and get a notice to quit within six months, and the law presumes reprisal. The landlord can only rebut it with clear and convincing evidence of an independent reason it would have acted the same way at the same time.
• Condominium common-expense liens in Massachusetts — six months that beat the mortgageG.L. c. 183A, § 6; G.L. c. 254, §§ 5, 5A; Drummer Boy Homes Association, Inc. v. Britton, 474 Mass. 17 (2016)A condominium association's lien for unpaid common expenses outranks a first mortgage for six months' worth of assessments, plus the costs and fees of enforcing it — and losing the notice steps costs the association the fees, not the priority.
• Quiet title and try title in Massachusetts — two statutes, and choosing the wrong one losesG.L. c. 240, §§ 1–5, 6–10; Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 460 Mass. 762 (2011); Abate v. Fremont Investment & Loan, 470 Mass. 821 (2015)Try title under c. 240 §§ 1–5 needs possession and record title, and lets you win on superior title alone. Quiet title under §§ 6–10 asks more — you must prove your own title is good — but reaches claimants a try title action cannot.
• Adverse possession in Massachusetts — twenty years, and registered land is immuneG.L. c. 260, §§ 21, 22; G.L. c. 185, § 53; Kendall v. Selvaggio, 413 Mass. 619 (1992)Twenty years of actual, open, notorious, exclusive and adverse use takes title. Paying taxes is not required and does not help — but if the land is registered under c. 185, no amount of time will do it.
• Trespass and private nuisance in Massachusetts — and the treble-damages tree statuteG.L. c. 242, § 7; G.L. c. 260, § 2A; Glavin v. Eckman, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 313 (2008)Trespass protects possession; nuisance protects use and enjoyment. Cut down a neighbour's trees without licence and G.L. c. 242 § 7 trebles the damages — unless you had good reason to believe the land was yours.
• Partition in Massachusetts — one co-owner can force the saleG.L. c. 241, §§ 1, 2, 14, 22, 25The right to partition is near-absolute: a co-owner of any share can compel division or sale, and the others cannot vote it down. No deadline applies, and the money is decided in the accounting rather than the petition.
• Zoning appeals in Massachusetts — twenty days, and both steps are jurisdictionalG.L. c. 40A, § 17; Kenner v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Chatham, 459 Mass. 115 (2011)You have 20 days from the day the decision is filed with the city or town clerk — to file the case and to get the clerk notice with a copy of the complaint. Miss either and the court has no jurisdiction. One day late is fatal.
• Construction defect in Massachusetts — six years, whether or not you knewG.L. c. 260, § 2B; Bridgwood v. A.J. Wood Construction, Inc., 480 Mass. 349 (2018); Stearns v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 481 Mass. 529 (2019)The six-year repose in G.L. c. 260 § 2B can bar a claim before the owner discovers the defect. It is not tolled by the discovery rule, not extended by fraudulent concealment, and it bars 93A claims that sound in tort.
• Mechanic's liens in Massachusetts — a chain of deadlines, and the lien dissolvesG.L. c. 254, §§ 2, 4, 8, 11, 14Chapter 254 is a sequence: notice of contract, statement of account, suit within 90 days, complaint recorded within 30. Miss any one and the lien is dissolved. There is no prejudice test and no good-cause exception.
• Products liability in Massachusetts — there is no strict liability tortG.L. c. 106, §§ 2-314, 2-318; Back v. Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. 633 (1978); Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 388 Mass. 342 (1983)Massachusetts never adopted strict products liability. The claim runs on the implied warranty of merchantability, which is fault-free, reaches anyone the seller could expect to be affected, and — unlike negligence — is not reduced by the plaintiff's ordinary carelessness.
• Assault, battery and false imprisonment in MassachusettsG.L. c. 260, § 2A; G.L. c. 258, § 10(c); Commonwealth v. Porro, 458 Mass. 526 (2010)Assault needs no touching and battery needs no injury — an offensive contact is enough. Three years to sue, and where the defendant is a public employee these intentional torts fall outside the Tort Claims Act entirely.
• Emotional distress claims in Massachusetts — IIED and NIED, and the corroboration ruleAgis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140 (1976); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540 (1982); Sullivan v. Boston Gas Co., 414 Mass. 129 (1993); G.L. c. 260, § 2AThe negligent claim requires physical harm manifested by objective symptomatology. The intentional one does not — but it demands conduct beyond all possible bounds of decency, which almost nothing meets.
• The Massachusetts Tort Claims Act — two years to present, and a $100,000 ceilingG.L. c. 258, §§ 2, 4, 10Suing a city, town or state agency means presenting the claim in writing within two years and suing within three. Recovery is capped at $100,000, with no interest before judgment and no punitive damages — and ten statutory exclusions stand behind that.
• The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act — threats, intimidation or coercionG.L. c. 12, §§ 11H, 11I; Bally v. Northeastern University, 403 Mass. 713 (1989); Barron v. Kolenda, 491 Mass. 408 (2023)The MCRA reaches private actors as well as government, and pays mandatory attorney's fees — but only where rights were interfered with by threats, intimidation or coercion. A direct violation, without more, is not enough.
• Reach and apply in Massachusetts — the equity action for assets attachment cannot touchG.L. c. 214, § 3(6), (7), (8), (9)A separate equitable action, not a remedy. It exists precisely for property that cannot be attached or taken on execution — a business interest, a beneficial interest, an insurer's obligation — and it reaches what Rule 4.1 and Rule 4.2 cannot.
• Replevin in Massachusetts — getting the thing itself backG.L. c. 247, §§ 7, 8, 10, 17, 18; G.L. c. 260, § 2AConversion makes the defendant buy your property. Replevin gets the property back. It runs under G.L. c. 247, requires a bond before the writ issues, and is the right claim when the item is unique and money will not do.
• Declaratory judgment in Massachusetts — settling the question before the damageG.L. c. 231A, §§ 1, 2, 9; Mass. R. Civ. P. 57Chapter 231A lets a court decide what a contract, a policy or a covenant means before anyone breaches it. It needs an actual controversy — not a hypothetical — and it is the standard way to make an insurer answer the duty-to-defend question.
• Wrongful foreclosure in Massachusetts — before the sale and after it are different casesG.L. c. 244, §§ 14, 35A, 35B; U.S. Bank National Association v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637 (2011); Pinti v. Emigrant Mortgage Co., 472 Mass. 226 (2015); U.S. Bank National Association v. Schumacher, 467 Mass. 421 (2014)Ibanez voids a sale by a party that did not hold the mortgage. Pinti voids one where the paragraph 22 notice was defective. But a § 35A right-to-cure defect does not void a completed sale — and once the sale is done, the remedies narrow sharply.
• Debt collection practices in Massachusetts — two calls a week, and it is a 93A violationG.L. c. 93, § 49; 940 CMR 7.00; G.L. c. 260, § 5AG.L. c. 93 § 49 makes unfair collection a chapter 93A violation, which means the multiplier and mandatory attorney's fees. The Attorney General's regulations cap phone contact at two per seven days — stricter than federal law, and they reach original creditors too.
• Invasion of privacy in Massachusetts — a two-sentence statute, not four common-law branchesG.L. c. 214, §§ 1B, 3A; G.L. c. 272, § 99; Schlesinger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 409 Mass. 514 (1991)Massachusetts made privacy statutory. G.L. c. 214 § 1B gives a right against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference — and the interference must be unreasonable and either substantial or serious. Three years, no multiplier, Superior Court in equity.
• The Massachusetts Lemon Law — three sections of chapter 90, and they are not interchangeableG.L. c. 90, §§ 7N, 7N¼, 7N½; G.L. c. 260, § 5A; G.L. c. 93ASection 7N½ is the New Car Lemon Law — one year or 15,000 miles, three repair attempts or 15 business days out of service. Section 7N¼ is the used-vehicle dealer warranty, scaled to mileage. Section 7N voids a sale that fails inspection within seven days.
• Usury in Massachusetts — 20 percent, a criminal statute, and a letter that legalises itG.L. c. 271, § 49; G.L. c. 140, §§ 96–114B; G.L. c. 260, § 5AG.L. c. 271 § 49 caps interest and expenses at 20 percent — but it is a criminal statute with no damages action, regulated lenders are exempt, and a lender who files a notice with the Attorney General is exempt too.
• Breach of warranty on goods in Massachusetts — four years, running from deliveryG.L. c. 106, §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315, 2-316, 2-318, 2-725The UCC clock is unusual: four years from tender of delivery, regardless of whether you knew about the breach. No discovery rule, unless the warranty explicitly extends to future performance — and the parties can shorten it to one year.
• Legal malpractice in Massachusetts — three years, and the case within a caseG.L. c. 260, § 4; Colucci v. Rosen, Goldberg, Slavet, Levenson & Wekstein, P.C., 25 Mass. App. Ct. 107 (1987)Three years under G.L. c. 260 § 4 — and there is no seven-year repose for attorneys, whatever you may read. That repose applies only to medical providers. What does apply is the case-within-a-case rule: you must win the underlying matter to win this one.
• Whistleblower and retaliatory discharge in Massachusetts — the statute covers public employees onlyG.L. c. 149, § 185; Wright v. Shriners Hospital for Crippled Children, 412 Mass. 469 (1992)G.L. c. 149 § 185 protects public employees, not private-sector ones — its definition of "employer" is the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions. Private employees rely on the narrow common-law public policy exception, or on statute-specific retaliation provisions.
• Personnel records and background checks in Massachusetts — § 52C and the CORI rulesG.L. c. 149, § 52C; G.L. c. 6, §§ 167–178; 803 CMR 2.00You can demand your personnel file twice a year and the employer has five business days to produce it — and if it puts negative information in the file, it must notify you within ten days. The enforcement route runs through the Attorney General, not a private damages suit.
• Trade secret misappropriation in Massachusetts — MUTSA since 2018, and the non-compete rules that came with itG.L. c. 93, §§ 42–42G; G.L. c. 149, § 24L; 18 U.S.C. § 1836The 2018 act gives three years from discovery, exemplary damages up to twice the award for willful and malicious misappropriation, and fees that run both ways. The same legislation rewrote non-compete law — including a garden leave requirement.
• Derivative actions and corporate dissolution in Massachusetts — universal demand, and no oppression groundG.L. c. 156D, §§ 7.41, 7.42, 7.44, 14.30, 14.32; G.L. c. 156C, §§ 44, 56Massachusetts abolished the futility exception for corporations — every derivative claim needs a written demand and a 90-day wait. And judicial dissolution requires 40 percent of the voting power plus deadlock: the Legislature left out the model act's oppression and waste grounds.
• Fraudulent transfer in Massachusetts — still the UFTA, and the claim is extinguished, not barredG.L. c. 109A, §§ 5, 6, 8, 9, 10Massachusetts has not adopted the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act — chapter 109A is still the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Four years from the transfer, or one year from discovery if later, and the claim is extinguished rather than merely time-barred.
• Civil conspiracy in Massachusetts — two forms, and the rare one is nearly unusableKurker v. Hill, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 184 (1998); Aetna Casualty Surety Co. v. P & B Autobody, 43 F.3d 1546 (1st Cir. 1994); G.L. c. 260, § 2AMassachusetts recognises a true conspiracy tort requiring coercive power that no defendant had alone — and it is almost never proved. The everyday claim is concerted action, which is a theory of joint liability rather than a wrong of its own.
• Promissory estoppel in Massachusetts — reliance in place of considerationLoranger Construction Corp. v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 376 Mass. 757 (1978); G.L. c. 260, § 2Massachusetts treats it as a contract claim with reliance substituting for consideration — six years to sue. It fails where a valid contract covers the same subject, and it will not rescue a promise the statute of frauds requires in writing.
• Malicious prosecution and abuse of process in Massachusetts — and the anti-SLAPP problemLincoln v. Shea, 361 Mass. 1 (1972); Millennium Equity Holdings, LLC v. Mahlowitz, 456 Mass. 627 (2010); G.L. c. 231, § 59H; G.L. c. 260, § 2AMassachusetts does not require special injury for civil malicious prosecution, which makes the claim easier here than in many states. What makes it hard is the anti-SLAPP statute — these claims are based on petitioning, and a losing plaintiff pays the defendant's fees.
• Chapter 21E in Massachusetts — cleanup costs, contribution, and a notice that must be answered in 45 daysG.L. c. 21E, §§ 4, 4A, 5, 11A, 15; Grand Manor Condominium Association v. City of Lowell, 478 Mass. 682 (2018)Liability under c. 21E is strict, joint and several, and retroactive — an owner can be liable for a release caused by someone else decades earlier. The § 4A notice is the gateway to fees, and the recipient must respond in writing within 45 days.
• Easements in Massachusetts — how they are created, how far they reach, and how they endG.L. c. 187, §§ 2, 5; G.L. c. 184, § 23; G.L. c. 185, § 53Twenty years of uninterrupted adverse use creates a prescriptive easement under G.L. c. 187 § 2 — but not over registered land. And a Massachusetts easement is not lost by non-use: it takes abandonment, release, merger or the c. 184 § 23 thirty-year rule.
• Certiorari and mandamus in Massachusetts — sixty days, and only if nothing else worksG.L. c. 249, §§ 4, 5; Revere v. Massachusetts Gaming Commission, 476 Mass. 591 (2017)Certiorari corrects errors in quasi-judicial proceedings that nothing else reviews — and it must be brought within sixty days. Mandamus compels a plain ministerial duty and has no fixed deadline. Both are unavailable if any other adequate remedy exists.
• Dram shop and social host liability in Massachusetts — serving someone already intoxicatedG.L. c. 138, § 69; Cimino v. Milford Keg, Inc., 385 Mass. 323 (1982); McGuiggan v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 398 Mass. 152 (1986); G.L. c. 231, § 60JA licensee that serves a visibly intoxicated person can be liable to whoever that person then injures. A social host can be too — but only for supplying alcohol, not for allowing guests to drink what they brought.