G.L. c. 260, § 2B; Bridgwood v. A.J. Wood Construction, Inc., 480 Mass. 349 (2018); Stearns v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 481 Mass. 529 (2019)
Construction defect in Massachusetts — six years, whether or not you knew
A claim in Massachusetts trial courts · Last verified August 26, 2026
Construction claims in Massachusetts are decided by a deadline more often than by a defect. Section 2B sets a three-year limitations period running from accrual — and behind it an absolute six-year statute of repose that runs from completion of the work, whether or not anyone knew anything was wrong.
The difference between the two is the whole page. A limitations period can be delayed by the discovery rule and tolled by fraudulent concealment. A repose period cannot be. It is not a deadline to sue after the claim arises; it is an outer boundary after which the claim cannot arise at all.
What the claim is
A building has a defect — water intrusion, structural failure, defective envelope, faulty systems — and you want the designer, contractor or builder to pay for it.
Where the right comes from
Common law negligence, breach of contract, and breach of warranty, all constrained by G.L. c. 260, § 2B.
What a plaintiff has to prove
The elements are the elements of whichever theory is pleaded, and most complaints plead all three.
Negligence: duty, breach of the applicable professional or workmanlike standard, causation and damage. Expert testimony is required in all but the plainest cases.
Breach of contract: the agreement, the plaintiff's performance, the defective work, and damages — see breach of contract.
Breach of warranty: express warranties in the contract, and the implied warranty of good workmanship where it applies.
The theory chosen matters for the deadline. Section 2B by its terms governs actions of tort, so a pure contract claim runs on the six-year contract period in c. 260 § 2 rather than on § 2B — but a tort claim dressed as a contract claim will be treated as what it is.
The three-year period
Three years from accrual, subject to the discovery rule. A construction defect claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the harm and its cause, which for a latent defect can be years after the work.
The six-year repose
Section 2B: "in no event shall such actions be commenced more than six years after the earlier of the dates of: (1) the opening of the improvement to use; or (2) substantial completion of the improvement and the taking of possession for occupancy by the owner."
Whichever comes first, and the clock runs from the building, not from the injury.
For public projects, the second paragraph of § 2B sets its own triggers: the earlier of official acceptance of the project by the public agency, the opening of the property to public use, the contractor's acceptance of a final estimate under G.L. c. 30 § 39G, or substantial completion.
Who the repose protects
Not everyone connected to a building. Section 2B protects those involved in the "design, planning, construction or general administration of an improvement to real property" — architects, engineers, designers, contractors and construction managers, the people who furnish individualised professional services.
It does not protect mere suppliers of materials, who furnish a product rather than expertise, and who are answerable under ordinary product and warranty rules instead. That distinction is often the plaintiff's only route once six years have passed.
And it does not protect owners and occupiers in their capacity as such. A landowner whose negligent maintenance caused an injury is not shielded by the repose merely because the building is old.
What the repose does not yield to
Not the discovery rule. A defect found in year seven is barred, however diligent the owner was.
Not fraudulent concealment. Section 12 tolls limitations periods; it does not extend repose. A builder who hid the defect is still protected once six years pass.
Not the plaintiff's minority or incapacity.
Not chapter 93A, where the 93A claim sounds in tort. Bridgwood v. A.J. Wood Construction, Inc., 480 Mass. 349 (2018), held that a c. 93A claim resting on negligent construction is barred by § 2B — plaintiffs cannot escape the repose by relabelling the count.
Not a latent disease. Stearns v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 481 Mass. 529 (2019), applied the repose to asbestos claims where the disease manifested decades later, and declined to create an exception. That decision states the rule as starkly as it can be stated: the repose bars claims that could not possibly have been brought in time.
How long you have to file
Three years from accrual, and never more than six years from completion, on a tort theory.
Six years on a pure contract claim, under G.L. c. 260, § 2 — which is why the contract count matters, though it reaches only parties to the contract.
What has to happen before you file
A chapter 93A demand letter, 30 days, if a 93A count is included and no exemption applies.
Contract conditions — notice, opportunity to cure, mediation or arbitration clauses. Construction contracts are dense with them and courts enforce them.
Registration issues where the work was residential home improvement, under G.L. c. 142A, which carries its own requirements and its own consequences for an unregistered contractor.
What the claim pays
The cost of repair, or the diminution in value where repair is disproportionate.
Consequential damages — temporary housing, lost rent, damaged contents — where foreseeable.
Twelve percent interest.
Chapter 93A relief, where the claim survives Bridgwood — double or treble damages and mandatory fees for a willful or knowing violation. In practice this means a 93A count grounded in deception rather than in negligent workmanship.
Attorney's fees where the contract provides them, which many construction contracts do.
The economic loss rule
Massachusetts bars recovery in tort for damage a defective product or building causes to itself. An owner whose building is merely defective — no personal injury, no damage to other property — is confined to contract and warranty theories against parties they contracted with.
That rule and the repose together are why construction defect litigation in Massachusetts is front-loaded onto the contract documents. Who has a contract with whom decides who can be sued, and when the building was finished decides for how long.
Which court
District Court or the Boston Municipal Court within the $50,000 procedural threshold; Superior Court above it, which is where nearly all of these cases go.
Common defenses
- The six-year repose, which is absolute and is raised first.
- Limitations — three years from discovery.
- The economic loss rule.
- No privity, for a warranty or contract claim against a party the owner did not contract with.
- Disclaimers and limitation-of-liability clauses in the construction contract.
- The defect was caused by maintenance, misuse or a later alteration.
- The defendant was a material supplier, outside § 2B — which cuts the other way, and is why suppliers are sued late.
What people get wrong
The six-year clock can expire before you find the defect. That is what a repose is, and Massachusetts applies it without an exception for latent harm.
Concealment does not extend it. Fraudulent concealment tolls limitations, not repose.
Relabelling the claim as 93A does not help where the substance is negligent construction — Bridgwood forecloses it.
Material suppliers are not protected. Once the repose has run against the builder, the supplier may still be reachable.
The contract deadline is different. A pure contract claim gets six years from breach, and against the party you contracted with that is often the better route.
Where it came from
Statutes of repose for construction appeared across the country in the 1960s and 1970s, pushed by architects, engineers and contractors facing a new problem: the discovery rule. Once limitations periods began running from discovery rather than from the act, a designer could be sued forty years after finishing a building, by an owner they never met, on a record that no longer existed.
The repose was the answer, and it is deliberately blunt. It does not ask whether the claim is good, whether the plaintiff was diligent, or whether the defendant behaved well. It fixes an end date from the building's completion so that professional liability can be insured, records can be destroyed, and firms can close.
Massachusetts has enforced that logic to its conclusion. Bridgwood refused to let the statutory consumer claim escape it. Stearns applied it to a disease that could not have manifested inside the period. Both decisions acknowledge the harshness and both hold that the harshness is the design — a repose that yielded to the cases where it mattered would not be a repose.
Common questions
How long do I have to sue a builder in Massachusetts?
Three years from when you knew or should have known of the defect, and never more than six years from the opening of the improvement to use or substantial completion and occupancy, whichever came first.
What is a statute of repose?
An absolute outer deadline measured from the defendant's work rather than from the injury. It can bar a claim before the claim exists.
Can it be extended if the builder hid the defect?
No. Fraudulent concealment tolls a limitations period; it does not extend a repose.
Can I sue under chapter 93A instead?
Not where the 93A claim rests on negligent construction. Bridgwood holds § 2B bars it.
Does the repose protect everyone involved?
No. It protects those who provided design, planning, construction or general administration — not mere suppliers of materials, and not owners in their capacity as owners.
What about my contract claim?
A pure contract claim runs on the six-year contract period from breach, against the party you contracted with.