Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140 (1976); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540 (1982); Sullivan v. Boston Gas Co., 414 Mass. 129 (1993); G.L. c. 260, § 2A
Emotional distress claims in Massachusetts — IIED and NIED, and the corroboration rule
A claim in Massachusetts trial courts · Last verified August 26, 2026
Two claims share this page and they trade off against each other. One has an easier conduct standard and a harder damages requirement; the other reverses it.
Negligent infliction (NIED) takes ordinary carelessness — but requires physical harm manifested by objective symptomatology, corroboration a jury can weigh.
Intentional infliction (IIED) needs no physical manifestation at all — but requires conduct "extreme and outrageous", beyond all possible bounds of decency, which is a threshold almost nothing clears.
What the claims are
Someone's conduct caused you severe emotional harm — either because they did not care what happened to you, or because they meant it.
Where the rights come from
Common law. IIED was recognised in Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140 (1976). The NIED elements come from Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540 (1982), and the corroboration requirement was explained in Sullivan v. Boston Gas Co., 414 Mass. 129 (1993).
Negligent infliction — what a plaintiff has to prove
- Negligence by the defendant;
- Emotional distress;
- Causation;
- Physical harm manifested by objective symptomatology; and
- That a reasonable person would have suffered emotional distress in the circumstances.
Element four is the case. Sullivan requires "objective evidence of harm corroborating the emotional distress alleged, sufficient to allow a jury to determine the validity of the claim." The purpose is evidentiary rather than moral: courts wanted something more than testimony about how bad the plaintiff felt.
What has satisfied it: sleeplessness, nightmares, gastrointestinal symptoms, headaches, weight loss or gain, hair loss, hypertension, and a diagnosed psychiatric condition supported by treatment records.
What has not: upset, worry, humiliation and anger, described without any physical or clinical corroboration.
The requirement does not demand a broken bone. It demands something a witness other than the plaintiff can speak to.
Bystander claims
Massachusetts allows recovery by someone who witnessed injury to a close relative, on the Dziokonski and Ferriter line of cases. The factors are the plaintiff's proximity to the accident in time and space, the closeness of the relationship, and whether the plaintiff perceived the event or its immediate aftermath. The objective-symptomatology requirement applies here too.
Intentional infliction — what a plaintiff has to prove
- The defendant intended to inflict emotional distress, or knew or should have known that distress was the likely result;
- The conduct was extreme and outrageous, beyond all possible bounds of decency, and utterly intolerable in a civilised community;
- The conduct caused the distress; and
- The distress was severe — of a nature no reasonable person could be expected to endure.
No physical harm is required. Agis settled that, and it is the trade-off for the much higher conduct standard.
Element two is the case here, and it is a question the court screens before a jury sees it. Massachusetts repeats that "bad manners or mere hurt feelings" do not qualify. Insults, indignities, threats, annoyances and petty oppressions do not. Nor, ordinarily, does harsh conduct in an employment relationship — a demotion, a hostile supervisor, a badly handled firing.
What clears it is sustained cruelty, conduct aimed at a person known to be especially vulnerable, or an abuse of a position of power over the plaintiff.
How long you have to file
Three years for both, under G.L. c. 260, § 2A, with the discovery rule.
What has to happen before you file
Nothing — with two significant qualifications.
Against a public employer, an IIED claim is barred: G.L. c. 258, § 10(c) excludes intentional torts, including intentional mental distress, from the Tort Claims Act. The individual employee can be sued personally. An NIED claim against the public employer is within the Act and requires presentment within two years.
In employment, chapter 151B is the exclusive remedy for conduct within its scope, and an emotional distress count resting on the same discriminatory conduct is generally preempted.
What the claim pays
Damages for the emotional distress itself, and for the physical symptoms.
Medical and psychological treatment costs.
Lost earnings, where the distress interfered with work.
Twelve percent prejudgment interest.
No punitive damages at common law, and no attorney's fees.
Comparative negligence applies to the NIED claim under G.L. c. 231, § 85, reducing recovery and barring it past 50 percent. It does not apply to IIED.
Which court
District Court or the Boston Municipal Court within the $50,000 procedural threshold; Superior Court above it.
Common defenses
- No objective symptomatology, which defeats NIED and is raised in nearly every case.
- The conduct was not extreme and outrageous, which the court screens as a matter of law.
- The distress was not severe.
- No causation — the distress came from something else, which is why plaintiffs' treatment records become the battleground.
- Chapter 151B preemption, in employment.
- Section 10(c), for an intentional tort claim against a public employer.
- Comparative negligence, on the NIED count.
- Limitations.
What people get wrong
NIED needs physical corroboration; IIED does not. This is the single most useful distinction on the page and it decides which claim to plead.
"Outrageous" is a high bar and it is the judge's screen. Conduct that was cruel, unfair or humiliating usually does not reach it.
Hurt feelings are not a claim. Massachusetts says so in those words.
Objective symptomatology is not the same as physical injury. Sleeplessness, nausea, weight change and a documented psychiatric diagnosis can satisfy it.
Employment cases usually fail — on 151B preemption if the conduct was discriminatory, and on the outrageousness standard if it was not.
A public employer cannot be sued for IIED. But its employee can be, personally.
Where it came from
The common law refused for a long time to compensate emotional harm on its own. The worry was proof — distress is invisible, easy to claim and hard to test — and the traditional answer was to require an accompanying physical injury or an independent tort.
Massachusetts dismantled that requirement in two steps, and the sequence explains the present shape of the law.
Agis came first, in 1976, and allowed recovery for intentional infliction without physical harm. The reasoning was that the proof problem is much smaller where the defendant's conduct was outrageous enough that the distress needs no separate proof — the conduct itself is the corroboration.
Payton and Sullivan then handled the negligent case, where there is no outrageous conduct to supply that assurance. Rather than requiring an independent physical injury, the SJC required objective symptomatology — evidence a jury could evaluate that the distress was real.
So the two claims are answers to the same evidentiary question, reached from opposite directions. One gets its assurance from the defendant's conduct; the other requires it from the plaintiff's body. A claim that has neither does not survive, which is the intended result.
Common questions
Can I sue for emotional distress alone in Massachusetts?
Yes. For a negligent claim you need physical harm manifested by objective symptomatology. For an intentional claim you need conduct that was extreme and outrageous.
What counts as objective symptomatology?
Physical or clinical evidence corroborating the distress — sleeplessness, nausea, headaches, weight change, hair loss, hypertension, or a diagnosed and treated psychiatric condition.
Do I need a physical injury for IIED?
No. Agis removed that requirement for the intentional claim.
What counts as "extreme and outrageous"?
Conduct beyond all possible bounds of decency and utterly intolerable in a civilised community. Bad manners and hurt feelings do not qualify, and the judge decides whether the conduct can meet the standard.
Can I sue my employer for emotional distress?
Rarely. Chapter 151B preempts claims resting on discriminatory conduct, and ordinary workplace unpleasantness does not meet the outrageousness standard.
Can I sue a city or town?
Not for intentional infliction — G.L. c. 258 § 10(c) excludes it. The individual employee can be sued. A negligent claim against the public employer requires presentment within two years.