G.L. c. 214, §§ 1B, 3A; G.L. c. 272, § 99; Schlesinger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 409 Mass. 514 (1991)
Invasion of privacy in Massachusetts — a two-sentence statute, not four common-law branches
A claim in Massachusetts trial courts · Last verified August 26, 2026
Most states protect privacy through four common-law torts. Massachusetts did something different: it passed a statute, and it is two sentences long.
"A person shall have a right against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with his privacy. The superior court shall have jurisdiction in equity to enforce such right and in connection therewith to award damages."
Everything else is judicial construction of those twenty-eight words.
What the claim is
Someone intruded on your private life, or disclosed something private about you, in a way that was both unreasonable and serious.
Where the right comes from
Section 1B, enacted in 1974. Related statutes carry their own claims: G.L. c. 214, § 3A for unauthorised commercial use of a name, portrait or picture, and G.L. c. 272, § 99 for interception of wire and oral communications.
What a plaintiff has to prove
- An interference with privacy; and
- That the interference was unreasonable, and
- either substantial or serious.
Read the conjunctions carefully, because the courts have. The SJC has held the statute requires the interference to be unreasonable AND (substantial OR serious) — Schlesinger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 409 Mass. 514 (1991), explaining that the section was "not intended to prohibit serious or substantial interferences which are reasonable or justified."
So a serious intrusion that was justified is not actionable, and a trivial intrusion that was unjustified is not either. Both halves have to be satisfied.
What the section reaches
Intrusion into private affairs — surveillance, searching belongings, reading private communications, monitoring outside what an employment relationship justifies, entering private space.
Disclosure of private facts — publishing or circulating information about a person's private life. Massachusetts treats medical information, financial details, sexual matters and family circumstances as core private facts.
Employer conduct, which is where a large share of § 1B litigation arises — workplace monitoring, disclosure of an employee's medical or personnel information, and investigations that reach into private life. The recurring question is whether the employer's legitimate interest made the intrusion reasonable.
What it does not reach
False light. Massachusetts has never recognised it, and a claim that a true impression was misleadingly conveyed belongs in defamation or nowhere.
Information already public, or a matter of legitimate public concern.
Reasonable conduct, however intrusive — which is the Schlesinger point.
And there is no Massachusetts analogue to the newer statutes some states have passed. Texas, for example, has chapters creating civil claims for the non-consensual disclosure of intimate images and for online impersonation, with statutory damages and mandatory fees. Massachusetts has no equivalent. A person facing that conduct here has to map it onto § 1B, the wiretap statute, § 3A for commercial use of a likeness, or defamation — none of which was designed for it, and none of which carries a multiplier.
The wiretap statute — the stronger claim where it fits
G.L. c. 272, § 99 is one of the strictest wiretap laws in the country, and where the facts involve a recording, it is usually the better claim.
Massachusetts is an all-party consent state. Secretly recording a wire or oral communication is prohibited, and unlike many states the statute has no exception for a participant recording their own conversation.
It has its own civil action, under § 99(Q), giving an aggrieved person actual and punitive damages with a liquidated minimum, plus litigation costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
That fee provision is the practical difference. Section 1B shifts no fees; § 99 does.
How long you have to file
Three years under G.L. c. 260, § 2A, running from the interference — or from the disclosure, where that is the wrong complained of.
What has to happen before you file
Nothing.
What the claim pays
Damages, which the statute authorises the court to award "in connection with" enforcing the right — including emotional distress, which is usually the substance of the claim.
Injunctive relief. The section is written as an equity provision, and an order to stop the surveillance or to return or destroy material is often the object.
Twelve percent interest.
No statutory multiplier and no fee award under § 1B.
Chapter 93A, where the conduct occurred in trade or commerce, which supplies the multiplier and mandatory fees the privacy statute lacks.
Wiretap damages under c. 272 § 99(Q), where a recording is involved — actual and punitive damages, a liquidated minimum, costs and fees.
Which court
The Superior Court, which the statute names — § 1B assigns jurisdiction in equity to the Superior Court by its own terms. That is unusual and it means a § 1B claim does not belong in the District Court on the theory that the amount is small.
Who can be sued
The person who intruded or disclosed.
An employer, for its own conduct and for an employee acting within the scope of employment.
A business, which brings chapter 93A into play.
A public employer, with a significant caveat: G.L. c. 258, § 10(c) excludes invasion of privacy from the Tort Claims Act by name, so the public employer is not liable and the individual employee is the defendant.
Common defenses
- The interference was reasonable — the Schlesinger defence, and the one that decides most employment cases.
- Not substantial or serious.
- Consent, express or implied.
- The information was already public, or of legitimate public concern.
- A legitimate business or employment justification for the monitoring or disclosure.
- Section 10(c), for a claim against a public employer.
- Limitations — three years.
What people get wrong
Massachusetts privacy law is a statute, not four torts. Guidance written for other states does not describe it.
Both halves of the test have to be met. Unreasonable, and either substantial or serious. A justified intrusion is not actionable however invasive.
There is no false light claim here.
Section 1B pays no fees. The wiretap statute and chapter 93A do, which is why they are pleaded alongside it.
Recording a conversation you are part of is still illegal in Massachusetts without everyone's consent — and it carries its own civil claim with fees.
You cannot sue a city for invasion of privacy. Section 10(c) excludes it; the employee is the defendant.
Where it came from
The four common-law privacy torts were catalogued in the mid-twentieth century and adopted piecemeal across the states, producing a body of law with four separate sets of elements and considerable inconsistency between jurisdictions.
Massachusetts skipped that. Section 1B was enacted in 1974 as a single general right, and the Legislature left the content to the courts — which is why the operative language is a standard rather than a list of prohibited acts.
The choice has costs and benefits. The benefit is flexibility: § 1B reaches conduct the four categories would miss, because it asks about the interference rather than about which pigeonhole it occupies. The cost is that the statute supplies no remedy beyond damages and an injunction, so the claim has none of the machinery — statutory damages, multipliers, fee-shifting — that Massachusetts attached to its consumer and civil rights statutes.
That gap is most visible in the area the Legislature has not addressed. Other states have written specific statutes for intimate-image disclosure and online impersonation, with damages floors and mandatory fees, because the general privacy tort proved a poor fit for conduct that spreads instantly and cheaply. Massachusetts has not, and a person facing that conduct here is arguing about whether it was "unreasonable, substantial or serious" under a 1974 standard.
Common questions
Does Massachusetts have an invasion of privacy claim?
Yes, and it is statutory — G.L. c. 214 § 1B, a right against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with privacy.
What do I have to prove?
That the interference was unreasonable, and that it was either substantial or serious. Both halves.
How long do I have to sue?
Three years from the interference.
Can I recover attorney's fees?
Not under § 1B. The wiretap statute and chapter 93A both provide fees where they apply.
Can someone record a conversation with me without telling me?
No. Massachusetts requires all-party consent, and the wiretap statute carries its own civil claim with damages, a liquidated minimum and attorney's fees.
Is there a Massachusetts law about someone posting intimate images or impersonating me online?
Not a dedicated civil statute of the kind some states have. Those facts have to be brought under § 1B, the wiretap statute, § 3A for commercial use of a likeness, or defamation.