Rule 54.Judgments: Costs

(2013)

The amendment to Rule 54(c) in 2013 was part of a group of amendments to Rules 5(a), 54(c), and 55(b)(2) that responded to the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Hermanson v. Szafarowicz, 457 Mass. 39 (2010). The Hermanson case dealt with the conflict between G.L. c. 231, § 13B, which limits a plaintiff’s ability to demand a specific monetary amount in a complaint, and Rule 54(c), which provides that a default judgment may not exceed the amount requested in the demand for judgment.

Detailed analysis of the amendments to these three rules is set forth in the Reporter’s Notes to the 2013 amendments to Rule 55(b)(2).

(1996)

With the merger of the District Court rules into the Mass.R.Civ.P., minor differences which had existed between Mass.R.Civ.P. 54 and Dist./Mun.Cts.R.Civ.P. 54 have been eliminated. These differences were based on the lack of civil jury trials in the District Court. Although there are still no civil jury trials in the District Court (with some exceptions), the differences are not significant enough to merit any changes in the merged set of civil rules.

(1986)

Under Rule 54(f), the initial entry of judgment by the trial court should be the sum of the verdict and interest on that verdict to the time of said entry. Post-judgment interest should be computed on that total. See, e.g., Boston Edison v. Tritsch, 370 Mass. 260, 266 (1976); Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. McCarthy, 550 F.Supp. 231, 248 (D.Mass.1982).

(1973)

Rule 54(a) crystallizes the meaning of “judgment” (and “final judgment”), and emphasizes the difference between these terms and the concept of “judgment” under pre-existing Massachusetts practice. Heretofore, “judgment” has meant the last step in the case, which cuts off all appellate review (unless the losing party can successfully press a petition to vacate the judgment). Under the Rules, “judgment” is merely the final adjudicating act of the trial court, and starts the timetable for appellate review. Briefly stated, a case which “went to judgment” under the old practice was, except in the rarest circumstances, forensically dead; henceforth, a case in which judgment is “entered” is ready for appeal. See Rule 58 and Appellate Rules 3 and 4. For a definition of “appeal” see Appellate Rule 1.

Because the Rules merge “law” and “equity,” see Rule 2, the word “judgment” also incorporates what used to be called a “decree”.

Practice under Federal Rule 54(b) (identical to Rule 54(b)) is to wait until all claims are ripe for judgment before entering judgment on any of them. However, the court may “direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties,” although “only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.” This exception is necessary to avoid the injustice that may result from reserving judgment until final adjudication of all of several remotely-related claims.

Rule 54(c) requires that a judgment by default extend only to what is prayed for in the demand for judgment; otherwise, a judgment should grant the relief to which the prevailing party is entitled.

Rule 54(c) also provides that every final judgment (except a default judgment) shall grant the relief to which the party is entitled, regardless of whether he requested it or not. Thus a party may be granted equitable relief when he asked for damages, or damages when he requested equitable relief. A party may be awarded greater damages than the ad damnum.

Rule 54(d) accords with G.L. c. 261, § 1: “In civil actions the prevailing party shall recover his costs, except as otherwise provided.” Costs fixed by statute are of course taxed in accordance therewith. Costs in actions whose costs are not thus regulated may not be taxed more broadly than in regulated actions. See G.L. c. 261, § 13. In the latter event, however, both rules and statute vest the court with discretion as to whether costs shall be taxed at all.

Massachusetts practice with respect to taxation of costs can be found in G.L. c. 261, § 19. The clerk may tax the costs without notifying any party, unless the adverse party has given “seasonable notice in writing to the clerk of his desire to be present at the taxation or causes such notice to be entered on the docket.” This procedure will continue under Rule 54(d).

Rule 54(e) deals with the taxation of costs incident to depositions. These costs are entirely subject to the court's discretion. But costs may never be allowed unless the court finds the taking of the deposition to have been reasonably necessary. Items includible as “taxable costs” are also listed in Rule 54(e). Rule 54(e) is for all practical purposes identical to S.J.C.Rule 3:15, Section 9. The only difference is that Rule 54(e) permits taxation of witnesses' fees and mileage allowances.