Pro Confesso
prō confessō · also written decree pro confesso; bill taken pro confesso; taken as confessed
Legal Latin Dictionary · Last verified November 14, 2026
Pronunciation
There is no single official pronunciation of legal Latin. What follows is how most American lawyers and judges say the phrase, and how a Roman would have said it.
- Common US legal pronunciation: proh kun-FESS-oh, IPA /proʊ kənˈfɛsoʊ/. Some say the second word kon-FESS-oh, /kɑnˈfɛsoʊ/.
- Classical Latin (restored): proh kohn-FESS-soh, IPA [proː koːnˈfɛssoː]. The double s was held a moment longer, and by the usual rule of classical Latin the o before nf was long.
Literal translation
- pro — as, for, the same as (here, treating a thing as something it is taken to be)
- confesso — confessed, admitted; the ablative of confessus, the past participle of the verb confiteor, “to confess”
Put together: “as confessed,” or more plainly, “as if admitted.”
What it means in law
Courts of equity decided cases on written pleadings. The complainant filed a bill, and the defendant was expected to appear and then plead, demur or answer. A defendant who was served and did nothing, or who appeared and then let the time to respond run out, could have the bill taken pro confesso. The federal Equity Rules then let the case go forward ex parte, without the defendant, and the court could enter a decree on the bill. That decree was a decree pro confesso.
The order did not hand the complainant whatever he asked for. In Thomson v. Wooster (1885), Justice Bradley explained that the court itself had to decide what the bill’s statements, taken as true, properly supported, and that the matter of the bill ought to be opened and explained to the court before a decree issued. Allegations that were distinct and positive were taken as true without proof. Where the demand was uncertain, as with damages or profits that had to be counted, proof was still needed, often before a master. That is what happened in Thomson: the decree held a patent valid and infringed, and a master took an account of the defendants’ profits.
Once entered and left standing, the decree bound the defaulting defendant. In Thomson the defendants tried, before the master and then on appeal, to show that the patent was invalid. The Court held them barred. They could challenge the decree only for an error that appeared on the face of the bill itself.
Default also has limits when several defendants are charged jointly with the same wrong. In Frow v. De La Vega (1872), De La Vega charged Frow and several other defendants with a joint conspiracy to cheat him out of land in Texas. Frow defaulted, and the trial court entered a final decree against him alone; later the other defendants won on the merits and the bill was dismissed. The Supreme Court called that result absurd. Where a bill charges several defendants jointly and one defaults, the court should enter a default and decree pro confesso against that one and go on with the case against the rest. If the complainant loses on the merits, the bill is dismissed as to everyone, the defaulter included.
Pro confesso is not a confession of judgment, in which a debtor agrees in writing that judgment may be entered, and it is not nolo contendere, a plea in a criminal case. A bill was taken as confessed because the defendant said nothing, not because the defendant admitted anything. The Court in Thomson noted that Lord Hardwicke compared it to the common-law judgment by nil dicit, the judgment entered against a defendant who says nothing in answer.
Modern rules speak of default instead. A few rulesets keep the old words, mostly to translate them into the new vocabulary, as the rule pages below show.
Etymology
Pro is the preposition Lewis & Short enters as prō. Among its many senses is one for viewing or treating a thing as something: “for, the same as, just as, as”. The dictionary’s example from Terence, habui, amavi pro meo, it renders “as my own”.
Confesso comes from confĭtĕor, “to acknowledge, confess, own, avow”. The entry adds that this verb implies giving up a position, “implying a sacrifice of will or a change of conviction”, where the plain verb fateor is a simple acknowledgment. Although confiteor is deponent, its participle confessus is also used “in a pass. signif.”, and the dictionary’s first example of that use comes from the Twelve Tables, Rome’s early code, as Aulus Gellius quotes it (Lex XII. Tab. ap. Gell. 15, 13, 11). As an adjective in the passive sense the participle means “acknowledged; hence, undoubted, evident, certain, incontrovertible”.
The dictionary does not record pro confesso as a phrase. Reading it as “(treated) as a thing confessed,” with confesso in the ablative after pro, is our reading of the grammar. The irony is built in: the defendant confessed nothing, but the court treated the bill as though he had.
Source: Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879), entries prō, confĭtĕor, via the Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University). Glosses in quotation marks are quoted from it.
In the opinions
Three passages by Justice Bradley, writing for the Court in two nineteenth-century cases under the federal Equity Rules. Each is quoted from the official United States Reports.
It is thus seen that by our practice, a decree pro confesso is not a decree as of course according to the prayer of the bill, nor merely such as the complainant chooses to take it; but that it is made (or should be made) by the court, according to what is proper to be decreed upon the statements of the bill, assumed to be true.
After reviewing English and New York chancery practice and the federal Equity Rules then in force, Justice Bradley summed up what such a decree is.
From the authorities cited, and the express language of our own Rules in Equity, it seems clear that the defendants, after the entry of the decree pro confesso, and whilst it stood unrevoked, were absolutely barred and precluded from alleging anything in derogation of, or in opposition to, the said decree, and that they are equally barred and precluded from questioning its correctness here on appeal, unless on the face of the bill it appears manifest that it was erroneous and improperly granted.
The defendants had let the bill go unanswered and then tried to attack the patent the decree had declared valid; the Court explained why they could not.
The defaulting defendant has merely lost his standing in court. He will not be entitled to service of notices in the cause, nor to appear in it in any way. He can adduce no evidence, he cannot be heard at the final hearing. But if the suit should be decided against the complainant on the merits, the bill will be dismissed as to all the defendants alike—the defaulter as well as the others.
The passage follows the Court’s statement that, when one of several defendants charged with a joint wrong defaults, the proper course is to enter a default and a formal decree pro confesso against him and proceed with the case on the others’ answers. The official text of that sentence is misread in the scanned copy, so the quotation begins after it.
Where it appears in the rules
The rule pages below keep the old phrase in their official text. Alabama’s and Mississippi’s Rule 81 translate it into modern terms, Mississippi’s Rule 55 uses it for one kind of uncontested divorce, and a Virginia statute lets a court set aside a decree pro confesso on listed grounds.
4 rule pages in 3 jurisdictions use “pro confesso” in their official text.
The two Rule 81s say that a decree pro confesso “shall be understood to mean entry of default as provided in Rule 55” (Alabama Rule 81(e); Mississippi’s Rule 81(e) has the same words). That is the first step, not the judgment. In federal court the same two steps appear in Federal Rule 55: when a party has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that is shown, “the clerk must enter the party’s default”. A default judgment is a separate step: the clerk enters it, on request, only for a sum certain (or one that can be made certain by computation) against a defendant who defaulted by not appearing and is neither a minor nor an incompetent person; otherwise the party must apply to the court, which may hold a hearing to “establish the truth of any allegation by evidence”. Rule 55(c) provides that “The court may set aside an entry of default for good cause”. The old idea of a bill taken as confessed lives on in Federal Rule 8(b)(6): “An allegation—other than one relating to the amount of damages—is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied”.
Notable remarks
Two sentences from Thomson v. Wooster on where the practice came from. Both are the Court’s own words.
By the early practice of the civil law, failure to appear at the day to which the cause was adjourned was deemed a confession of the action; but in later times this rule was changed, so that the plaintiff, notwithstanding the contumacy of the defendant, only obtained judgment in accordance with the truth of the case as established by an ex parte examination.
Justice Bradley traced the idea of treating default as confession back to Roman procedure, citing a nineteenth-century work on Roman civil procedure.
Lord Hardwicke likened a decree pro confesso to a judgment by nil dicit at common law, and to judgment for plaintiff on demurrer to the defendant’s plea.
The comparison is that of Lord Hardwicke, Lord Chancellor of England in the eighteenth century. The sentence is the Court’s own summary of it, citing his decision in an English case.
Frequently asked questions
Is a decree pro confesso the same as a default judgment?
They are close cousins. A decree pro confesso was the equity court’s judgment against a defendant who failed to answer the bill; a default judgment is the modern judgment against a party who fails to plead or defend. Alabama’s and Mississippi’s rules equate a decree pro confesso with an entry of default, which in modern practice is the first step. A default judgment comes after it, and under Federal Rule 55 it may require a hearing or proof.
Did taking a bill pro confesso mean the complainant automatically won?
No. In Thomson v. Wooster (1885) the Supreme Court said the decree was made by the court according to what was proper on the bill’s statements, assumed to be true, and not simply as the complainant chose to take it. Clear, specific allegations were taken as true without proof. Damages, profits and other uncertain matters still had to be proved.
Can a defendant undo a decree pro confesso or a default?
Sometimes. Under the Equity Rules discussed in Thomson, the decree became absolute unless the court set it aside, or gave more time to answer, at the same term on the defendant’s motion and affidavit showing cause. Today, Federal Rule 55(c) lets a court set aside an entry of default for good cause and a final default judgment under Rule 60(b). Virginia’s statute allows a decree pro confesso to be set aside on motion for fraud on the court, a void judgment, proof of an accord and satisfaction, or the defendant’s status as a servicemember.
What happens when only one of several defendants defaults?
Under Frow v. De La Vega (1872), when defendants are charged jointly, the court should enter a default against the one who failed to answer and go on with the case against the others. It should not enter a final judgment against the defaulter alone while the case continues. If the others win on the merits, the claim is dismissed against all of them, the defaulter included.
Is pro confesso the same as confessing judgment?
No. A confession of judgment is a debtor’s own consent to have judgment entered. Pro confesso describes the effect of silence: the defendant did not answer, so the court treated the bill as admitted. Nor is it related to nolo contendere, a plea in a criminal case.