Jus Sanguinis
jūs sanguĭnis · also written ius sanguinis
Legal Latin Dictionary · Last verified November 16, 2026
Pronunciation
There is no single official pronunciation of legal Latin. What follows is how most American lawyers and judges say the phrase, and how a Roman would have said it.
- Common US legal pronunciation: JUS SANG-gwih-nis, IPA /dʒʌs ˈsæŋɡwɪnɪs/. Many say YOOS SANG-gwih-nis, /juːs ˈsæŋɡwɪnɪs/, closer to the Latin.
- Classical Latin (restored): YOOS SAHNG-gwih-nis, IPA [juːs ˈsaŋɡʷɪnɪs]. The u of jūs was long; both i’s of sanguinis were short, so the stress falls on the first syllable.
Literal translation
- jus — right, law
- sanguinis — of blood; the genitive of sanguis
Put together: “right of blood,” meaning a right that comes from one’s parents. Its counterpart is jus soli, “right of the soil,” citizenship fixed by the place of birth.
What it means in law
A nation can decide who is a citizen at birth in two basic ways. It can look at where the child was born, or at who the child’s parents are. The second is jus sanguinis: citizenship that passes from parent to child, like an inheritance, wherever the child happens to be born. Many countries make descent their main rule. The United States does not.
American law starts from the place of birth. The Fourteenth Amendment makes citizens of persons born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction, but it says nothing about a child born abroad to an American parent. In Rogers v. Bellei (1971) the Supreme Court, quoting United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), said that the Amendment left that subject to Congress. So in this country, citizenship by descent exists only to the extent a statute grants it.
Congress has granted it since 1790, almost without a break, and always with conditions. The early laws said that the right of citizenship would not descend to children whose fathers had never lived in the United States. They also looked backward, so for more than fifty years after 1802 a child born abroad to a father who became a citizen after that year was an alien. Bellei noted the gap; Congress closed it in 1855. In Weedin v. Chin Bow (1927) the Court read that condition strictly. Chin Bow was born in China in 1914 to a father who was an American citizen, because the grandfather had been born in the United States, but who had never been in this country until 1922. The Court held that the father had to have lived here before the child was born, so Chin Bow was not a citizen. Reading the statute that way, Chief Justice Taft wrote, adopted the rule of jus sanguinis and made the fact and time of birth its basis.
Because citizenship by descent rests on statute, Congress can shape it. In Bellei the Court, five to four, upheld a law that took away the citizenship of a man born abroad to an American mother because he had not lived in the United States for the time the law required. The conditions have changed many times and have often turned on the parents’ residence here, and sometimes on the parent’s sex and marital status. Miller v. Albright (1998) shows how contested that last point can be: a woman born abroad to an unmarried American father challenged a statute that asked more of citizen fathers than of citizen mothers, and the Court affirmed the judgment against her without any opinion drawing a majority. Which version of the law applies to a person usually depends on the date of birth.
Jus sanguinis is not a lesser form of citizenship once acquired. It is a different route to citizenship at birth, and in American law it is a route Congress builds. The birthplace rule is constitutional; the descent rule is statutory. The jus soli entry covers the birthplace rule and the Supreme Court’s 2026 decision on it.
Etymology
Jūs is the ordinary Latin word for “right, law, justice”.
Sanguis is “blood”, first in the literal sense. Lewis & Short also records a transferred sense that is the one the legal phrase needs: “Blood, i. e. consanguinity, descent, race, stock, family”. Among its examples is sanguine conjuncti, glossed “blood-relations, relatives by blood”.
Sanguinis is the genitive, so jus sanguinis is a right of, or arising from, blood. Lewis & Short does not record the legal phrase; that reading is ours, and so is the contrast with jus soli.
Source: Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879), entries jūs, sanguis, via the Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University). Glosses in quotation marks are quoted from it.
In the opinions
Three passages: two from Chief Justice Taft’s opinion for the Court in Weedin v. Chin Bow, and one from a dissent in Miller v. Albright. Each is quoted from the official United States Reports. Rogers v. Bellei, the leading case on citizenship by descent, does not use the Latin phrase; it speaks of transmitting citizenship by descent.
Only two constructions seem to us possible, and we must adopt one or the other. The one is that the descent of citizenship shall be regarded as taking place at the birth of the person to whom it is to be transmitted, and that the words “have never been resident in the United States ” refer in point of time to the birth of the person to whom the citizenship is to descend. This is the adoption of the rule of jus sanguinis in respect of citizenship, and that emphasizes the fact and time of birth as the basis of it.
The statute said that the right of citizenship would not descend to children whose fathers had never lived in the United States. The Court weighed two readings of that condition and adopted this one, which tests the father’s residence as of the child’s birth. The space before the closing quotation mark is in the official report.
It is very clear that the exact meaning of the proviso upon the point here at issue was not before the Court. The section itself, and the policy of the United States in the sections that preceded it, were important in the discussion only in showing how restricted or otherwise was the application of the jus sanguinis in our law.
Chin Bow’s lawyers relied on United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898). The Court answered that the earlier case had not decided this question, and had looked at the descent statutes only for what they showed about the reach of the rule.
Nor have I found any such support in the history of the jus sanguinis statutes. That history shows a virtually unbroken tradition of transmitting American citizenship from parent to child “at birth,” under statutes that imposed certain residence requirements.
There was no opinion of the Court in Miller. Justice Breyer, dissenting for himself and Justices Souter and Ginsburg, argued that statutes passing citizenship from parent to child deserve full judicial review, and found nothing in their history to suggest otherwise.
Where it appears in the rules
No rule on this site uses “jus sanguinis” in its official text.
Citizenship at birth is governed by the Constitution and by federal statutes, not by rules of court.
Frequently asked questions
What is the difference between jus sanguinis and jus soli?
Jus sanguinis, the right of blood, passes citizenship from parent to child wherever the child is born. Jus soli, the right of the soil, gives citizenship to a child born within the country’s territory. The United States uses both: the birthplace rule comes from the Constitution, and the descent rule from statutes.
Is a child born abroad to an American parent automatically a citizen?
Often, but only if the statute that applies is satisfied. Those statutes have long required that the American parent, or parents, lived in the United States for some period before the child’s birth, and the details have changed over the years. Which version applies usually depends on when the child was born.
Can Congress change citizenship by descent?
Yes, within constitutional limits. Because the Fourteenth Amendment does not cover children born abroad, citizenship by descent comes from Congress. In Rogers v. Bellei (1971) the Supreme Court upheld a law that ended the citizenship of a man born abroad who did not later live in the United States for the period the law required.
Did the Supreme Court use the phrase in Rogers v. Bellei?
No. Bellei is the leading case on citizenship by descent, but it speaks of transmitting citizenship by descent and does not use the Latin. It does use jus soli for the birthplace rule. The Latin jus sanguinis appears in Weedin v. Chin Bow (1927) and in Justice Breyer’s dissent in Miller v. Albright (1998), both quoted above.