Causa Proxima
causa proxĭma · also written causa proxima non remota spectatur
Legal Latin Dictionary · Last verified November 16, 2026
Pronunciation
There is no single official pronunciation of legal Latin. What follows is how most American lawyers say the phrase, and how a Roman would have said it.
- Common US legal pronunciation: KOW-zuh PROK-sih-muh, IPA /ˈkaʊzə ˈprɒksɪmə/. Some say KAW-zuh, /ˈkɔːzə/.
- Classical Latin (restored): KOW-sah PROK-sih-mah, IPA [ˈkau̯sa ˈprɔksɪma]. The s of causa was always voiceless, as in see; the i of proxima is short, so the stress goes back to prox-.
Literal translation
- causa — a cause, a reason
- proxima — nearest, next; the superlative of propior, nearer
Put together: “the nearest cause.” The full maxim, causa proxima non remota spectatur, adds non (not), remota (remote, distant) and spectatur (is looked at): “the nearest cause, not the remote one, is looked to.”
What it means in law
Most losses have more than one cause. A ship sinks in a storm that its crew sailed into carelessly; a fire spreads because a repair was put off. When a contract or a rule of law makes someone answer only for losses from a particular cause, a court has to decide which link in the chain counts. The maxim causa proxima non remota spectatur gives the old answer: look to the nearest cause, not the remote ones.
The Supreme Court applied it to marine insurance. A policy insures against named perils, such as the perils of the sea. If a peril of the sea is the proximate cause of a loss, the insurer pays, and the court does not ask what brought the peril about. So the insurer generally cannot defend by showing that the crew’s carelessness led the ship into the storm or the collision; the owner did not promise that his servants would always take care.
General Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sherwood (1853) shows the other side of the rule. Through her crew’s failure to keep a proper lookout, the insured brig Emily ran into the schooner Virginian and sank her. The Emily’s owner had to pay the schooner’s owners for their loss, and he asked his insurers to repay him. The Court said no. A collision alone gave the schooner’s owners no claim against him; only his crew’s negligence did. So the negligence, not the peril of the sea, was the efficient cause of the money he paid out, and the policy did not insure against his servants’ negligence. As the Court put it, the two rules were both applications of the same maxim: stop at the peril when the peril alone produced the loss, but look behind it when the loss depends on what caused the peril. The Court added that the owner could recover for the damage the collision did to his own ship, a loss the peril itself caused.
Sherwood also shows what “proximate” meant to the Court. It was not simply the last event in time. The Court spoke of the efficient cause, the one that actually produced the loss claimed, and said that a peril that was not the efficient cause could not, in any just sense, be called the proximate cause. The Court also leaned on long commercial practice: it found no evidence that underwriters had ever paid claims of this kind.
Outside insurance, American courts nearly always use the English proximate cause. In negligence cases a plaintiff generally must show both that the defendant’s conduct was a cause in fact of the harm and that it was a proximate cause, close enough to the harm for the law to hold the defendant responsible. How courts draw that line differs from state to state and from one kind of claim to another.
Etymology
Causa is the everyday Latin word for a cause. Lewis & Short define it as “that by, on account of, or through which any thing takes place or is done; a cause, reason, motive, inducement”. The entry quotes Cicero drawing a related line, between a cause and whatever merely comes first: non sic causa intellegi debet, ut quod cuique antecedat, id ei causa sit, sed quod cuique efficienter antecedat (Cic. Fat. 15, 34). In our translation: a cause must not be understood as whatever comes before a thing, but as what comes before it and brings it about. That is close to the “efficient cause” of Sherwood; the comparison is ours.
Proxima is the feminine of proxĭmus, which Lewis & Short treat under prŏpĭor, “nearer, nigher”; the superlative means “the nearest, next”. In the maxim, remota comes from rĕ-mŏvĕo, whose participle the dictionary glosses “removed, i. e. afar off, distant, remote”, and spectatur is the passive of specto, “to look at, behold; to gaze at, watch, observe, etc.”
Source: Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879), entries causa, prŏpĭor, rĕ-mŏvĕo, specto, via the Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University). Glosses in quotation marks are quoted from it. The translations of the maxim and of Cicero are ours.
In the opinions
Two passages from Justice Curtis’s opinion for the Court in General Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sherwood, quoted from the official United States Reports. The first applies the maxim to the case; the second explains how it works. No other opinion reviewed for this page uses the Latin in the Court’s own words.
We know of no principle of insurance law which prevents us from looking for this sole operative cause, or requires us to stop short of it, in applying the maxim causa proxima non remota spectatur.
The shipowner’s loss was the damages he paid for sinking another vessel, and his own declaration said his crew’s negligence caused the collision. The Court asked whether the maxim stopped it from looking at that negligence.
The two rules are in themselves consistent. Indeed, they are both but applications, to different cases, of the maxim, causa proxima non remota spectatur. In applying this maxim, in looking for the proximate cause of the loss, if it is found to be a peril of the sea, we inquire no further ; we do not look for the cause of that peril. But if the peril of the sea, which operated in a given case, was not of itself sufficient to occasion, and did not in and by itself occasion the loss claimed, if it depended upon the cause of that peril whether the loss claimed would follow it, and therefore a particular cause of the peril is essential to be shown by the assured, then we must look beyond the peril to its cause, to ascertain the efficient cause of the loss.
The Court reconciled two lines of cases: those holding the insurer liable for a sea peril even when the master was careless, and those discharging the insurer when the master’s neglect was the real cause of the loss.
Where it appears in the rules
No rule on this site uses “causa proxima” in its official text.
Many rule pages on this site use the English proximate cause instead, and they are not counted here. The closest to the maxim’s home ground is California’s Code of Civil Procedure § 431.50, on insurance suits in which the insurer says that “although the proximate cause of the loss was a peril insured against, the loss was remotely caused by or would not have occurred but for a peril excepted in the contract of insurance”; the insurer must spell out that defense in its answer.
Frequently asked questions
What does causa proxima non remota spectatur mean?
“The nearest cause, not the remote one, is looked to.” It tells a court deciding who bears a loss to look at the cause that actually produced it, not at earlier events further back in the chain.
Is causa proxima the same as proximate cause?
Closely related, but not identical. Proximate cause is the English form of the phrase, and modern courts, statutes and rules almost always use it. Insurance law and tort law use it differently, though. In insurance, the maxim looks for the efficient cause of the loss among the perils, as in Sherwood. In negligence, proximate cause limits liability to harms close enough to the defendant’s conduct for the law to hold the defendant responsible. The Latin appears mostly in older insurance cases.
Does proximate mean the last cause in time?
Not necessarily. In General Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sherwood (1853) the Supreme Court looked for the efficient cause, the one that actually produced the loss claimed, and held that a collision at sea was not the proximate cause of the damages a shipowner paid when only his crew’s negligence made him liable for them.
Does an insurer have to pay if the crew’s carelessness caused a covered peril?
Under the rule Sherwood describes, generally yes: when a peril of the sea is the proximate cause of a loss, courts do not ask what caused the peril, so the crew’s negligence is no defense for the insurer. The answer can differ when the loss claimed depends on that negligence itself, as in Sherwood, and the policy’s own terms always matter.
How is proximate cause used outside insurance?
In negligence and other tort cases, a plaintiff generally must show that the defendant’s conduct was both a cause in fact of the harm and a proximate cause of it. Courts use the English phrase, and the tests they apply vary by state and by kind of claim.