Alibi
ălĭbī
Legal Latin Dictionary · Last verified November 14, 2026
Pronunciation
There is no single official pronunciation of legal Latin. What follows is how most American lawyers say the word, and how a Roman would have said it.
- Common US legal pronunciation: AL-uh-bye, IPA /ˈæləˌbaɪ/. This is also the everyday English pronunciation.
- Classical Latin (restored): AH-lih-bee, IPA [ˈalɪbiː]. The middle vowel is short, so the stress falls on the first syllable; the final ī is long.
Literal translation
- alibi — elsewhere, in another place; a Latin adverb, not a noun
Put together: “elsewhere.” English turned the adverb into a noun, so that an alibi is the claim of having been elsewhere.
What it means in law
An alibi is a simple defense with a simple logic. The accused says, “I was not there.” If he was in another place when the crime happened, he cannot have committed it. Oregon’s statute, as the Supreme Court quoted it in Wardius v. Oregon (1973), defined alibi evidence along those lines: evidence that the defendant was, at the time of the offense, somewhere other than the place where it was committed.
An alibi is not an excuse or a justification. Self-defense admits the act and gives a reason for it; an alibi denies that the defendant did the act at all. The prosecution still has to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that includes proving that the defendant was the person who committed the crime. An alibi is evidence that gives the jury a reason to doubt it. The word’s everyday sense, any excuse at all, is much looser than the legal one.
Because an alibi turns on witnesses and times, it is easy to invent and hard to check at the last minute. That is why many jurisdictions have notice-of-alibi rules. They require a defendant who plans to rely on an alibi to tell the prosecution before trial where he claims to have been and who will say so. In Williams v. Florida (1970) the Supreme Court upheld Florida’s version. Florida’s rule worked both ways: once the defendant named his alibi witnesses, the State had to name the witnesses it would call in rebuttal. The Court held that the rule did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination, because it only made the defendant reveal earlier what he planned to reveal at trial anyway. (Williams also upheld Florida’s six-person jury, a separate holding.)
Williams left an important question open: whether such a rule is valid when the defendant gets nothing in return. Wardius answered it three years later. Oregon required alibi notice but gave defendants no right to learn the State’s rebuttal witnesses. When Wardius gave no notice, the trial judge struck his alibi witness’s testimony and would not let him testify about the alibi himself. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that due process forbids enforcing an alibi rule unless the defendant has reciprocal discovery rights.
Both opinions expressly reserved how far a court may go in punishing a defendant who does not comply, for example by excluding alibi evidence. Later decisions have taken up that question, so these two cases are not the last word on it. The answer depends on the rule, the facts and constitutional limits on keeping relevant evidence from the jury.
Etymology
Ălĭbī is a Latin adverb, and Lewis & Short gloss it simply “elsewhere.” Its fuller definition reads “Elsewhere, otherwhere, somewhere else, in or at another place”. In its note on the word’s origin, the dictionary treats alibi as a contracted form of aliubi, which it connects with alius, “other,” and ibi, “there.”
Cicero hardly used it. Lewis & Short note that it is very freq. in the post-Aug. per., esp. in Pliny, but appears in Cic. only twice. Its use as an English noun, meaning a defense, is the law’s own development, not something the Latin dictionary records.
Source: Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879), entry ălĭbī, via the Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University). Glosses in quotation marks are quoted from it. The English glosses of alius and ibi are ours.
In the opinions
Four passages from the two Supreme Court cases that shaped notice-of-alibi rules, quoted from the official United States Reports; a spaced ellipsis marks where a footnote number or a citation has been left out.
Given the ease with which an alibi can be fabricated, the State’s interest in protecting itself against an eleventh-hour defense is both obvious and legitimate. Reflecting this interest, notice-of-alibi provisions, dating at least from 1927, . . . are now in existence in a substantial number of States. . . . The adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until played.
Williams, tried for robbery in Florida, had to give the prosecution the name of his alibi witness before trial. Brushing aside a suggestion that the rule denied him due process, the Court explained what the State gains from such rules and why the adversary system permits them.
At most, the rule only compelled petitioner to accelerate the timing of his disclosure, forcing him to divulge at an earlier date information that the petitioner from the beginning planned to divulge at trial. Nothing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles a defendant as a matter of constitutional right to await the end of the State’s case before announcing the nature of his defense, any more than it entitles him to await the jury’s verdict on the State’s case-in-chief before deciding whether or not to take the stand himself.
Williams argued that the rule forced him to be a witness against himself. The Court disagreed, reasoning that he had always meant to call his alibi witness at trial.
We hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids enforcement of alibi rules unless reciprocal discovery rights are given to criminal defendants.
Oregon’s statute required alibi notice but gave defendants no discovery rights. Wardius’s alibi witness, who said they had been at a drive-in movie together, was struck because he had given no notice.
We do not suggest that the Due Process Clause of its own force requires Oregon to adopt such provisions. . . . But we do hold that in the absence of a strong showing of state interests to the contrary, discovery must be a two-way street.
The Court made clear that it was not ordering Oregon to adopt any particular discovery system, only that an alibi rule must cut both ways.
Where it appears in the rules
Notice-of-alibi requirements belong mostly to criminal procedure, and this site publishes chiefly civil rules, so only two of its rule pages use the word. Both are notice rules of the kind Williams and Wardius addressed. Each link opens the rule with its full verbatim text.
2 rule pages in 2 jurisdictions use “alibi” in their official text.
Both follow the two-way pattern the Supreme Court required. Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 413(d), on the State’s written motion, defense counsel must disclose, “if the defendant intends to prove an alibi, specific information as to the place where he maintains he was at the time of the alleged offense”; the rule before it, Rule 412, gives the accused discovery of the State’s witnesses and evidence. In Michigan’s juvenile courts, MCR 3.922(C) requires notice “of the intent to rely on a defense of alibi or insanity”, and the prosecutor must then give notice of any rebuttal, with “names and addresses of rebuttal witnesses”. In the federal courts the requirement is in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 12.1, on notice of an alibi defense), which this site does not carry.
Frequently asked questions
Is an alibi an affirmative defense?
Not in the usual sense. An affirmative defense, such as self-defense, admits the act and offers a legal reason why the defendant should not be held responsible. An alibi denies that the defendant was there at all. The prosecution keeps the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, including that the defendant was the one who committed the crime. Even so, many jurisdictions require advance notice of an alibi, as the next answer explains.
Does a defendant have to tell the prosecution about an alibi before trial?
Often, yes. Many jurisdictions have notice-of-alibi rules that require a defendant who intends to rely on an alibi to say, before trial, where he claims to have been and who his alibi witnesses are. Some rules apply only after the prosecution makes a written demand, as Florida’s did in Williams v. Florida (1970). The details, including deadlines, vary from court to court.
Does a notice-of-alibi rule violate the right against self-incrimination?
The Supreme Court held in Williams v. Florida (1970) that Florida’s rule did not. The defendant still decides whether to raise an alibi at all; the rule only makes him reveal it earlier than he otherwise would.
Does the prosecution have to disclose anything in return?
Yes, if the rule is to be enforced. In Wardius v. Oregon (1973) the Supreme Court held that due process forbids enforcing an alibi rule unless the defendant has reciprocal discovery rights, such as the right to learn the witnesses the State will call to rebut the alibi.
What happens if the defendant does not give notice?
That depends on the rule and the court. The Florida rule in Williams threatened to exclude the defendant’s alibi evidence other than his own testimony, and the Oregon statute in Wardius barred alibi evidence unless the court for good cause ordered otherwise. In both cases the Supreme Court expressly left open how far such exclusion is constitutional; later decisions have addressed the question, so check current law. Courts generally have some discretion, and constitutional limits apply to keeping a defendant’s evidence from the jury.
Is a legal alibi the same as an excuse?
No. In everyday speech an alibi can be any excuse. In law it means one thing: the claim, backed by evidence, that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed.