Georgia restraining orders: thirty days, and only consent extends them

Georgia procedure · Last verified August 17, 2026

Georgia's injunction law sits in two places. The procedure is in OCGA 9-11-65, which looks like Rule 65 until you reach the numbers. The grounds are in Chapter 5 of Title 9, which is a set of equity maxims that most states never codified.

Thirty days — but no good-cause extension

OCGA 9-11-65(b):

Every temporary restraining order granted without notice shall be endorsed with the date and hour of issuance, shall be filed forthwith in the clerk's office and entered of record, and shall expire by its terms within such time after entry, not to exceed 30 days, as the court fixes, unless the party against whom the order is directed consents that it may be extended for a longer period.

Two departures from the ordinary version of this sentence.

Thirty days. Most states cap an ex parte order at ten or fourteen. Georgia allows three times that.

And there is no good-cause extension. Read the closing clause: the only stated route past the court's fixed period is the consent of the party against whom the order is directed. The familiar "for good cause shown, is extended for a like period" is simply absent.

So the two halves work against each other in a way worth planning around. A Georgia applicant gets a long order, but once it expires the applicant cannot ask the court to extend it over objection. The thirty days are what there is, and the interlocutory injunction hearing has to happen inside them.

That hearing is set on the usual terms — at the earliest possible time, taking precedence over all matters except older matters of the same character — and the applicant has to press it: "if he does not do so, the court shall dissolve the temporary restraining order." The restrained party may move to dissolve or modify on two days' notice, or shorter as the court prescribes.

Security is something the court may require

OCGA 9-11-65(c) opens with a word that changes the default:

As a prerequisite to the issuance of a restraining order or an interlocutory injunction, the court may require the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been enjoined or restrained wrongfully.

"May require," not "shall issue only upon." A Georgia injunction can issue with no bond behind it, so a respondent who wants security has to ask.

Where security is given, the surety "submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of the court as his agent," and liability "may be enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent action."

Equity takes no part in the criminal law

OCGA 9-5-2 is one of the shortest sections in the Code and one of the most absolute:

Equity will take no part in the administration of the criminal law. It will neither aid criminal courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction, nor will it restrain or obstruct them.

Both halves are worth reading. Equity will not aid a criminal court, and will not restrain or obstruct one. An application that asks a civil judge to interfere with a criminal proceeding, in either direction, runs straight into this section.

Enjoining a court of law, and a sheriff's sale

OCGA 9-5-3 divides the question:

(a) Equity will not enjoin the proceedings and processes of a court of law, absent some intervening equity or other proper defense of which a party, without fault on his part, cannot avail himself at law. (b) Writs of injunction may be issued by judges of the superior courts to enjoin sales by sheriffs, at any time before a sale takes place, in any proper case made by application for injunction.

Subsection (a) sets a demanding test with three parts: an intervening equity or other proper defense, one the party cannot avail himself of at law, and an absence of fault on that party's part.

Subsection (b) is the practical exception, and the timing in it is strict — at any time before a sale takes place. Once the sheriff's sale has happened, this route is gone.

Trespass and waste have their own thresholds

Two sections narrow what would otherwise be ordinary injunction grounds.

On trespass, OCGA 9-5-4:

Equity will not interfere to restrain a trespass, unless the injury is irreparable in damages, or the trespasser is insolvent, or other circumstances exist which, in the discretion of the court, render the interposition of the writ necessary and proper, among which shall be the avoidance of circuity and multiplicity of actions.

Three alternative routes, joined by "or": irreparable injury, an insolvent trespasser, or circumstances making the writ necessary — with multiplicity of actions named as one.

On waste, OCGA 9-5-5 is stricter:

Equity will not interfere by injunction to restrain waste when the petitioner's title is not clear. Such relief shall be granted only when the title is free from dispute.

"Free from dispute." A waste injunction is not available while title is contested, however strong the petitioner's case looks.

Two more limits: creditors and personal services

OCGA 9-5-6:

Creditors without liens may not, as a general rule, enjoin their debtors from disposing of property nor obtain injunctions or other extraordinary relief in equity.

A general rule rather than an absolute bar, but it is the answer to the common instinct to freeze a debtor's assets before judgment.

And OCGA 9-5-7 on personal services:

Generally an injunction will not issue to restrain the breach of a contract for personal services unless the services are of a peculiar merit or character and cannot be performed by others.

Two conditions, both required: peculiar merit or character, and services that cannot be performed by others.

The discretion, and the second application

OCGA 9-5-8 tells the judge how to hold the power:

The granting and continuing of injunctions shall always rest in the sound discretion of the judge, according to the circumstances of each case. This power shall be prudently and cautiously exercised and, except in clear and urgent cases, should not be resorted to.

That is an unusual instruction to find in a code — a direction that the remedy "should not be resorted to" except in clear and urgent cases.

A refusal is not necessarily the end, though. OCGA 9-5-9 is one line: "A second injunction may be granted in the discretion of the judge." And OCGA 9-5-10: "A perpetual injunction shall be granted only after hearing and upon a final decree."

Georgia's reach also extends past its borders. OCGA 9-5-11: "Equity may enjoin the defendant as to transactions involving fraud, trust, or contracts beyond the limits of this state."

Family cases sit outside the Code section

OCGA 9-11-65(e):

This Code section is not applicable to actions for divorce, alimony, separate maintenance, or custody of children. In such actions, the court may make prohibitive or mandatory orders, with or without notice or bond, and upon such terms and conditions as the court may deem just.

No thirty-day limit, no notice requirement, no bond requirement — the court sets terms it deems just.

A short checklist

If you are applying:

Use the thirty days. Get the interlocutory hearing inside them; there is no good-cause extension.
Ask the restrained party for consent early if you will need longer.
Check the equity limits before drafting. Criminal proceedings, contested-title waste claims, and lien-less creditor claims run into express bars.
On a sheriff's sale, move before the sale.
On a personal-services contract, plead both conditions — peculiar merit, and services others cannot perform.
Expect the "prudently and cautiously" standard to be quoted against you, and address urgency directly.

If you are restrained:

Ask the court to require security. It is discretionary and will not be imposed on its own.
Withhold consent to an extension unless you want the order to continue; without it the court cannot extend over your objection.
Move to dissolve on two days' notice.
Test the ground, not just the equities. Chapter 5 bars several categories outright.

Where these rules live

This page explains what the rules say. It isn't legal advice, and how the equity limits in Chapter 5 apply on particular facts is developed in case law this site doesn't cover.

How this guide is sourced. Every procedural statement here is drawn from the text of the rules named above, each of which is reproduced verbatim on its own page on this site. Quoted rule language appears in quotation marks or block quotes; everything else is original writing. Last verified August 17, 2026.

This page explains what the rules say. It is legal information, not legal advice, and it cannot tell you how a rule applies to your situation. Deadlines are often short and some are not extendable — if the outcome matters, talk to a lawyer or your court’s self-help center.