Responding to a Georgia complaint: 30 days, automatic default, and the 15 days that follow

Most states require the plaintiff to do something to obtain a default. Georgia doesn't. The case falls into default on its own, and then a short statutory window opens that the defendant can use without asking anyone's permission.

Thirty days

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(a)(1):

Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a defendant shall serve an answer within 30 days after the service of the summons and complaint upon the defendant, unless otherwise provided by statute.

The same paragraph adds a point that catches people out from the other direction: "A cross-claim or counterclaim shall not require an answer, unless one is required by order of the court, and shall automatically stand denied."

What a motion does to the 30 days

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(a)(2): unless the court sets a different time, serving a motion under Code section 9-11-12 alters the answer time as follows:

• if the court denies the motion or postpones disposition until trial — the answer is served within 15 days after notice of the court's action;
• if the court grants a motion for a more definite statement — the answer is served within 15 days after the more definite statement is served.

Fifteen days, not a fresh 30. The structure mirrors FRCP 12(a)(4), with a shorter interval.

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b) lists the defenses that may be made by motion at the pleader's option rather than in the responsive pleading — the familiar set including lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person, improper venue, insufficiency of process, insufficiency of service of process, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Automatic default

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55(a) is where Georgia parts company with most of the country:

If in any case an answer has not been filed within the time required by this chapter, the case shall automatically become in default unless the time for filing the answer has been extended as provided by law.

No application. No entry by a clerk. No notice. Day 31 arrives and the case is in default by operation of the statute.

The 15-day opening as a matter of right

The next sentence is the one worth acting on:

The default may be opened as a matter of right by the filing of such defenses within 15 days of the day of default, upon the payment of costs.

Two conditions, both mechanical: file the defenses within 15 days of the day of default, and pay costs. There is no showing of excuse, no meritorious-defense requirement, no motion the court can deny. "As a matter of right" is the statute's phrase.

So the practical Georgia answer window is 30 days, then a further 15 days at the price of costs — provided the defendant acts before the 15 days run.

Note what the period runs from: the day of default, which is the day after the 30 days expire, not the day the defendant learned of anything.

After the 15 days

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55(a) continues:

If the case is still in default after the expiration of the period of 15 days, the plaintiff at any time thereafter shall be entitled to verdict and judgment by default, in open court or in chambers, as if every item and paragraph of the complaint or other original pleading were supported by proper evidence, without the intervention of a jury …

That "as if every item and paragraph … were supported by proper evidence" is the consequence of the default. Liability is established from the pleading.

Damages are treated separately. The subsection excepts actions ex delicto and those involving unliquidated damages, in which the plaintiff "shall be required to introduce evidence and establish the amount of damages before the court without a jury," with the defendant entitled to introduce evidence as to damages, and either party entitled to move for a new trial on damages.

Two refinements sit in the same sentence. If a defendant, though in default, "has placed damages in issue by filing a pleading raising such issue," either party is entitled on demand to a jury trial on damages. And: "An action based upon open account shall not be considered one for unliquidated damages within the meaning of this Code section."

That last clause matters in collection cases. An open-account claim is treated as liquidated, so the evidentiary hearing the ex delicto and unliquidated-damages exceptions require doesn't apply.

Opening the default after the 15 days — § 9-11-55(b)

Once the as-of-right window closes, the standard changes completely.

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55(b):

At any time before final judgment, the court, in its discretion, upon payment of costs, may allow the default to be opened for providential cause preventing the filing of required pleadings or for excusable neglect or where the judge, from all the facts, shall determine that a proper case has been made for the default to be opened, on terms to be fixed by the court.

Three grounds, and then four requirements that all have to be met:

In order to allow the default to be thus opened, the showing shall be made under oath, shall set up a meritorious defense, shall offer to plead instanter, and shall announce ready to proceed with the trial.

Each of those is a distinct condition, and Georgia courts treat them as conditions precedent. A sworn showing with a meritorious defense that omits the offer to plead instanter, or the announcement of readiness, doesn't satisfy the subsection on its face.

Note the outer boundary: subsection (b) operates "at any time before final judgment." It is not a route to undo a judgment already entered — that is a different problem, governed by the motion and relief-from-judgment provisions elsewhere in the chapter.

The three positions, side by side

Computing the time

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-6(a) supplies the computation: exclude the day of the act or event from which the period begins to run; include the last day, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in which case the period runs until the end of the next day that is not one of those. Where the period is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays are excluded from the count.

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-6(b) governs enlargements, and § 9-11-6(e) supplies the additional time after service by mail.

Amending while you still can

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(a) gives a party leave to amend a pleading "as a matter of course and without leave of court at any time before the entry of a pretrial order." Georgia's amendment right is unusually broad and runs off the pretrial order rather than off a responsive pleading — worth knowing alongside the deadlines above, since it means a filed answer can be improved later far more freely than in most systems.

This is not magistrate court

Georgia's magistrate courts and its dispossessory proceedings run on separate provisions with much shorter answer periods. Everything above concerns civil actions under the Civil Practice Act in superior and state courts.

Where these rules live

• O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4 — Process
• O.C.G.A. § 9-11-6 — Time
• O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12 — Defenses and Objections
• O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15 — Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
• O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55 — Default Judgment

The Georgia courts publish self-help material at georgiacourts.gov, and Georgia Legal Aid maintains guidance for people sued in debt cases. This page explains what the statutes say. It isn't legal advice.