§ 72.054.Liability for Employee Negligence in Operating Commercial Motor Vehicle

Title 4. Liability in Tort · Chapter 72. Liability of Motor Vehicle Owner or Operator · Subchapter B. Actions Regarding Commercial Motor Vehicles · Last amended 2023 · Last verified August 29, 2026

In one sentenceSection 72.054 confines an employer's ordinary negligence liability to respondeat superior if it stipulates course and scope, but lets specified federal safety failures come in on negligent entrustment.

Full Text of § 72.054

Text sizeJump to: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

(a)Except as provided by Subsection (d), in a civil action under this subchapter, an employer defendant's liability for damages caused by the ordinary negligence of a person operating the defendant's commercial motor vehicle shall be based only on respondeat superior if the defendant stipulates, within the time provided by Section 72.052 for filing a motion to bifurcate, that, at the time of the collision, the person operating the vehicle was:

(1)the defendant's employee; and

(2)acting within the scope of employment.

(b)Except as provided by Subsection (c), if an employer defendant stipulates in accordance with Subsection (a) and the trial is bifurcated under Section 72.052, a claimant may not, in the first phase of the trial, present evidence on an ordinary negligence claim against the employer defendant, such as negligent entrustment, that requires a finding by the trier of fact that the employer defendant's employee was negligent in operating a vehicle as a prerequisite to the employer defendant being found negligent in relation to the employee defendant's operation of the vehicle. This subsection does not prevent a claimant from presenting evidence allowed by Section 72.053(b).

(c)In a civil action under this subchapter in which an employer defendant is regulated by the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 (Pub. L. No. 106-159) or Chapter 644, Transportation Code, a party may present any of the following evidence in the first phase of a trial that is bifurcated under Section 72.052 if applicable to a defendant in the action:

(1)whether the employee who was operating the employer defendant's commercial motor vehicle at the time of the collision that is the subject of the civil action:

(A)was licensed to drive the vehicle at the time of the collision;

(B)was disqualified from driving the vehicle under 49 C.F.R. Section 383.51, 383.52, or 391.15 at the time of the collision;

(C)was subject to an out-of-service order, as defined by 49 C.F.R. Section 390.5, at the time of the collision;

(D)was driving the vehicle in violation of a license restriction imposed under 49 C.F.R. Section 383.95 or Section 522.043, Transportation Code, at the time of the collision;

(E)had received a certificate of driver's road test from the employer defendant as required by 49 C.F.R. Section 391.31 or had an equivalent certificate or license as provided by 49 C.F.R. Section 391.33;

(F)had been medically certified as physically qualified to operate the vehicle under 49 C.F.R. Section 391.41;

(G)was operating the vehicle when prohibited from doing so under 49 C.F.R. Section 382.201, 382.205, 382.207, 382.215, 395.3, or 395.5 or 37 T.A.C. Section 4.12, as applicable, on the day of the collision;

(H)was texting or using a handheld mobile telephone while driving the vehicle in violation of 49 C.F.R. Section 392.80 or 392.82 at the time of the collision;

(I)provided the employer defendant with an application for employment as required by 49 C.F.R. Section 391.21(a) if the collision occurred on or before the first anniversary of the date the employee began employment with the employer defendant; and

(J)refused to submit to a controlled substance test as required by 49 C.F.R. Section 382.303, 382.305, 382.307, 382.309, or 382.311 during the two years preceding the date of the collision; and

(2)whether the employer defendant:

(A)allowed the employee to operate the employer's commercial motor vehicle on the day of the collision in violation of 49 C.F.R. Section 382.201, 382.205, 382.207, 382.215, 382.701(d), 395.3, or 395.5 or 37 T.A.C. Section 4.12, as applicable;

(B)had complied with 49 C.F.R. Section 382.301 in regard to controlled-substance testing of the employee driver if:

(i)the employee driver was impaired because of the use of a controlled substance at the time of the collision; and

(ii)the collision occurred on or before the 180th day after the date the employee driver began employment with the employer defendant;

(C)had made the investigations and inquiries as provided by 49 C.F.R. Section 391.23(a) in regard to the employee driver if the collision occurred on or before the first anniversary of the date the employee driver began employment with the employer defendant; and

(D)was subject to an out-of-service order, as defined by 49 C.F.R. Section 390.5, at the time of the collision.

(d)If a civil action is bifurcated under Section 72.052, evidence admissible under Subsection (c) is:

(1)admissible in the first phase of the trial only to prove ordinary negligent entrustment by the employer defendant to the employee who was driving the employer defendant's commercial motor vehicle at the time of the collision that is the subject of the action; and

(2)the only evidence that may be presented by the claimant in the first phase of the trial on the negligent entrustment claim.

(e)The provisions of Subsection (c) may not be construed to create a new rule or regulation or subject a person to a rule or regulation not applicable to the person without regard to this section.

(f)Nothing in this section prevents a claimant from pursuing:

(1)an ordinary negligence claim against an employer defendant for a claim, such as negligent maintenance, that does not require a finding of negligence by an employee as a prerequisite to an employer defendant being found negligent for its conduct or omission, or from presenting evidence on that claim in the first phase of a bifurcated trial; or

(2)a claim for exemplary damages under Chapter 41 for an employer defendant's conduct or omissions in relation to the collision that is the subject of the action, or from presenting evidence on that claim in the second phase of a bifurcated trial.

End

Plain-English Summary

The most intricate provision in the subchapter, and it offers the employer a trade.

The stipulation: an employer defendant's liability for ordinary negligence in operating its commercial motor vehicle shall be based only on respondeat superior if the defendant stipulates, within the time for filing a bifurcation motion, that at the time of the collision the operator was the defendant's employee and acting within the scope of employment.

What the employer gets: the claimant may not, in the first phase, present evidence on an ordinary negligence claim against the employer, such as negligent entrustment, that requires a finding that the employee was negligent. Hiring, training, and supervision evidence stays out of the liability phase.

What the employer gives up: it concedes course and scope, so if the driver was negligent the company is liable. The usual defence that the driver was on a frolic, or was a contractor, is surrendered.

Subsection (c) is the carve-out, and it is long and specific. Where the employer is regulated by the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act or Chapter 644 of the Transportation Code, a party may present first-phase evidence on ten matters about the driver — whether they were licensed, disqualified, under an out-of-service order, driving in violation of a licence restriction, road-tested, medically certified, driving while prohibited under the drug and hours-of-service rules, texting or using a handheld phone, whether an employment application was provided in the first year, and whether they refused a controlled substance test in the preceding two years.

And four about the employer — whether it allowed the driver to operate in violation of the drug and hours rules, whether it complied with controlled-substance testing where the driver was impaired and the collision occurred within 180 days of hire, whether it made the required background investigations within the first year, and whether it was itself under an out-of-service order.

Subsection (d) confines that evidence: it is admissible in the first phase only to prove ordinary negligent entrustment, and is the only evidence the claimant may present in the first phase on that claim.

Subsection (f) preserves two routes. A claimant may still pursue an ordinary negligence claim that does not require a finding of employee negligence — negligent maintenance is the example given — in the first phase, and an exemplary damages claim against the employer in the second.

Frequently Asked Questions

What happens if a trucking company stipulates course and scope?

Its liability for ordinary negligence in operating the vehicle is based only on respondeat superior, and the claimant may not present first-phase evidence on claims such as negligent entrustment that require a finding of employee negligence.

Is the company's safety record ever admissible in phase one?

Yes, for a federally regulated carrier — fourteen specified matters about the driver and the employer are admissible, but only to prove ordinary negligent entrustment, and they are the only such evidence the claimant may present.

What does the company give up by stipulating?

Course and scope. It cannot argue the driver was outside the scope of employment or not its employee.

Can I still claim negligent maintenance?

Yes. A claim that does not require a finding of employee negligence as a prerequisite may be pursued in the first phase.

Amendment History

Added by Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 785 (H.B. 19), Sec. 4, eff. September 1, 2021.
Amended by:
Acts 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 709 (H.B. 2190), Sec. 117, eff. September 1, 2023.

Source & verification. Section text is reproduced verbatim from Texas Legislature Online (statutes.capitol.texas.gov). Enacted by the Texas Legislature. Current through May 14, 2026. Last verified August 29, 2026. · Official source