§ 101.003.Remedies Additional

One sentence preserving whatever else a claimant has: the remedies authorised by this chapter are in addition to any other legal remedies.

The section forecloses an argument the chapter would otherwise invite. A statute that carefully defines when a government may be sued, caps the damages, and imposes a notice deadline looks like an exclusive scheme — and a defendant would naturally argue that anything outside it is barred.

This says otherwise. The chapter adds a remedy; it does not remove any.

What survives is substantial. Federal civil rights claims, inverse condemnation under the Texas Constitution’s takings clause, statutory waivers of immunity in other codes, ultra vires claims against officials, and claims against a governmental unit acting in a proprietary rather than governmental capacity — none of these depends on this chapter.

The distinction matters most where the Act’s limits bite. A claimant facing the damages cap, or an exception that removes their claim entirely, is not necessarily without a remedy — the question becomes whether a route outside the chapter is available.

Read it against the election-of-remedies provision, which cuts the other way. That section forces a claimant to choose between suing the governmental unit and suing its employee, and dismisses the employee where the unit is sued. So the chapter is additive as to remedies while being restrictive as to defendants.

The individual-immunity provision similarly preserves whatever immunity an employee holds, rather than substituting the chapter’s scheme for it.