Article 55. Appeals Generally · Last amended 2020 · Last verified July 21, 2026
In one sentenceCPLR 5519 lists the situations in which taking an appeal automatically stays enforcement of the judgment or order -- for government appellants, when a money undertaking is posted, or when property is placed in the court's custody -- and lets courts grant, limit, or lift stays in other cases.
(a)Stay Without Court Order. Service upon the adverse party of a notice of appeal or an affidavit of intention to move for permission to appeal stays all proceedings to enforce the judgment or order appealed from pending the appeal or determination on the motion for permission to appeal where:
1. the appellant or moving party is the state or any political subdivision of the state or any officer or agency of the state or of any political subdivision of the state; provided that where a court, after considering an issue specified in question four of section seventy-eight hundred three of this chapter, issues a judgment or order directing reinstatement of a license held by a corporation with no more than five stockholders and which employs no more than ten employees, a partnership with no more than five partners and which employs no more than ten employees, a proprietorship or a natural person, the stay provided for by this paragraph shall be for a period of fifteen days; or 2. the judgment or order directs the payment of a sum of money, and an undertaking in that sum is given that if the judgment or order appealed from, or any part of it, is affirmed, or the appeal is dismissed, the appellant or moving party shall pay the amount directed to be paid by the judgment or order, or the part of it as to which the judgment or order is affirmed; or 3. the judgment or order directs the payment of a sum of money, to be paid in fixed installments, and an undertaking in a sum fixed by the court of original instance is given that the appellant or moving party shall pay each installment which becomes due pending the appeal and that if the judgment or order appealed from, or any part of it, is affirmed, or the appeal is dismissed, the appellant or moving party shall pay any installments or part of installments then due or the part of them as to which the judgment or order is affirmed; or 4. the judgment or order directs the assignment or delivery of personal property, and the property is placed in the custody of an officer designated by the court of original instance to abide the direction of the court to which the appeal is taken, or an undertaking in a sum fixed by the court of original instance is given that the appellant or moving party will obey the direction of the court to which the appeal is taken; or 5. the judgment or order directs the execution of any instrument, and the instrument is executed and deposited in the office where the original judgment or order is entered to abide the direction of the court to which the appeal is taken; or 6. the appellant or moving party is in possession or control of real property which the judgment or order directs be conveyed or delivered, and an undertaking in a sum fixed by the court or original instance is given that the appellant or moving party will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste and that if the judgment or order appealed from, or any part of it, is affirmed, or the appeal is dismissed, the appellant or moving party shall pay the value of the use and occupancy of such property, or the part of it as to which the judgment or order is affirmed, from the taking of the appeal until the delivery of possession of the property; if the judgment or order directs the sale of mortgaged property and the payment of any deficiency, the undertaking shall also provide that the appellant or moving party shall pay any such deficiency; or 7. the judgment or order directs the performance of two or more of the acts specified in subparagraphs two through six and the appellant or moving party complies with each applicable subparagraph.
(b)Stay in Action Defended by Insurer. If an appeal is taken from a judgment or order entered against an insured in an action which is defended by an insurance corporation, or other insurer, on behalf of the insured under a policy of insurance the limit of liability of which is less than the amount of said judgment or order, all proceedings to enforce the judgment or order to the extent of the policy coverage shall be stayed pending the appeal, and no action shall be commenced or maintained against the insurer for payment under the policy pending the appeal, where the insurer:
1. files with the clerk of the court in which the judgment or order was entered a sworn statement of one of its officers, describing the nature of the policy and the amount of coverage together with a written undertaking that if the judgment or order appealed from, or any part of it, is affirmed, or the appeal is dismissed, the insurer shall pay the amount directed to be paid by the judgment or order, or the part of it as to which the judgment or order is affirmed, to the extent of the limit of liability in the policy, plus interest and costs;
2. serves a copy of such sworn statement and undertaking upon the judgment creditor or his attorney; and 3. delivers or mails to the insured at the latest address of the insured appearing upon the records of the insurer, written notice that the enforcement of such judgment or order, to the extent that the amount it directs to be paid exceeds the limit of liability in the policy, is not stated in respect to the insured. A stay of enforcement of the balance of the amount of the judgment or order may be imposed by giving an undertaking, as provided in paragraph two of subdivision (a), in an amount equal to that balance.
(c)Stay and Limitation of Stay by Court Order. The court from or to which an appeal is taken or the court of original instance may stay all proceedings to enforce the judgment or order appealed from pending an appeal or determination on a motion for permission to appeal in a case not provided for in subdivision (a) or subdivision (b), or may grant a limited stay or may vacate, limit or modify any stay imposed by subdivision (a), subdivision (b) or this subdivision, except that only the court to which an appeal is taken may vacate, limit or modify a stay imposed by paragraph one of subdivision (a).
(d)Undertaking. On an appeal from an order affirming a judgment or order, the undertaking shall secure both the order and the judgment or order which is affirmed.
(e)Continuation of Stay. If the judgment or order appealed from is affirmed or modified, the stay shall continue for five days after service upon the appellant of the order of affirmance or modification with notice of its entry in the court to which the appeal was taken. If an appeal is taken, or a motion is made for permission to appeal, from such an order before the expiration of the five days, the stay shall continue until five days after service of notice of the entry of the order determining such appeal or motion. When a motion for permission to appeal is involved, the stay, or any other stay granted pending determination of the motion for permission to appeal, shall:
(i)if the motion is granted, continue until five days after the appeal is determined; or
(ii)if the motion is denied, continue until five days after the movant is served with the order of denial with notice of its entry.
(f)Proceedings After Stay. A stay of enforcement shall not prevent the court of original instance from proceeding in any matter not affected by the judgment or order appealed from or from directing the sale of perishable property.
(g)Appeals in Medical, Dental or Podiatric Malpractice Judgments. Appeals in medical, dental or podiatric malpractice judgments. In an action for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, if an appeal is taken from a judgment in excess of one million dollars and an undertaking in the amount of one million dollars or the limit of insurance coverage available to the appellant for the occurrence, whichever is greater, is given together with a joint undertaking by the appellant and any insurer of the appellant’s professional liability that, during the period of such stay, the appellant will make no voidable transaction as described in article ten of the debtor and creditor law, the court to which such an appeal is taken shall stay all proceedings to enforce the judgment pending such appeal if it finds that there is a reasonable probability that the judgment may be reversed or determined excessive. In making a determination under this subdivision, the court shall not consider the availability of a stay pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b) of this section. Liability under such joint undertaking shall be limited to voidable transactions made by the appellant subsequent to the execution of such undertaking and during the period of such stay, but nothing herein shall limit the liability of the appellant for voidable transactions pursuant to article ten of the debtor and creditor law or any other law. An insurer that pays money to a beneficiary of such a joint undertaking shall thereupon be subrogated, to the extent of the amount to be paid, to the rights and interests of such beneficiary, as a judgment creditor, against the appellant on whose behalf the joint undertaking was executed.
Plain-English Summary
Winning a judgment does not always mean collecting on it right away, because taking an appeal can freeze enforcement. CPLR 5519(a) lists seven situations where serving a notice of appeal or an affidavit of intent to seek permission to appeal stays enforcement without needing a court order at all: the state or a political subdivision (or its officer or agency) is the appellant; a money judgment is stayed by posting an undertaking to pay if the judgment is affirmed; an installment judgment is stayed by an undertaking covering each installment as it comes due; personal property is placed in the custody of a court-designated officer; an instrument is executed and deposited to abide the court's direction; real property is at issue and an undertaking against waste and for use-and-occupancy value is given; or the judgment combines several of these categories and the appellant satisfies each one.
Subdivision (b) gives a parallel automatic stay when an insurer defends an insured against a judgment that exceeds the policy limit: the insurer's sworn statement, undertaking, and notice to the insured stay enforcement up to the policy amount, and the insured can add an undertaking to stay the rest. Subdivision (c) then lets the court from or to which the appeal is taken, or the court of original instance, grant a stay in a case subdivisions (a) and (b) do not cover, and lets courts vacate, limit, or modify most stays -- though only the appellate court can touch a stay based on a government appellant under paragraph one of subdivision (a).
The remaining subdivisions round out the mechanics: subdivision (d) says an undertaking on an appeal from an order affirming a judgment secures both; subdivision (e) extends a stay for five days after an affirmance or modification, and further while a later appeal or permission motion is pursued; subdivision (f) makes clear a stay does not freeze matters the judgment does not touch or block the sale of perishable property; and subdivision (g) requires the court to stay a medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice judgment over one million dollars once it finds a reasonable probability the judgment will be reversed or found excessive, provided the appellant has posted the required undertaking and a joint undertaking against voidable transfers.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does filing an appeal automatically stop the other side from enforcing the judgment?
Only in the specific situations CPLR 5519(a) and (b) describe, such as a government appellant, a properly posted undertaking, or an insurer's statement and undertaking. Outside those categories, a party generally needs a court order under subdivision (c) to get a stay.
How much of an undertaking do I need to post to stay enforcement of a money judgment?
Under CPLR 5519(a)(2), the undertaking has to cover the sum the judgment directs to be paid, so that if the judgment is affirmed or the appeal is dismissed, the appellant can still pay the amount (or the affirmed portion of it).
Is a stay automatic when the state or a government agency appeals?
Yes. CPLR 5519(a)(1) stays enforcement automatically when the appellant or moving party is the state, a political subdivision, or an officer or agency of either, without requiring an undertaking, subject to a narrower time limit in certain license-reinstatement cases.
What happens to the stay if my appeal is denied or the judgment is affirmed?
CPLR 5519(e) continues the stay for five days after service of the order of affirmance or modification with notice of entry, and extends it further if a party takes a further appeal or moves for permission to appeal within that period.
Does an insurance company get its own stay when defending an insured on appeal?
Yes. CPLR 5519(b) stays enforcement up to the policy limit when the insurer files a sworn statement and undertaking, serves them on the judgment creditor, and notifies the insured, and it bars a separate action against the insurer while the appeal is pending.
Can a court lift or limit a stay of enforcement pending appeal?
Yes, generally. CPLR 5519(c) lets the court the appeal is taken from or to, or the court of original instance, vacate, limit, or modify a stay, except that only the appellate court can alter a stay based on a government appellant under paragraph one of subdivision (a).
Are stays handled differently for large medical malpractice judgments?
Yes. CPLR 5519(g) requires the appellate court to stay a malpractice judgment over one million dollars once it finds a reasonable probability of reversal or that the award is excessive, provided the appellant has posted a substantial undertaking and a joint undertaking against voidable asset transfers.
Advisory Committee Notes
(See also Advisory Committee Notes preceding § 5501, under subheading “Stays.”).
This section consolidates all of the former provisions relating to stays of execution pending appeals or determinations on applications for permission to appeal. It is similar in approach to New Jersey rule 1:4-6 in that it gives the court complete control over stays. Subd (a) enumerates situations in which a stay may be secured without a court order; subd (b) permits an appropriate court to grant a stay in a situation not covered by subd (a) and to modify any stay. The former power of the courts to modify an automatic stay obtained under CPA §§ 594 through 598 and § 601 was unclear although there appears to be inherent power equivalent to that explicitly granted by subd (b). Cf. Carter v Hodge, 150 NY 532, 44 NE 1101 (1896); Genet v Delaware & H. Canal Co., 113 NY 472, 21 NE 390 (1889); Kager v Brenneman, 52 App Div 446, 65 NY Supp 129 (1st Dept 1900) affd, 165 NY 674, 59 NE 1124 (1901); Cohen & Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals 684–85 (rev ed 1952); 11 NY Jud Council Rep 292–93 (1945). It should be recognized that this section is not applicable where a statute provides specific limitations on stays. E.g., Alco. Bev. Control Law § 121; cf. Yacht Club Catering, Inc. v Bruckman, 276 NY 44, 11 NE2d 345 (1937). CPA § 574 is covered by this section. The former section also prevented a summary proceeding from being brought based on nonpayment of rent when an action in ejectment based on nonpayment had resulted in a stayed judgment. Since actions in ejectment will no longer be used to collect rent, that provision of § 574 is not needed.
Subd (a) of this section is applicable to stays pending both the determination of an appeal and the determination of a motion for permission to appeal. It does not apply to a determination of an intermediate appellate court which directs restitution. Lamport v Smedley, 157 App Div 442, 142 NY Supp 350 (1st Dept 1913), provides an example of such a situation. The Appellate Division reversed a judgment of the Supreme Court pursuant to which stock certificates and cash were delivered to the plaintiff and directed that both be returned to the defendant. Upon the delivery into court of the certificates and the giving of an undertaking for the cash in accordance with former §§ 594 and 595, the plaintiff secured an order of the Supreme Court staying the execution of the judgment entered upon the determination of the Appellate Division, pending an appeal to the Court of Appeals. On an appeal by the defendant from the stay order, the Appellate Division held that the Supreme Court had no power to grant it, because §§ 594 and 595 related “to an original judgment or order for the delivery of property or the payment of a sum of money, and not to an order or judgment on appeal for the restitution of property, the delivery of which by one party to another pending the action has been erroneously required.” Id. at 444–45, 142 NY Supp at 351. Although the quoted language suggests that the stay provisions only apply to an “original judgment,” the decision must be restricted to the restitution situation. For when an intermediate appellate court reverses a judgment for the defendant and directs entry of judgment or order for the plaintiff, the stay provisions are applicable and the defendant may secure a stay without a court order if the judgment or order falls within one of the enumerated classes. It should also be noted that the Lamport case involved an original judgment which required two acts by the defendant—delivery of the certificates and payment of money. In such a situation, it would seem that a court order would be necessary for a stay under former law because the judgment is not one for “money only” as required by the language of former § 594 and the other applicable sections. Of course, a stay could have been secured under former law without a court order for a judgment requiring either of the acts alone. The word “only” has been omitted from subparagraphs 2 and 3 of subd (a) and a new subparagraph 7 has been added to permit a stay without a court order where the judgment appealed from requires the doing of two or more acts and stays could have been secured of judgments requiring each of the acts alone under subparagraphs 2 through 6. Subparagraph 1 is derived from former §§ 570 and 571 and is intended to encompass all of the persons and bodies specifically enumerated in those sections. Subparagraphs 2 through 6 are derived from former CPA §§ 594 through 598. Those sections, as well as former §§ 573, 598-a, 599, 600, 601 and 615, were amended in 1945 upon the recommendation of the Judicial Council. See 11 NY Jud Council Rep 273–93 (1945). One of the purposes of the amendments was to make it clear that the undertaking for costs required by former § 593 on an appeal to the Court of Appeals was necessary for a stay. Id. at 285. This undertaking is eliminated as a prerequisite for a stay in the new CPLR. CPA § 600 qualified §§ 594 through 598 by excepting cases where it was specially prescribed by law that a stay might have been had without security. The laws to which it had reference were CPA §§ 570, 571 and 568-a. See Bliss, New York Code of Civil Procedure § 1333 note (4th ed 1895). Subparagraph 1 makes § 600 unnecessary so far as §§ 570 and 571 are concerned and, since § 568-a has not been carried over into the new CPLR (see notes to subd (b) of this section) there is no need for former § 600 at all. CPA § 569 as it related to the waiver of any undertaking necessary for a stay has also been omitted since the new general undertaking provisions permit waiver by stipulation. Subparagraphs 2 and 3 are taken from CPA § 594. The words “from a judgment for a sum of money” have been omitted; the words “directs the payment of a sum of money” are broad enough to include them. CPA §§ 594 through 598 all use the term “judge,” and “court or judge” indiscriminately when speaking of the power to fix the sum of the undertaking. This subdivision uses the term “court” since it is contemplated that a judge will be authorized to do many of the acts which the rules specify are to be done by the court. Subparagraph 4 is based upon CPA §§ 595 and 596. In contrast to former § 596, this subparagraph permits a chattel to be placed in the custody of a court official. There is no reason why the party seeking a stay should not be given this alternative. Cf. CPA art 66 (Action to recover a chattel). If such deposit will create administrative problems, the court may make an appropriate order. See subd (b). The words “to abide the direction of the court to which the appeal is taken” are added to parallel subparagraph 5. Subparagraph 5 is taken from CPA § 597. Subparagraph 6 is taken from CPA § 598. It has been shortened and one substantive change has been made. Under the former section, the undertaking must have provided for the payment of the value of the use and occupation of the real property when the judgment or order was affirmed or the appeal was dismissed only if there was a deficiency upon sale. There is no reason to limit the undertaking to this one situation; this subdivision provides for the payment of the value of use and occupation whenever the appellant or moving party remains in possession or control of the property. Cf. Nev R Civ P 73(d)(4). The words “with interest and costs, and all expenses chargeable against the proceeds of the sale” have been eliminated as unnecessary. These sums would have to be charged against the proceeds of the sale in computing the deficiency.
Subd (b) of this section is based on CPA § 568-a. The detailed procedure of the former statute which is familiar to insurers who utilize it should be retained.
Subd (c) of this section is patterned after CPA § 598-a. It gives the power to modify a stay secured under subdivision (a), as well as the power to grant a stay in a case not covered by that subdivision, to the court from or to which the appeal is taken and the court of original instance. This substantially conforms with former law (see CPA §§ 598-a, 613, 615, 626, 634, 634-a) except as to stays pending the determination of an application for permission to appeal from a determination of the Appellate Term, where former law permitted only the Appellate Division to grant a stay. See Stern v Barrett Chemical Co. 124 App Div 377, 108 NY Supp 811 (1st Dept 1908); Bruce-Webster v Abbott, 69 Misc 309, 125 NY Supp 635 (Sup Ct, App T 1910). The limitation placed by former § 615 on the power to stay a money judgment or order on an appeal to the Appellate Division has been eliminated. Section 599-a has been omitted as unnecessary because of the broad language of this subdivision. The final “except” clause accords closely with former law which provided for an unconditional stay where appeal was taken by the state, a municipal corporation or certain public officers. CPA §§ 570, 571. Cf. City of Utica v Hanna, 249 NY 26, 30, 162 NE 573, 574 (1928); People ex rel. Ames v Judson, 59 Misc 538, 112 NY Supp 408 (Sup Ct 1908). To prevent unnecessary hardship to a private party, the court to which the appeal is taken is given power to protect him. Cf. Wuttke v O’Connor, 202 Misc 550, 115 NYS2d 852 (Sup Ct 1952).
The first sentence of subd (d) of this section is derived from CPA § 567 and the last sentence of § 565. The requirement that the notice must show where the deposit or bond is filed is eliminated since this subdivision makes it clear where that place is. The second sentence of this subdivision is taken from former § 599. See 11 NY Jud Council Rep 289–290 (1945). The third sentence covers the first sentence of former § 565. The remainder of former § 565 and § 566 have been omitted because they cover details of undertakings which are treated in more general rules.
Subd (e) of this section is taken from part of the first sentence of CPA § 573. Since any further appeal will be taken from the order of the appellate court (see § 5512) the stay continues for five days from service of notice of entry in that court rather than in a lower court.
Subd (f) of this section is derived from part of CPA § 573 and the last paragraph of § 601. Reference to depositing the proceeds of a sale of perishable property in court has been omitted as unnecessary since the court order directing the sale will contain appropriate directions for the disposition of the proceeds.
This measure would clarify 5519(e) with respect to procedures for continuation of a stay of proceedings where an appeal as of right is timely taken, or a timely notion is made for permission to take an appeal, from an affirmance or modification of an order determining a prior appeal. The present provision has been troublesome for lack of precision and because reference to motions for permission to appeal was not included, probably through inadvertence.
CPLR 5519(e) now provides for continuance of the stay after the determination of the first appeal, for five days from service upon the appellant of the notice of entry, in the court to which the first appeal was taken, of the order determining that appeal. Where an appeal is taken from such an order, the stay continues until determination of the appeal. DFI Communications Inc. v. Greenberg, 41 N.Y.2d 1017 (1977) held that a motion to continue the stay is unnecessary since the filing of the notice of appeal automatically continues the stay. CPLR 5519(e) would be clarified to reflect the decision by providing for such automatic continuation if the second appeal is taken within the designated 5-day period after the determination of the first appeal, except that the 5-day period would now be measured from service on appellant of the order of affirmation or modification as well as the notice of entry. It would also be provided that the stay continue until 5 days after determination of the appeal.
CPLR 5519(e) would be further clarified by providing a similar mechanism to govern the continuation of a stay where a motion for permission to appeal is made. Absence of such specific provision has generated unnecessary applications in such cases for continuation of the stay until determination of the appeal ( Created Gemstones, Inc. v. Union Carbide Corporation, 45 N.Y. 2d 772 (1978)). Thus, where a motion for permission to appeal is made within the designated 5-day period, any stay would continue until the motion is granted or denied. If the motion is granted whether or not the designated 5-day period has elapsed, the stay would continue until 5 days after the determination of the appeal. If the motion is denied, the stay would continue for 5 days after the movant is served with the order of denial with notice of its entry.
The last sentence of CPLR 5519(e), which relates to the duration of any stay granted pending a motion for permission to appeal, would be stricken as unnecessary because of the proposed amendments.
This bill would also make several verbal changes of a purely stylistic nature in CPLR 5519(e).
Amendment History
Add, L 1962, ch 308, eff Sept 1, 1963; amd, L 1963, ch 532, eff Sept 1, 1963; L 1965, ch 744, § 1; L 1975, ch 70, § 1; L 1979, ch 239, § 1, eff Jan 1, 1980; L 1988, ch 184, § 5, eff July 1, 1988; L 1988, ch 493, § 1, eff Sept 1, 1988; L 2019, ch 580, § 4, effective April 4, 2020.
Source & verification. Provision text, History, and Advisory
Committee Notes are reproduced verbatim from the Consolidated Laws of New York.
Last verified July 21, 2026.
· Official source
Also known as:stay pending appeal New Yorkstay of enforcement pending appeal New Yorkdoes filing an appeal stop enforcement of a judgmentautomatic stay of judgment New York appealundertaking to stay judgment enforcement NYbond to stop collection during appealCPLR 5519 stay