(a) Where demand necessary. Except as provided in article 3 of the uniform commercial code, where a demand is necessary to entitle a person to commence an action, the time within which the action must be commenced shall be computed from the time when the right to make the demand is complete, except that 1. where a right grows out of the receipt or detention of money or property by a trustee, agent, attorney or other person acting in a fiduciary capacity, the time within which the action must be commenced shall be computed from the time when the person having the right to make the demand discovered the facts upon which the right depends; and 2. where there was a deposit of money to be repaid only upon a special demand, or a delivery of personal property not to be returned specifically or in kind at a fixed time or upon a fixed contingency, the time within which the action must be commenced shall be computed from the demand for repayment or return.
§ 206.Computing periods of limitation in particular actions.
Article 2. Limitations of Time · Last amended 1966 · Last verified July 21, 2026
In one sentenceFixes the accrual date for four particular claims: those requiring a demand before suit, claims against an agent after a judgment against the principal, breach of covenant against encumbrances, and mutual open accounts.
Full Text of CPLR 206
(b) Based on misconduct of agent. Where a judgment is entered against a principal in an action based upon an injury resulting from the act or omission of his deputy or agent, the time within which an action by the principal against the deputy or agent to recover damages by reason of such judgment must be commenced shall be computed, from the time when the action against the principal was finally determined. Where an injury results from the representation by a person that he is an agent with authority to execute a contract in behalf of a principal, the time within which an action to recover damages for breach of warranty of authority must be commenced by the person injured against the purported agent shall be computed from the time the person injured discovered the facts constituting lack of authority.
(c) Based on breach of covenant of seizin or against incumbrances. In an action based upon breach of a covenant of seizin or against incumbrances, the time within which the action must be commenced shall be computed from an eviction.
(d) Based on account. In an action based upon a mutual, open and current account, where there have been reciprocal demands between the parties, the time within which the action must be commenced shall be computed from the time of the last transaction in the account on either side.
Plain-English Summary
Some claims don't have an obvious starting point for the limitations clock, so CPLR 206 supplies one for four recurring situations. Subdivision (a) covers claims where a demand is a prerequisite to suing, except demand claims governed by article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which this subdivision leaves to the UCC's own rules: ordinarily, the clock starts the moment the plaintiff could have made the demand, not when the demand is made. Two exceptions soften that rule — claims against a trustee, agent, attorney, or other fiduciary run from when the plaintiff discovers the facts giving rise to the right, and claims for a deposit repayable only on demand, or property not due back at a fixed time, run from the demand itself.
Subdivision (b) covers a narrower problem: when a principal is held liable for an agent's wrongdoing and later wants to recover from the agent, the clock runs from the final determination of the action against the principal, not from an earlier or intermediate ruling that might still be reversed on appeal. A related rule covers someone injured by a person falsely claiming to act as an authorized agent — that claim runs from when the injured party discovers the lack of authority.
Subdivisions (c) and (d) round out the section: a claim for breach of the covenant of seizin or against encumbrances on real property accrues at eviction, and a claim on a mutual, open, and running account between two parties accrues from the last transaction on either side of the ledger.
Frequently Asked Questions
When does the statute of limitations start if a demand is required before I can sue?
Under CPLR 206(a), the clock generally starts when the right to make the demand became complete, not when the demand was made, though a claim against a fiduciary runs from discovery of the underlying facts instead, and this rule doesn’t apply to demand claims governed by article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
If I sue an agent for wrongdoing that got their principal held liable, when does my time to sue start?
CPLR 206(b) measures that period from the final determination of the action against the principal, so an intermediate ruling that could still be reversed on appeal doesn't start the clock.
When does the statute of limitations start for a breach of the covenant against encumbrances on real property?
CPLR 206(c) starts the clock at the eviction resulting from the breach, not at the time the covenant was made.
What is a “mutual, open and current account”, and when does its limitations period start?
It's an account with reciprocal demands running between two parties, and under CPLR 206(d), the limitations period starts from the last transaction on either side of the account.
Does CPLR 206 cover every type of accrual date question?
No. It addresses four specific situations — demand-based claims, agent-liability claims, covenant claims, and mutual accounts — while CPLR 203 and other Article 2 sections supply accrual and computation rules for other types of claims.
Advisory Committee Notes
Subd (a) is substantially the same as CPA § 15. For easier comprehension, the section has been recast without effecting any change in substance. In subparagraph 2, “discovered” has been utilized rather than “has actual knowledge.” No change in substance is intended.
The first sentence of subd (b) is derived in substance from CPA § 14, except that the qualification of § 14 that “a subsequent reversal or setting aside of the judgment does not extend the time,” is deleted as unnecessary; it is included in the term “first recovered.” The former rule is retained because the principal has ample time to prosecute all appeals before being pressed by the running of the statute of limitation to bring suit against his agent. Where a judgment was entered against the principal, a reversal on an intermediate appeal resulted in a judgment dismissing the action and a final appeal resulted in reinstatement of the original judgment, time would be measured from entry of the original judgment. Phrase “time when the judgment against the principal was first entered” changed to “time when the action against the principal was finally determined.” Change based on suggestions that the words “first entered” left an ambiguity as to the effect of a subsequent reversal or setting aside of the judgment and that “finally determined” would be more equitable to the principal by permitting him to wait and see whether the judgment will be reversed or set aside. The second sentence is new and is intended to fix the rule of law left undetermined in Moore v Maddock, 251 NY 420, 167 NE 572 (1929) 64 ALR 1189. It is desirable that the statutes of limitation explicitly provide the commencement date for measurement of the period of limitation in an action against a purported agent for breach of warranty of authority. The provision incorporates the doctrine that in such an action the claim should not be barred until after the plaintiff has had the benefit of the normal period of limitation applicable to contract actions, measured from the date the plaintiff discovers the facts constituting lack of authority on the part of the purported agent.
Subd (c) is derived from subd 5 of CPA § 48.
With a few language changes, subd (d) is derived from the second paragraph of CPA § 11.
With slight language changes, subd (e) is derived from § 56 of the CPA. The word “transaction” is used rather than “item proved” to clarify the meaning. See 2 Carmody-Wait, Cyclopedia of New York Practice 284 (1952) [2 Carmody-Wait 2d 13:159].
Amendment History
Add, L 1962, ch 308, § 1 eff Sept 1, 1963; amd, L 1965, ch 248, eff Sept 1, 1965; L 1966, ch 138, § 2, eff Sept 1, 1966.
Source & verification. Provision text, History, and Advisory
Committee Notes are reproduced verbatim from the Consolidated Laws of New York.
Last verified July 21, 2026.
· Official source
Also known as: statute of limitations demand required New Yorkwhen does the statute of limitations start against an agentmutual open account statute of limitations New York