(a) Accrual of cause of action and interposition of claim. The time within which an action must be commenced, except as otherwise expressly prescribed, shall be computed from the time the cause of action accrued to the time the claim is interposed.
§ 203.Method of computing periods of limitation generally.
Article 2. Limitations of Time · Last amended 2022 · Last verified July 21, 2026
In one sentenceSets how New York measures a limitations period, from accrual to when a claim is interposed by service or filing, and governs reviving related counterclaims, tolling during a terminated action, relation-back of amended pleadings, and the two-year cap on discovery-based accrual.
Full Text of CPLR 203
(b) Claim in complaint where action commenced by service. In an action which is commenced by service, a claim asserted in the complaint is interposed against the defendant or a co-defendant united in interest with such defendant when:
1. the summons is served upon the defendant; or 2. first publication of the summons against the defendant is made pursuant to an order, and publication is subsequently completed; or 3. an order for a provisional remedy other than attachment is granted, if, within thirty days thereafter, the summons is served upon the defendant or first publication of the summons against the defendant is made pursuant to an order and publication is subsequently completed, or, where the defendant dies within thirty days after the order is granted and before the summons is served upon the defendant or publication is completed, if the summons is served upon the defendant’s executor or administrator within sixty days after letters are issued; for this purpose seizure of a chattel in an action to recover a chattel is a provisional remedy; or 4. an order of attachment is granted, if the summons is served in accordance with the provisions of section 6213; or 5. the summons is delivered to the sheriff of that county outside the city of New York or is filed with the clerk of that county within the city of New York in which the defendant resides, is employed or is doing business, or if none of the foregoing is known to the plaintiff after reasonable inquiry, then of the county in which the defendant is known to have last resided, been employed or been engaged in business, or in which the cause of action arose; or if the defendant is a corporation, of a county in which it may be served or in which the cause of action arose; provided that:
(i) the summons is served upon the defendant within sixty days after the period of limitation would have expired but for this provision; or
(ii) first publication of the summons against the defendant is made pursuant to an order within sixty days after the period of limitation would have expired but for this provision and publication is subsequently completed; or
(iii) the summons is served upon the defendant’s executor or administrator within sixty days after letters are issued, where the defendant dies within sixty days after the period of limitation would have expired but for this provision and before the summons is served upon the defendant or publication is completed.
6. in an action to be commenced in a court not of record, the summons is delivered for service upon the defendant to any officer authorized to serve it in a county, city or town in which the defendant resides, is employed or is doing business, or if none of the foregoing be known to the plaintiff after reasonable inquiry, then in a county, city or town in which defendant is known to have last resided, been employed or been engaged in business, or, where the defendant is a corporation, in a county, city or town in which it may be served, if the summons is served upon the defendant within sixty days after the period of limitation would have expired but for this provision; or, where the defendant dies within sixty days after the period of limitation would have expired but for this provision and before the summons is served upon the defendant, if the summons is served upon his executor or administrator within sixty days after letters are issued.
(c) Claim in complaint where action commenced by filing. In an action which is commenced by filing, a claim asserted in the complaint is interposed against the defendant or a co-defendant united in interest with such defendant when the action is commenced.
(d) Defense or counterclaim. A defense or counterclaim is interposed when a pleading containing it is served. A defense or counterclaim is not barred if it was not barred at the time the claims asserted in the complaint were interposed, except that if the defense or counterclaim arose from the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, upon which a claim asserted in the complaint depends, it is not barred to the extent of the demand in the complaint notwithstanding that it was barred at the time the claims asserted in the complaint were interposed.
(e) Effect upon defense or counterclaim of termination of action because of death or by dismissal or voluntary discontinuance. Where a defendant has served an answer containing a defense or counterclaim and the action is terminated because of the plaintiff’s death or by dismissal or voluntary discontinuance, the time which elapsed between the commencement and termination of the action is not a part of the time within which an action must be commenced to recover upon the claim in the defense or counterclaim or the time within which the defense or counterclaim may be interposed in another action brought by the plaintiff or his successor in interest.
(f) Claim in amended pleading. A claim asserted in an amended pleading is deemed to have been interposed at the time the claims in the original pleading were interposed, unless the original pleading does not give notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading.
(g) 1. Time computed from actual or imputed discovery of facts. Except as provided in article two of the uniform commercial code or in section two hundred fourteen-a of this chapter, where the time within which an action must be commenced is computed from the time when facts were discovered or from the time when facts could with reasonable diligence have been discovered, or from either of such times, the action must be commenced within two years after such actual or imputed discovery or within the period otherwise provided, computed from the time the cause of action accrued, whichever is longer.
2. Notwithstanding paragraph one of this subdivision, in an action or claim for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, where the action or claim is based upon the alleged negligent failure to diagnose cancer or a malignant tumor, whether by act or omission, for the purposes of sections fifty-e and fifty-i of the general municipal law, section ten of the court of claims act, and the provisions of any other law pertaining to the commencement of an action or special proceeding, or to the serving of a notice of claim as a condition precedent to commencement of an action or special proceeding within a specified time period, the time in which to commence an action or special proceeding or to serve a notice of claim shall not begin to run until the later of either (i) when the person knows or reasonably should have known of such alleged negligent act or omission and knows or reasonably should have known that such alleged negligent act or omission has caused injury, provided, that such action shall be commenced no later than seven years from such alleged negligent act or omission, or (ii) the date of the last treatment where there is continuous treatment for such injury, illness or condition.
(h) Claim and action upon certain instruments. Once a cause of action upon an instrument described in subdivision four of section two hundred thirteen of this article has accrued, no party may, in form or effect, unilaterally waive, postpone, cancel, toll, revive, or reset the accrual thereof, or otherwise purport to effect a unilateral extension of the limitations period prescribed by law to commence an action and to interpose the claim, unless expressly prescribed by statute.
Plain-English Summary
A statute of limitations needs two dates: when the clock starts, and when it stops. CPLR 203 fixes the second date for nearly every action in New York. Subdivision (a) states the general rule — the period runs from accrual to the moment the claim is “interposed” — and the following subdivisions spell out exactly when interposition happens, depending on whether the case is commenced by serving a summons or filing with the court, and depending on how a defendant is served: personally, by publication, by delivery to a sheriff or county clerk, or through a provisional remedy like attachment.
Several subdivisions solve problems that would otherwise trap a party through no fault of their own. Subdivision (d) lets a defendant raise a counterclaim tied to the same transaction as the plaintiff's claim, even if that counterclaim would be time-barred standing alone — a defendant sued late in the game shouldn't lose a defense because the plaintiff waited to sue. Subdivision (e) tolls the clock for the time a prior, timely action against the same defendant was pending, so a plaintiff whose case ended for reasons unrelated to the merits — the plaintiff's death, a voluntary discontinuance, or dismissal — doesn't lose ground already covered. Subdivision (f) lets an amended pleading relate back to the original filing date, so long as the original pleading gave the defendant notice of the transaction the amendment addresses.
Subdivision (g) governs claims measured from discovery rather than from the underlying event: absent a more specific rule, like the medical-malpractice discovery statute or the UCC's own provisions, a plaintiff gets two years from actual or constructive discovery, or the ordinary period from accrual, whichever runs longer, plus a special rule extending that logic to cancer-misdiagnosis malpractice claims. Subdivision (h), added in 2022, stops parties from unilaterally resetting the accrual date on certain mortgage-related instruments, closing off maneuvers designed to revive an otherwise stale foreclosure claim.
Frequently Asked Questions
When does the statute of limitations clock start running in New York?
Under CPLR 203(a), the period runs from when the cause of action accrues to when the claim is “interposed”, with the following subdivisions defining exactly when interposition happens depending on how the case was commenced.
What does it mean for a claim to be “interposed”?
It's the specific act — such as service of the summons, filing with the court, or first publication — that CPLR 203(b) or (c) treats as satisfying the statute of limitations for that claim, depending on how the action was commenced.
Can I raise a counterclaim that would otherwise be time-barred?
Yes, if it arose from the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim — CPLR 203(d) allows an otherwise-barred counterclaim to proceed to the extent of the plaintiff's own demand.
Does amending my complaint restart the statute of limitations?
No. CPLR 203(f) treats a claim in an amended pleading as interposed on the same date as the original pleading, as long as the original gave notice of the underlying transaction — it doesn't create a new, later filing date.
What is the “discovery rule” under CPLR 203(g)?
Where a specific statute measures a limitations period from discovery of the facts, CPLR 203(g) caps that discovery-based extension at two years from actual or imputed discovery, or the ordinary period from accrual, whichever is longer.
Advisory Committee Notes
Subd (c) changes the present statutory law. CPA § 61 provided that a cause of action upon which an action could not be maintained under the statutes of limitation could not be interposed as a defense or counterclaim. The first sentence of § 11 of the CPA contained a similar limitation in respect to a claim to relief interposed by a defendant. The new provision allows a counterclaim, which would otherwise be barred, if it arose from a transaction or occurrence upon which the plaintiff’s right to relief depends. Further, a defense or counterclaim unrelated to the adversary’s claim may be effectively interposed under the new provision if it was not barred at the time of the commencement of the action.
Subd (d) is substantially derived from CPA § 26. The word “terminated” includes the terms “dismissed,” “discontinued” and “abates” of § 26.
Subd (e) is new. It is intended to overcome the effect of Harriss v Tams, 258 NY 229, 179 NE 476, and related cases. Formerly there was no governing statutory provision in New York on the effect of amended pleadings on the statutes of limitation. Cf. Fed R Civ P 15(c).
Subd (f), which has no counterpart in former practice, was added at the suggestion of the Joint Committee on the CPA. Where the facts are not discovered, and the period consequently would not begin to run until long after the event, there seems no reason why the plaintiff should not be required to proceed expeditiously after such discovery. The period adopted for such cases is two years from the discovery, unless the applicable period— computed without the benefit of postponement for nondiscovery—would not have run by this time.
1978 Recommendations of the Committee to Advise and Consult with the Judicial Conference and the Chief Administrator of the Courts on the Civil Practice Law and Rules:
The recommended changes remove ambiguities from and improve the structure of, present paragraph 5 of subdivision b of CPLR 203.
The provision to be repealed, which sets forth the procedure for adding 60 days to the statute of limitations and which has been the subject of recent legislation, has caused difficulties for several years. Chapter 494 of the Laws of 1977 rectified the major defects, but several important technical problems remain which require correction in order to render fully effective that valuable legislation.
First, the present paragraph is a page-long rambling sentence which is stylistically awkward and difficult to read. This bill would restructure the entire provision, dividing it into an introductory passage designating the officer to whom the summons must be delivered in order to toll the statute of limitations, and three subparagraphs providing for the addition of 60 days to the time limit where personal service, service by publication or service on defendant’s executor or administrator is utilized.
Second, while the bill would retain the appropriate sheriff outside New York City as the person to receive service for the purposes of this provision, it would change the present reference to the appropriate “clerk of the court” within New York City to the appropriate “clerk of the county” therein as the person to receive the summons for extension purposes. The change was prompted by the consideration that the term “clerk of the county” is less vague than “clerk of the court,” and gives more precise direction to the plaintiff.
Third, the present provision is ambiguous in that it could be read as meaning that the summons may be delivered to the sheriff, or filed with the clerk, in the county where the action arose only where the defendant is a corporation. This was not the intent of chapter 494 of the Laws of 1977, and would be corrected by this bill, clearly to provide that the summons may be transmitted to the appropriate officer in the county in which the action arose regardless of who the defendant may be.
Finally, several grammatical and verbal changes would be made for purposes of clarification.
Subd (a) is derived from the first paragraph of § 11 of the CPA. The word “actually” before “interposed” is omitted. The remaining subdivisions of this rule indicate more precisely when a claim is interposed for purposes of the statutes of limitation.
Subd (b) incorporates the different methods by which actions may be commenced in satisfaction of the claim interposed requirement of subd a. The opening paragraph is derived from CPA § 16 without substantial change. The term “joint contractor” has been omitted as an unnecessary example of a situation in which codefendants are “otherwise united in interest.” Such omission was not intended to change the former law. Subparagraph 1 is derived from CPA §§ 16 and 218 without substantial change. Subparagraph 2 is new since there was no express provision in the former law of this nature in the absence of the granting of a provisional remedy. Subparagraph 3 is derived from CPA §§ 825, 905, 1092, without substantial change. While CPA § 825 referred only to the acquisition of jurisdiction upon the granting of a provisional remedy, it has been construed to mean that the granting of the remedy conditionally commences an action for purposes of the statutes of limitation. Schram v Keane, 279 NY 227, 18 NE2d 136 (1938). CPA § 218, which provided that an action was commenced by the service of a summons, and § 825 were both derived from § 416 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It seemed clear under § 416 that the granting of a provisional remedy was a means by which an action could be commenced, and the court in the Schram Case could find no intent to change this by the separation of the provisions in the CPA. CPA § 825 specified that the jurisdiction acquired was conditional, and liable to be divested, where it “is made dependent by a special provision of law upon some act to be done after the granting of the provisional remedy.” The act referred to was not described further. With respect to attachement, it seems apparent that service of a summons under § 905 was intended. Despite lack of a “special provision of law,” it has been assumed, by analogy, that service of a summons was the conditional act intended with respect to all provisional remedies. See 2 Carmody-Wait Cyclopedia of New York Practice 345 (1952), and cases there cited. Moreover, the language of CPA § 818 implied that if a summons had not already been served, it should “accompany” an arrest or injunction order served on the defendant. See CPA §§ 839, 883. Except for the limitation contained in CPA § 905, however, which was applicable only to attachment, no provision specifically required that the summons be served within a limited period of time. Similarly, while replevin is not, strictly speaking, a provisional remedy, when it precedes service of summons the court obtained jurisdiction under the CPA § 1092, but made a voluntary general appearance. See 7 NY Jud Council Rep 418 n 103(d) (1941). By contrast, the provision in subparagraph 3 provides service by publication must be completed. No express requirement of service of a summons was made. Compare Kurzweil v Story & Clark Piano Co. 159 NY Supp 231 (NY C Ct 1916), with Devonia Discount Corp. v Bianchi, 241 App Div 838, 271 NY Supp 413 (2d Dept 1934). In an action commenced by sequestration, the court found that jurisdiction was not acquired if a summons was not served “at once or within a reasonable time.” Matthews v Matthews, 240 NY 28, 33, 147 NE 237, 238 (1925). Under subparagraph 3 of subdivision b the condition must be satisfied is expressly stated for all provisional remedies. The condition is derived from CPA § 905 which provided for service or commencement of publication within thirty days after a warrant of attachment was issued. It was unclear under § 905, however, whether a plaintiff might serve a defendant personally after the thirty-day period if he had commenced publication theretofore. Another doubtful area under former law was whether publication must be completed after the defendant made a voluntary general appearance. Subparagraph 4 is derived from CPA §§ 17 and 21 without substantial change. Subparagraph 5 is derived from CPA § 18 without substantial change.
Amendment History
Add, L 1962, ch 308, § 1; amd, L 1965, ch 56, § 1; L 1965, ch 112, § 1; L 1965, ch 113, § 1; L 1965, ch 196, § 1; L 1966, ch 138, § 1; L 1970, ch 397, §§ 1, 2; L 1975, ch 109, § 4; L 1976, ch 722, § 1; L 1977, ch 494, § 1; L 1979, ch 404, § 1, eff Jan 1, 1980; L 1992, ch 55, § 395; L 1992, ch 216, § 1, eff July 1, 1992; L 1996, ch 606, § 1, eff Sept 1, 1997; L 2002, ch 334, § 1, eff Aug 6, 2002, deemed eff Nov 21, 2001; L 2017, ch 506, § 1, eff Jan 31, 2018; L 2018, ch 1, § 1, effective January 31, 2018; L 2022, ch 821, § 4, effective December 30, 2022.
Source & verification. Provision text, History, and Advisory
Committee Notes are reproduced verbatim from the Consolidated Laws of New York.
Last verified July 21, 2026.
· Official source
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