Rule 1.Procedure for Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings

REPORTER'S NOTES--2026 AMENDMENT: 33 V.S.A. § 5225(f) authorizes the court to order a child who is the subject of a delinquency petition to abide by conditions of release pending a merits or disposition hearing. Rule 1(b) is amended to allow a judicial officer to set temporary conditions of release prior to a preliminary hearing providing that the judicial officer has found probable cause and has determined that conditions are necessary to prevent bodily injury to the juvenile or another person or harm to property. The threshold finding for issuance of temporary conditions prior to the preliminary hearing parallels the language in V.R.Cr.P. 4(c)(1)(D).

REPORTER'S NOTES--2025 AMENDMENT: V.R.F.P. 1(i)(2)(B) and (i)(7) are amended for the sole purpose of replacing outdated terminology. The amendments do not reflect an intent to change in any manner the range of disabilities covered by the previous terminology.

REPORTER'S NOTES--2023 AMENDMENT: Vermont Rule for Family Proceedings 1(a)(1) is amended to make V.R.C.P 43.1 applicable to delinquency proceedings for the purposes of remote proceedings under V.R.F.P. 17.

REPORTER'S NOTES--2018 AMENDMENTS: Rule 1 is amended to change its 15-and 3-day time periods to 14 days and 5 days, consistent with the simultaneous “day is a day” amendments to V.R.C.P. 6 and V.R.Cr.P. 45, which adopt from the Federal Rules the day-is-a-day counting system, a simplified method of computing time periods. V.R.Cr.P. 45 applies under Rule 1, and V.R.C.P. 6 is generally applicable in the Family Division. See V.R.F.P. 2(a), 4.0(a), 9(e). The amendments are intended both to achieve simplicity and to maintain uniformity with the Federal Rules and among the various bodies of Vermont procedural rules. In sum, most periods of 3 days are changed to 5 unless there is a specific reason for the shorter time. Periods of 5 to 20 days are converted to 7 or multiples of 7 for convenience. Thus, 5 days becomes 7. Seven days remains 7. Ten and 15 days become 14. Twenty days become 21. Several 10-day time periods were enlarged and changed to 28 days for consistency with the changed federal standard for motion practice. Thirty-day time periods remain unchanged. Forty-five and 50-day periods, not found in the Federal Rules, have been changed to 42 and 49 days, consistent with the “multiple of 7” simplification adopted in the Federal Rules. For details, see Reporter's Notes to concurrent amendments of V.R.C.P. 6 and V.R.Cr.P. 45.

REPORTER'S NOTES--2015 AMENDMENT: Rule 1 (a)(3) is amended to add a reference to V.R.Cr.P. 11.1, promulgated on November 13, 2013, as an emergency amendment effective on that date. The criminal rule was adopted to implement provisions of 18 V.S.A. § 4230(a)(5) as added by Act No. 76 of 2013, § 1, requiring the court to engage in a colloquy with a defendant additional to that required by V.R.Cr.P. 11 prior to accepting a plea of guilty or nolo to an offense of possession of specified amounts of marijuana or hashish, or cultivation of marijuana, proscribed by § 4230(a)(1)-(4). V.R.Cr.P 11.1(a) essentially embodies the language of the statute, which requires the court to advise the defendant of potential collateral consequences such as loss of educational or housing benefits or professional licensure that could stem from an admission of guilt or a guilty or nolo plea. V.R.Cr.P. 11.1(b), like the statute, provides for withdrawal of the plea and further proceedings on a not-guilty plea if the court has failed to conduct the colloquy and negative consequences result for the defendant. The present amendment makes clear that proceedings under V.R.Cr.P. 11.1, like those under V.R.Cr.P. 11 and other provisions of the criminal rules, are subject to specific procedural provisions of V.F.R.P. 1 and that appropriate terminology of the family rule is to be substituted for that of the criminal rules.

REPORTER'S NOTES--2013 AMENDMENT: Rule 1(b)(1) is amended to require that the petition in a delinquency proceeding be supplemented by factual data concerning the race/ethnicity of the child who is the subject of the proceeding. The amendment provides that the facts to be presented are those contained in the Law Enforcement Juvenile Data Sheet, Form 101. The Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), pursuant to the Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA), 42 U.S.C. § 5601 et seq., requires states to identify, monitor, and assess the ratio of minority race youth in contact with the justice system in order to promote equitable treatment for all children and youth based on race and ethnicity. The purpose is to determine whether there is Disproportionate Minority Contact (DMC). See 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(23). For purposes of this statutory mandate, minority populations are defined using the OMB (Office of Management and Budget) categorical definitions of Black/African-American, American Indian, Asian, Pacific Islander/Native Hawaiian, and Hispanic. Applicable regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part § 31.30, require that if DMC is identified at established contact points these must be explained. Where documentation is not available to determine if DMC exists, the state must provide a time-limited plan of action, not to exceed six months, for developing and implementing a system for the ongoing collection, analysis, and dissemination of information regarding minorities. Noncompliance with the DMC requirements results in a 20% loss of Delinquency Prevention funds and a requirement that 50% of the state's remaining Title II Delinquency Prevention funds be designated towards remediation of the noncompliance, leading to significant reduction in the award of delinquency prevention grants until the issue is resolved. In the past several years, only 60% of juvenile court case filings have included the necessary OMB race/ethnicity categories. Adoption of the present amendments as part of a larger time-limited plan for completing the DMC assessment, together with strong evidence of commitment from the relevant state agencies, is intended to forestall imposition on Vermont of sanctions for noncompliance. The court database is the best, and in some cases, the only source of information for several of the data points required in determining DMC. By requiring consistent race data entry in the Family Division, the amended rules will assure data transfer and show evidence of the state's commitment to collection and analysis. Rule 1(b)(2) is amended to substitute references to § 1079 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 15 V.S.A., ch. 20, adopted by Act 29 of 2011, § 1, for references to the similar provisions of § 1037 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, former 15 V.S.A., ch. 19, repealed by Act 29 of 2011, § 8. Note that 15 V.S.A. § 1079(f) provides that “party” does not include a child in proceedings under 33 V.S.A. chs. 51 and 53.

REPORTER'S NOTES--2010 AMENDMENT: Emergency amendments to V.R.F.P. 1-3, 6, and 12 intended to implement 33 V.S.A. chapters 51-53 as enacted by Act 185 of 2007 (Adj. Sess.), effective January 1, 2009, were promulgated on December 17, 2008, effective January 1, 2009, with a direction that the Advisory Committee on Family Rules report on any comments received by September 30, 2009. No comments having been received, these amendments are now made permanent.

REPORTER'S NOTES--2009 EMERGENCY AMENDMENT: Rule 1 is amended on an emergency basis to incorporate in the rule changes made necessary by the enactment of Act No. 185 of 2007 (Adj. Sess.), which repealed 33 V.S.A. chapter 55 covering juvenile proceedings and replaced it with 33 V.S.A. chapters 51-53, effective January 1, 2009. Simultaneous amendments have been made to Rules 2, 3, 6, and 12. Most of the changes simply substitute references to appropriate sections of the newly enacted legislation. Other changes are briefly noted below. In Rule 1(a)(2), the reference to V.R.Cr.P. 5(g), covering pretrial release, as inapplicable in proceedings under Rule 1 has been eliminated in light of the changed nature of preliminary proceedings and the differences in language between former 33 V.S.A. § 5513(c) and new 33 V.S.A. 5225(e). In Rule 1(a)(3) and elsewhere, “emergency care” has been substituted for “detention” consistent with the new statutory language. See, e.g., 33 V.S. A. § 5252(c). References to the status conference have been deleted in this paragraph and elsewhere in light of the establishment of required preliminary and pretrial hearings and related timelines in 33 V.S.A. §§ 5225, 5227. In Rule 1(c), “temporary care” has been substituted for “detention” to reflect new statutory terminology. See 33 V.S.A. § 5255. “Child” has been substituted for “juvenile,” or added, in this subdivision and elsewhere for consistency with usage in the former and present statute. See 33 V.S.A. §§ 5102(2), 5112, 5225. In Rule 1(d)(2) and elsewhere, the Family Services Division of the Department for Children and Families has been substituted for the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, consistent with current law. See 33 V.S.A. §§ 302(2), 303. Rule 1(d) (3) has been amended to reflect the provisions of new 33 V.S.A. §§ 5225, 5227, noted above. In Rule 1(e), references to the status conference have been deleted and references to the pretrial hearing now required by 33 V.S.A. § 5227 have been added. In Rule 1(f)(3), “review” has been substituted for “hearing” for consistency with new 33 V.S.A. § 5258. The substitution of “case plan” for “report” in Rule 1(g)(1) reflects the language of new 33 V.S.A. § 5230.

REPORTER'S NOTES--2009 AMENDMENT: Rule 1(j) is added to provide a procedure governing withdrawal of an admission of delinquency comparable to the provisions of V.R.Cr.P. 32(d) for plea withdrawal in a criminal case. In a parallel to the criminal rule, the motion must be made before or within 30 days after the entry of an adjudication of delinquency. As in the criminal rule, the 30 days is intended to allow withdrawal during the appeal period. If a motion by a prisoner in custody under sentence is not made within 30 days under the criminal rule, the remedy is post-conviction relief under 13 V.S.A. § 7131 et seq. See Reporter's Notes to 1980 Amendment of V.R.Cr.P. 32(d). Similarly, under V.R.F.P. 1(j), the remedy after the 30-day period has passed would be a petition under 33 V.S.A. § 5532. The differing tests for allowing the motion use the disposition order as a determining point comparable to the imposition of sentence under V.R.Cr. P. 32(d). The tests for allowance of withdrawal before and after disposition are identical to those provided in the criminal rule for allowance of withdrawal before and after sentencing. See Reporter's Notes to V.R.Cr.P. 32(d). Note that if withdrawal of the admission occurs after the court has given notice to a school superintendent or headmaster of the entry of a delinquency adjudication pursuant to 33 V.S.A. § 5536a(b), the court should promptly inform the superintendent or headmaster of the withdrawal and ask that the notice be removed from the school's file.

REPORTER'S NOTES--2008 AMENDMENT: Rule 1(f)(3), promulgated as an emergency amendment by order of June 1, effective June 22, 2007, is now made permanent. See Reporter's Notes, 2007 Emergency Amendment.

REPORTER'S NOTES--2007 AMENDMENT: Rule 1(i), adopted effective July 14, 2006, is amended to make clear that the state also has the right to obtain an independent examination. Presumably, because the state will bear the cost of the examination, the right will be exercised sparingly.

REPORTER'S NOTES--2007 EMERGENCY AMENDMENT: Rule 1(f)(3) is added to comply with amendments to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 629h(b)(1), 675(5)(G), added by P.L. 109-239, § 8(a), (b), effective October 1, 2006. Rule 1(f)(3) requires notice of permanency hearings held in connection with a delinquency proceeding under Chapter 55 of Title 33 of the Vermont Statutes Annotated. It would also implement 33 V.S.A. § 5531(b). The simultaneous addition of Rule 2(f)(2) makes a similar provision for permanency hearings in CHINS cases. Section 629h(b)(1) as amended provides that, to be eligible for federal funding for certain court improvement grants under § 629h(a), “a highest State court shall have in effect a rule requiring State courts to ensure that foster parents, preadoptive parents, and relative caregivers of a child in foster care under the responsibility of the State are notified of any proceeding to be held with respect to the child.” This requirement implements § 675(5)(G), which, as amended, includes in the definition of “case review system” as applied to state foster-care and permanency proceedings a procedure under which “the foster parents (if any) of a child and any preadoptive parent or relative providing care for the child are provided with notice of, and a right to be heard in, any proceeding to be held with respect to the child, except that this subparagraph shall not be construed to require that any foster parent, preadoptive parent, or relative providing care for the child be made a party to such a proceeding solely on the basis of such notice and right to be heard.” Administrative guidance provided by the Children's Bureau of the Department of Health and Human Services states that the statutory term “proceeding” will be interpreted to mean “all permanency hearings, as well as six- month reviews, if held by the court.” Child Welfare Policy Manual § 8.3C.2b, QA#2 (1/31/07), at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/j2ee/ programs/cb/laws_policies/laws/cwpm/policy_d sp.jsp?citID=1. See also Administration for Children and Families, Children's Bureau, Program Instruction No. ACYF-CB-PI-07-03, at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/laws_policies/policy/pi/2007/ pi0703.htm . Rule 1(f)(3)(A) states the applicability of the rule and, consistent with the language of 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(G), provides that the notice must advise the caregiver that there is a right to be heard but that the notice and the right do not, of themselves, confer party status upon the caregiver. Pursuant to the above-quoted administrative guidance, the requirements of the rule do not apply to six-month reviews, because under current practice, these are administrative reviews. Rule 1(f)(3)(B) provides, in accordance with current practice, that, if the child is currently in the custody of DCF, the Department is to give notice to any caregiver for whom notice is required by the above-cited federal statutes. Such notice may be by first- class mail, by delivery in person, or by telephone when those methods will not ensure that the notice will be timely. Telephone notice is to be followed up by mail or delivery of a paper copy of the notice, which may ordinarily be accomplished by mailing or delivery of the case plan to the caregiver. If the child is not in DCF custody, the court is to give notice by first-class mail. To satisfy the mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 619h(b)(1) that the court “ensure” that the caregiver has been notified, Rule 1(f)(3)(C) requires the court, if the caregiver does not appear at the hearing, to inquire into the adequacy of notice and to provide for notice to be given if there has not been adequate notice.

REPORTER'S NOTES--2006 AMENDMENT: Rule 1(i) is added to provide a procedure for the determination of a juvenile's competence to be subject to delinquency proceedings. The new provision is intended to be the functional equivalent of the procedure for determining competence to stand trial in adult criminal proceedings. The rule has been proposed at the suggestion of the Supreme Court in In re J.M., 172 Vt. 61, 70-71, 769 A.2d 656, 664 (2001), a case involving a competency determination of a juvenile, in which the Court noted the absence of a procedure for such determinations in Family Court delinquency proceedings. Though there have been relatively few instances of the need for such determinations in Vermont, there is increasing concern in the state, and in a developing body of national literature, that juvenile and other courts be aware of the specific competency issues that may arise depending on the juvenile's maturity as well as mental ability. See, e.g., T. Grisso, “The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants,” Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, vol. 3, no. 1, 3-32 (1997); M. Beyer, “What's behind Behavior Matters: The Effects of Disabilities, Trauma, and Immaturity on Juvenile Intent and Ability to Assist Counsel,” 58 Guild Practitioner 2 (Spring 2001); R. Redding, “Adjudicative Competence in Juveniles: Legal and Clinical Issues,” Juvenile Forensic Fact Sheet (2000), http://www.ilppp.virginia.edu/Publications_and_Reports/AdjudComp .html. In the absence of a rule, there is also a lack of uniformity among the Family Court judges in the procedure for competency determinations. Rule 1(i) is based on New Mexico Children's Court Rules and Forms, Rule 10-221. Under paragraph (1), the issue of competence may be raised at any time on the motion of a party or the court's own motion. Once the issue is raised, paragraph (2) requires a mental examination as the basis for determination. The court is to select the psychologist or psychiatrist who will conduct the examination. In accordance with current practice, no showing of cause is required for the examination to be held; in the case of a juvenile, incompetence based on age is too intertwined with other causes of incompetence to be susceptible of advance determination. The rule does not attempt to define a standard for determining competence, which remains a matter of substantive law to be applied to the facts by the judge. In In re J.M., 172 Vt., at 67-68, 769 A.2d at 661-62, the Court adopted the formulation of the standard for adult competence set out in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960), that a defendant have “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” (Cf. State v. Lockwood, 160 Vt. 547, 554, 632 A.2d 655, 660 (1993)). The Vermont Court in In re J.M. then held that finding an incompetent juvenile to be delinquent would violate due process and went on to note that “evaluations of a particular juvenile's competency are to be made with regard to juvenile norms” because “it is likely that many juveniles, often because of limited life experience, may not have the same level of understanding of criminal proceedings as an adult.” In re J.M., 172 Vt., at 68, 769 A.2d at 662. Rule 1(i)(2) reflects the Court's position in In re J.M. by setting forth four factors to be considered in the examination “as appropriate to the circumstances of the child.” Depending on the circumstances, the examiner under factor (A) should consider not only the age of the juvenile but the degree of his or her maturity of thought, sense of identity, and moral reasoning. Factors (B) and (C) should cover not only mental illness and retardation but the juvenile's history of developmental delay, information processing problems, the presence of ADD/ADHD symptoms, intelligence level, and other brain dysfunction symptoms. Factor (D) should, in an appropriate case, include, but not be limited to, an analysis of past trauma resulting from abuse and violence, the effects of such trauma, and any continuing presence of trauma. In each case, the basic question is the impact of the factors considered on the juvenile's ability to satisfy the two prongs of the Dusky standard. See M. Beyer, supra; cf. State v. Lockwood, 160 Vt. at 560-78, 632 A.2d at 663-73 (Johnson, J., dissenting). The report required under paragraph (3), and any expert report independently obtained by the juvenile, will be considered by the court at the hearing under paragraph (5). The requirement that reports be sealed and the prohibition in paragraph (4) of evidentiary use of statements made at the examination are intended to reflect the policies of the mental health privilege and to protect the juvenile's Fifth Amendment rights. Note that paragraph (4) is taken virtually verbatim from 13 V.S.A. § 4816(c), with the substitution of “child” for “person” and the addition of “or obtained” to provide for the report of an expert obtained by the child. Rule 1(i)(5) provides for a hearing before the court “as soon as practicable” after the examination in order not to delay the underlying proceedings. At the hearing, reports of the court-ordered examination, and of any independent examination obtained by the juvenile, will be presented, and the parties may present other evidence on the issue of competence. The court is then to make the determination of competence. Rule 1(i)(6) provides that if the court determines that the juvenile is competent, the delinquency proceeding is to go forward “without delay.” In appropriate circumstances, the hearing could be turned into a status conference. Under Rule 1(i)(7), if the court determines that the juvenile is incompetent, the court is to dismiss the proceeding without prejudice unless the dismissal is based on a finding of long-term developmental disability or mental retardation not subject to amelioration in a timeframe that is reasonable in the circumstances of the case. In such a case, the dismissal may be with prejudice to the commencement of another delinquency proceeding. The state's attorney in either event, however, has discretion to commence a new and separate CHINS proceeding. If competence is restored in a case where dismissal has been without prejudice and the statute of limitations has not run, the state's attorney may subsequently commence a new delinquency proceeding or criminal proceedings if appropriate under 33 V.S.A. § 5506(a).

REPORTER'S NOTES--2000 AMENDMENT: Rule 1(b) is amended to reflect the statement in In re B.C., _______ Vt. _______, _______, 726 A.2d 45, 53 (1999), where the Supreme Court noted that there was no provision in Rule 2, covering CHINS cases, comparable to that in Rule 4(b)(1)(A) providing for the filing of the affidavit listing facts pertinent to jurisdiction as required by 15 V.S.A. § 1037, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. (Rule 4(d) requires such a filing by a defendant or any other party filing a responsive pleading.) The statute in fact requires such a filing by “each party” and, pursuant to 15 V.S.A. § 1031(3), covers custody issues in abuse and dependency proceedings, as well as in divorce. Thus, the requirement should apply to delinquency proceedings under Rule 1, as well as to CHINS proceedings under Rule 2. See simultaneous amendment of Rule 2(b). Jurisdictional information is critical at an early stage in a proceeding, because of the difficulty of undoing what the court has done in a complex matter when a jurisdictional problem arises later in the proceeding. The rule, however, reflects the reality that the SRS worker at the critical and stressful early stages of a proceeding may not be able to determine and present the necessary information in a form that the state's attorney can use. Thus, an affidavit is not required to be filed with the petition. At the hearing, the parents, and any other person appearing who is “acting as a parent,” defined in 15 V.S.A. § 1031(9), must file the statutory affidavit. This approach satisfies the statutory requirement that “each party” file an affidavit, relieves the state's attorney of the burden of determining facts known only to the parties, and provides the court with the necessary information. Rule 1(d)(4) is amended to limit the taking of depositions in juvenile delinquency proceedings. Increasing use of depositions has become a burden on the juvenile docket in some courts. Under the amended rule, if the offense would be a felony in District Court, the past practice continues: Depositions may be taken as of right pursuant to V.R.Cr.P. 15. If the offense would be a misdemeanor in District Court, V.R.Cr.P. 15(e)(4) applies: Depositions may be taken only by agreement or with the approval of the court for good cause shown. The rule provides that, “In determining whether to allow a deposition in misdemeanor cases, the court may consider, among other things, the consequences to the defendant, the importance of the witness's expected testimony, the complexity of the issues involved, the complexity of the witness's expected testimony (e.g., experts), and any other opportunities available to the defendant to discover the information sought by the deposition.” Depositions in misdemeanor cases continue to be subject to the protections provided for deponents, including minors and other “sensitive witnesses,” provided by V.R.Cr.P. 15(f).

REPORTER'S NOTES: This rule governing juvenile delinquency proceedings and the parallel rules for civil proceedings in juvenile court (proceedings involving children in need of care or supervision and proceedings involving termination of parental rights) are adopted to provide consistency, fairness and reasonable promptness in proceedings under Chapter 55 of Title 33 of the Vermont Statutes Annotated. These rules are the product of over three years of study by the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on Rules for Family Proceedings and its predecessor interim advisory committee. Family Court Rule 1 addresses juvenile delinquency cases. Rule 2 addresses proceedings for children in need of care or supervision. Rule 3 addresses proceedings to terminate parental rights. Subdivision (a)(1) of Rule 1 states the general rule, that the rules of criminal procedure govern delinquency cases. This has been true since the adoption of V.R.Cr.P. 54(a)(2) in 1973. Rule 54(a)(2) made the criminal rules applicable to all juvenile court cases. See In re M.W.R., 143 Vt. 6, 458 A.2d 1132 (1983) (applying criminal rules to neglect petition). However, under the present rule this general approach is subject to the exceptions and modifications found in subdivisions (a)(2) and (a)(3). The reference in V.R.Cr.P. 54(a)(2) to juvenile proceedings is superseded by the adoption of this rule and the simultaneous amendment of Rule 54(a)(2). Subdivision (a)(2) lists the criminal rules which are not applicable. The listed rules have been excluded either because they are irrelevant (e.g., the rules on juries) or would conflict with a statutory provision (e.g., the rule on trial calendars). Subdivision (a)(3) lists the rules which have been modified to conform to the juvenile code. The rule sets forth the modifications. Criminal Rule 3 applies only insofar as it provides a list of situations in which a warrantless arrest of an adult may be made; in these situations a child may be taken into custody for the purposes of initiating the statutory procedures set forth in 33 V.S.A. §§ 5510, 5511 and 5513. Criminal Rule 4 applies only to the extent it is incorporated by reference into Rule 5(c). Criminal Rule 5(c) sets forth those instances in which the juvenile court is authorized to examine probable cause; Criminal Rule 4 provides the applicable probable cause standards. Subdivisions (a), (c) and (h) of Criminal Rule 5 apply to any child who is the subject of a detention order or other order of the juvenile court under 33 V.S.A. § 5510. This means that when a child who has been taken into detention initially appears before a judge the judge must review probable cause. The review generally will be ex parte. See Reporter's Notes, V.R.Cr.P. 5. The judge also may review probable cause upon the child's request, with oral or written argument by the parties. See Reporter's Notes--1983 Amendment, V.R.Cr.P. 5. Whether or not requested, probable cause should be reviewed within 48 hours of detention in all cases in which a judicial finding of probable cause has not already been made. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 [111 S.Ct. 1661] (1991). Criminal Rule 11 applies, but is modified so that admissions and denials replace pleas of guilty and not guilty. The rules on status conferences, pretrial motions, disclosure, discovery and pretrial hearings, Rules 12, 12.1, 15, 16, 16.1, 16.2, 17 and 26, apply but are subject to the special rules set forth in subdivisions (d), (e), (h) and (i) of this rule and to the confidentiality provisions of 33 V.S.A. § 5523. These rules also are modified in additional respects. In lieu of pleas of guilty or not guilty, the pleas shall be admissions or denials, and the pleas are to be entered at the preliminary hearing. (Rule 10, on arraignments, does not apply.) The provision of Criminal Rule 12(e) that status conferences be held no earlier than 28 days after arraignment is modified by the statement that the court may schedule a status conference to be held at any time. It is expected that in most cases the status conference will be held much sooner than 28 days after the initial appearance. Because Criminal Rule 12(c) and (f) is adopted, all pretrial motions generally must be filed at or before the status conference or they are waived. If no status conference is scheduled, the rule provides that pretrial motions must be filed at or before the merits hearing or within 28 days of the preliminary hearing, whichever occurs first. The joinder rules, Criminal Rules 13 and 14, apply except that trial together of children shall not occur without their consent. Criminal Rule 32.1, on violation of probation, applies except that juvenile court orders of detention or other such orders of the court are substituted for references to persons in custody. Also, subdivision (a)(3), on release from custody, does not apply. Criminal Rule 42, on contempt, is modified so that it applies only to adults and to children who may be tried as adults (upon appropriate ruling that they should be tried as adults). Criminal Rule 42 complements but does not displace statutory procedures. See 33 V.S.A. §§ 5523(c) and 5539 (procedures for contempt). When contemptuous conduct is committed by children, the procedures set forth in the rule (summary punishment, jury trial) would be inappropriate. Resort to the statutory disposition process (33 V.S.A. § 5527) with its emphasis on the best interests of the child, alone or in combination with the statutory contempt procedures, is more in keeping with the purpose of the statute. Criminal Rule 47 is modified so that memoranda in opposition must be filed within 5 days, unless otherwise ordered by the court. The rule on continuances, Criminal Rule 50(b) and (c), applies subject to subdivision (b) of this rule. Criminal Rule 54 is modified so that “court” means the presiding judge of the family court. Criminal Rules 55 and 56 apply with minor adaptations, and subject to the confidentiality provisions of the statute. Under Family Court Rule 1(b), all petitions under Chapter 55 of Title 33, motions to modify or vacate court orders (33 V.S.A. § 5532), and motions for protective orders (33 V.S.A. § 5534) in all juvenile court matters must be scheduled and heard at the earliest possible time. The second sentence of this subdivision explicitly rejects the practice which developed under the statute of routinely continuing scheduled merits hearings once it is found they are to be contested. A merits hearing may be continued solely for good cause shown and found by the court. Good cause does not include routine scheduling conflicts. In evaluating good cause the juvenile court should weigh the impact of delay upon the juvenile against the competing needs of attorneys, parties and witnesses. In implementing this rule, the trial courts within each county may find it useful to develop protocols by which to avoid attorneys' scheduling conflicts before they occur. Subdivision (e), discussed below, provides the procedure by which the court can ascertain in advance which cases actually will need time for hearings on the merits. Under this rule it is not acceptable to determine this at the merits hearing itself. Subdivision (c) creates a preliminary hearing procedure for delinquency cases. The preliminary hearing must be held at the time of the statutory detention hearing (33 V.S.A. § 5515) or, if no detention hearing is held, at or within a reasonable time after the filing of a petition. Prior to the preliminary hearing the court shall assign counsel. If the facts of the case suggest that the guardian ad litem should not be the child's parent, the court should assign another person to serve as the guardian ad litem at or before the hearing. See 33 V.S.A. § 5525. The court will enter a denial (the juvenile court equivalent of a not guilty plea) at the detention hearing unless the juvenile, after consulting with both the attorney and the guardian ad litem, decides to enter an admission and the court decides to accept the admission. Subdivision (d) governs scheduling and discovery. The rule is constructed to provide the juvenile court the authority it needs to ensure that merits hearings are convened and completed within a reasonable time frame. Subdivision (d)(1) requires the court, at the preliminary hearing, to issue an order setting the matter for a status conference or for trial on the merits on a date certain. Subdivision (d)(2) authorizes the court to issue a discovery order, setting forth deadlines within which each party must comply with Criminal Rules 12.1, 15, 16 and 16.1 and the discovery provisions of this rule. The discovery order may be issued on the judge's own initiative; it must be issued if any party requests it. In those cases in which a discovery order is not issued, the parties will be expected to complete discovery prior to the status conference or merits hearing assigned at the detention hearing. As noted above, subdivision (a)(3) requires that all pretrial motions be filed at or prior to the status conference or, if no status conference is scheduled, at or before the merits hearing or within 28 days of the preliminary hearing, whichever occurs first. Subdivision (d)(3) authorizes the court to schedule a status conference at any time, whether or not a status conference was scheduled at the preliminary hearing and regardless of whether another status conference already has been held. Whenever the first status conference is held, that date will be the deadline under (a)(3) for the filing of motions, unless good cause is shown. Subdivision (d)(3) also provides that the court may schedule hearings on motions at any time. Subdivision (d)(4) provides the procedure for the taking of depositions. The rule incorporates by reference the procedures of Criminal Rule 15 governing the taking of depositions in felonies. These will apply to all delinquency cases, regardless of whether the delinquency would be a felony or a misdemeanor in criminal court. Subdivision (d)(4) also modifies the deposition rule by allowing notice of deposition to be given orally or in writing, so long as notice precedes the deposition by at least 48 hours. The requirement that the notice be reasonable continues to apply. See V.R.Cr.P. 15(b). Discovery of records held by the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services is governed by paragraph (5). Upon filing of the petition any party's attorney may inspect, copy or photograph all material or information within S.R.S. custody, possession or control which relates to the juvenile, the parent, the guardian ad litem or is otherwise relevant. If the Department or any party objects to such discovery, the burden is on S.R.S. or that party to file a motion for a protective order under V.R.Cr.P. 16.2. A representative of S.R.S. may object orally at the preliminary hearing, in lieu of filing a written motion. The oral objection may be made by any S.R.S. worker, whether or not an attorney. Subdivision (e) authorizes status conferences. The essential purpose of a status conference, in juvenile court, is to ascertain whether a merits hearing (i.e., trial) will be needed. If a merits hearing is not going to be needed because there will be an admission, the court will consider the admission at the conference. Under prior practice this occurred at the opening of the erstwhile merits hearing; since the clerks were unable to gauge how much time would be needed until the hearing commenced and the court learned if the matter was to be contested, it was rare for there to be adequate time for an evidentiary hearing. Under the new rule this should occur at the separately--and earlier--scheduled status conference. The intent is to have the evidentiary merits hearing in fact commence and be completed within the statutory time period. Subdivision (e) states that all parties shall attend each status conference unless the court orders otherwise. Admissions should be submitted at the conference, not at the opening of the merits hearing. Subdivision (f) governs parties other than the child and the state's attorney. Section 5502(a)(13) defines a party as the child and “any of the persons or agencies named in the order directing the issuance of a summons referred to in section 5519.” Section 5519 in turn requires service upon any parent, guardian or custodian described in § 5518. The latter section lists “the parent or parents having custody, the guardian or custodian of the child if other than parent, or, if there is no parent, guardian or custodian residing within the state, or if his residence address is unknown, ... any known adult relative or person having the child under his supervision, or, if there be none, the known adult relative or such person residing nearest to the location of the court.” Section 5519 also lists the Commissioner of S.R.S. if the petition alleges that the child is in need of care or supervision and the Commissioner of Corrections if the petition alleges delinquency, and “such other persons as appear to the court to be proper or necessary.” All of these persons apparently were intended by the Legislature to be parties, but only the child is in jeopardy of directly suffering the stigma of a delinquency adjudication and the penalties set forth in § 5529. A parent or custodian may suffer the loss or diminution of his or her relationship with the child, depending on the disposition ordered. Subdivision (f) recognizes the varying interests at stake. The rule requires that all parties receive notice of all proceedings and copies of all pleadings. The rule allows them unfettered participation in all proceedings relating to disposition of the child. However, the rule prohibits them from participating in pretrial discovery and from calling or examining witnesses or otherwise participating in the merits hearing unless the court, for good cause shown at or before the hearing, grants permission. The rule authorizes the court to place conditions on any grant of permission. Because of the constitutional requirement that the state prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, it is not contemplated that participation by a party other than the state would be proper in proving the allegations of the petition. Subdivision (g) is a special rule on discovery of information to be used at the disposition phase of the delinquency proceeding, described in 33 V.S.A. § 5527. Subdivision (g)(1) of the rule requires that disposition reports and expert witness reports be filed with the court. Arrangements shall be made by the party filing such reports for their receipt by guardians ad litem and attorneys of record at least three days prior to the disposition hearing. Parties who are not represented by counsel must receive notice that each report is available for review at the courthouse. This disclosure requirement applies to all parties submitting reports of expert witnesses. Failure to abide by the rule will constitute grounds for a continuance, if sought by a party prejudiced by the failure. In some cases, even the full three days notice may not provide adequate time for response and a continuance may be needed. Under subdivision (g)(2) all of the procedures for discovery set forth above in subdivision (d) apply to discovery of disposition information; there is a continuing obligation to provide copies of all new discoverable information as soon as it becomes available. However, the rule specifically states that written statements to be submitted to the court (other than the disposition report itself and expert witness reports) must be made available to other parties no later than the last business day prior to the hearing. Finally, subdivision (h) establishes the procedure for physical and mental evaluations in delinquency proceedings. Subdivision (h)(1) invokes V.R.Cr.P. 16.1(a)(1)(I), which authorizes examination of criminal defendants (here, the child charged with delinquency). The criminal rule is applicable to all phases of a delinquency case. Subdivision (h)(2) invokes Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 35, but the civil rule applies only after a finding of delinquency has been entered. The civil rule authorizes physical and mental examinations of any party and of any person in the custody or legal control of a party. The broader scope of the civil rule is needed to provide adequate information to the court at the disposition phase. Subdivision (b) of Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 35 is excluded from operation in delinquency proceedings. As is more fully discussed in the Reporter's Notes explaining Family Court Rule 2(h) (mental and physical examinations in “chins” proceedings), the waiver provisions of subdivision (b) run counter to the policies of these rules. Subdivision (h) is explicitly made subject to the limitation that no communications made during the course of any examination ordered pursuant to these rules may be used to incriminate the person being examined. This is a summary of 13 V.S.A. § 4816 and V.R.E. 503(d)(2).