§ 17.067.Default Judgment

The waiting period that protects a defendant who does not yet know they have been sued.

If process is served on the chairman under this subchapter, a court may not grant default judgment against the defendant before the 21st day after the day on which the chairman was served.

The clock runs from service on the chairman, not from the defendant’s receipt of the mailed notice. That is a deliberate choice: the date of service on the chairman is fixed and provable from the return, while the date a letter reached an out-of-state address is neither.

The trade is that a defendant whose notice is delayed in the post loses part of the 21 days. The continuance provision that follows is the answer to that.

Twenty-one days is longer than it looks in context. The ordinary Texas answer deadline is the Monday following the expiration of twenty days after service, and a default may be taken after it. Here the period is measured from an earlier event — service on the chairman, which precedes the defendant learning anything.

The section is a floor, not a licence. Nothing entitles a plaintiff to a default on the 21st day; the ordinary requirements still apply, including a return on file showing service that strictly complies with the subchapter.

A default granted too early is vulnerable. The prohibition is directed at the court — it may not grant — so a judgment entered inside the period is open to attack.

The whole subchapter is built around this exchange: the plaintiff gets service that counts as personal service, and the defendant gets the return requirements, the waiting period, and the continuance.