§ 110.003.Religious Freedom Protected

The operative provision, and it is strict scrutiny stated in a statute.

A government agency may not substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion — unless it demonstrates that applying the burden to that person is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.

Three features make this demanding, and each is deliberate.

The burden of demonstration is on the government, not on the claimant.

The interest must be compelling, which the definitions section ties to federal free exercise case law rather than leaving at large.

The means must be the least restrictive, so a government with a compelling interest still loses if a less burdensome route existed.

"The application of the burden to the person" is the phrase to notice. The government must justify the burden as applied to this claimant, not the rule in general — so a law with a compelling purpose may still fail against a particular objector.

The framework restores by statute what federal constitutional doctrine had moved away from, and the chapter’s definitions section drops the centrality requirement that once narrowed such claims.

Subsection (c) supplies a practical limit on the least restrictive means test. An agency making the demonstration is not required to separately prove that the remedy and penalty provisions of the measure are the least restrictive means to ensure compliance or to punish the failure to comply.

Without that, a government would have to justify its enforcement mechanism as well as its rule, and a defensible rule could fail because of how it is enforced.