The only questions that may be raised in a proceeding under this article are: 1. whether the body or officer failed to perform a duty enjoined upon it by law; or 2. whether the body or officer proceeded, is proceeding or is about to proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction; or 3. whether a determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion, including abuse of discretion as to the measure or mode of penalty or discipline imposed; or 4. whether a determination made as a result of a hearing held, and at which evidence was taken, pursuant to direction by law is, on the entire record, supported by substantial evidence. 5. A proceeding to review the final determination or order of the state review officer pursuant to subdivision three of section forty-four hundred four of the education law shall be brought pursuant to article four of this chapter and such subdivision; provided, however, that the provisions of this article shall not apply to any proceeding commenced on or after the effective date of this subdivision.
§ 7803.Questions raised.
Article 78. Proceeding Against Body or Officer · Last amended 2003 · Last verified July 21, 2026
In one sentenceCPLR 7803 limits an Article 78 proceeding to four questions: failure to perform a legal duty, acting without or in excess of jurisdiction, a determination made unlawfully, arbitrarily, or capriciously, or a hearing determination unsupported by substantial evidence, while routing state review officer special-education appeals elsewhere.
Full Text of CPLR 7803
Plain-English Summary
Article 78 doesn't open the door to any complaint a person might have about government action. CPLR 7803 confines the proceeding to four questions, and only these four. First, whether the body or officer failed to perform a duty the law requires of it, the modern equivalent of mandamus to compel. Second, whether the body or officer proceeded, is proceeding, or is about to proceed without or in excess of its jurisdiction, the equivalent of prohibition.
Third, whether a determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law, or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion, including abuse of discretion in the measure or mode of a penalty or discipline imposed. This is the broadest of the four questions and the one most often litigated, since it reaches procedural defects, legal errors, and the reasonableness of an agency's exercise of judgment. Fourth, whether a determination reached after a hearing where evidence was taken, held pursuant to a legal directive, is supported by substantial evidence on the entire record, a narrower, more deferential inquiry that generally gets transferred to the Appellate Division rather than decided by the trial-level court.
The fifth provision is a carve-out rather than a fifth question in the same sense: proceedings to review a final determination or order of the state review officer under the education law's special-education appeal provision go through Article 4 and that specific education law subdivision instead, and Article 78 does not apply to those proceedings once that provision took effect.
Frequently Asked Questions
What questions can be raised in an Article 78 proceeding?
Only four: whether the body or officer failed to perform a legally required duty, whether it acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, whether a determination violated lawful procedure or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion, or whether a hearing determination is supported by substantial evidence.
What does "arbitrary and capricious" mean in an Article 78 proceeding?
It's one of the grounds under CPLR 7803(3) for challenging a determination, covering agency action that violates lawful procedure, reflects an error of law, or amounts to an abuse of discretion, including in the severity of a penalty imposed.
What is the substantial evidence standard under CPLR 7803(4)?
It asks whether a determination made after a hearing at which evidence was taken, held under a legal directive, is supported by substantial evidence when the whole record is considered.
Can Article 78 be used to challenge a special education decision?
No, not for review of a final determination or order of the state review officer under subdivision three of section forty-four hundred four of the education law; that review goes through Article 4 and that education law subdivision instead.
What's the difference between the four grounds in CPLR 7803?
The first two mirror the old mandamus and prohibition writs, covering a failure to act and acting beyond authority; the third covers procedural and legal errors along with abuse of discretion; the fourth is a narrower review of whether hearing evidence supports the result.
Can you challenge how severe a penalty is through Article 78?
Yes. CPLR 7803(3) specifically includes abuse of discretion as to the measure or mode of penalty or discipline imposed among the grounds for review.
Does Article 78 let a court compel an agency to act?
Yes, the first question under CPLR 7803 asks whether the body or officer failed to perform a duty enjoined upon it by law, the modern form of a mandamus claim.
Advisory Committee Notes
This section is derived from part of CPA § 1296. The first question specified is the same as the first of CPA § 1296; the second combines the second and third stated in CPA § 1296. The third question specified in the section combines the three paragraphs in CPA § 1296 numbered 4, 5 and 5-a. Paragraph 5-a was enacted to overcome the rule stated in the cases of Barsky v Board of Regents, 305 NY 89, 111 NE2d 222, affd 347 US 442 (1953), and Sagos v O’Connell, 301 NY 212, 93 NE2d 644 (1950), which held that the degree of punishment was not reviewable.
Paragraph 5-a was added to CPA § 1296 in 1955, with no express indication of where it was to be placed. Laws 1955, c. 661. It seems apparent, however, that it was not intended that paragraph 5-a be qualified by the paragraph preceding paragraphs 6 and 7. This may be inferred from the numbering “5-a” rather than “8” and from the simultaneous amendment of the paragraphs following paragraph 7. The latter amendment included paragraph 5-a with paragraphs 1 through 5 as describing matters to be decided in the first instance by Special Term. Ibid. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Clevenger’s 1957 Manual places paragraph 5-a following, and thus qualified by, the paragraph preceding paragraphs 6 and 7. See also the 1957 pocket part to volume 6B of Gilbert-Bliss’ Civil Practice at page 43, where the same error is made.
The last phrase of the qualifying paragraph which was added in 1951 (Laws 1951, c. 663) is discussed in the notes to CPLR § 7804(e).
Paragraph 3 of this section indicates that abuse of discretion may include, but is not limited to, the measure or mode of punishment. This change extends the scope of review to include any abuse of discretion, so that the scope will be no narrower than the scope of review on appeal from a determination of a judge at Special Term.
The language in paragraph 4 aptly describes the “substantial evidence” test of Stork Restaurant, Inc. v Boland, 282 NY 256, 26 NE2d 247 (1940), Miller v Kling, 291 NY 65, 50 NE2d 546 (1943), and Brennan v Rubino, 8 NY2d 16, 21, 167 NE2d 332, 334 (1960); see generally, Toch, Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations in New York State, 24 Albany L Rev 95, 115–19 (1960); Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 Iowa L Rev 331, 347–48 (1961).
This section is not intended to change, affect or impair in any manner established principles of judicial review which hold the burden of overcoming an administrative determination to be upon the petitioner; as for example, a proceeding by a taxpayer to review a determination of the State Tax Commission under Tax Law §§ 199 and 375, where the burden rests upon the taxpayer to show the determination is “clearly erroneous.” See, e.g., People ex rel. Kohlman & Co. v Law, 239 NY 346, 146 NE 622 (1925); People ex rel. Hull v Graves, 289 NY 173, 45 NE2d 161 (1942); Young v Bragalini, 3 NY2d 602, 148 NE2d 143 (1958).
Amendment History
Add, L 1962, ch 308, § 1, eff Sept 1, 1963; amd, L 1962, ch 318, § 26, eff Sept 1, 1963; L 2003, ch 492, § 2, eff Sept 1, 2003.
Source & verification. Provision text, History, and Advisory
Committee Notes are reproduced verbatim from the Consolidated Laws of New York.
Last verified July 21, 2026.
· Official source
Also known as: arbitrary and capricious standard New YorkArticle 78 substantial evidence standardgrounds for Article 78 petitionabuse of discretion Article 78mandamus to compel New York agencyquestions raised Article 78 proceeding