§ 6513.Duration of notice of pendency.
Article 65. Notice of Pendency · Last amended 1963 · Last verified July 21, 2026
Full Text of CPLR 6513
Plain-English Summary
A notice of pendency does not stay on the record forever. CPLR 6513 caps its effective life at three years from the date of filing. Once that period runs, the notice loses its force unless something has been done to extend it before the clock runs out.
Extension is available, but not automatic. Before the three-year period -- or a prior extension -- expires, the plaintiff can move for another like period, on whatever notice the court requires, and the court will grant it only for good cause shown. If the court grants the extension, the order itself has to be filed, recorded, and indexed before the earlier period runs out, so there is no gap in the public record between one period of effectiveness and the next.
Frequently Asked Questions
How long does a notice of pendency last in New York?
Three years from the date of filing, unless the court grants an extension.
Can a notice of pendency be extended past three years?
Yes, the plaintiff can move for an extension for a like additional period, but only on notice the court requires and for good cause shown.
What must the plaintiff show to get an extension of a notice of pendency?
Good cause -- the statute does not automatically renew a notice, and the court decides whether the plaintiff's showing justifies another three-year period.
When must the extension motion be made?
Before the original three-year period, or any prior extension, expires.
What happens if the extension order isn't filed before the deadline?
The extension order must be filed, recorded, and indexed before the prior period expires, so missing that deadline leaves the notice without continuous effect.
Advisory Committee Notes
This section is derived from CPA § 121-a, which was added in 1957, upon recommendation of the Judicial Conference. See Laws 1957, c 877, § 2; 2 NY Jud Conference Rep 114–16 (1957).
The phrase “as notice” in the first sentence of CPA § 121-a has been deleted. It appeared to distinguish the effect of a notice of pendency as “constructive notice” from its effect of binding subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers “to the same extent as if . . . [they were parties] to the action.” See CPA § 121. Such a distinction is wholly unwarranted, for the second statement of effect is simply an amplification of the first. Under common law principles, a purchaser with notice of the pendency of an action takes subject to its consequences. See, e.g., 2 NY Jud Conference Rep 125 (1957).
It should be noted that the notice of pendency statute is intended only to replace a constructive notice occasioned by commencement of an action with a constructive notice occasioned by the filing, recording and indexing of a paper. Actual notice to a prospective purchaser would subject him to the consequences of a suit, whether or not an effective statutory notice is on file. See 2 NY Jud Conference Rep 125 (1957); 14 Carmody-Wait, Cyclopedia of New York Practice 93 (1954); 3 Merrill, Notice 97–98, 119 (1952); cf. Note, 12 Tulane L Rev 308 (1938). Under CPA § 121-a, a prospective purchaser, who had not examined the notice of pendency records and hence had no actual notice of a suit, could not be charged with constructive notice if a filed notice was over three years old. But the operation of CPA § 121-a would have been thwarted if a purchaser who examined the records and discovered a stale notice could have been considered to have been thereby actually notified of a pending suit or charged with a duty to investigate whether the suit was still pending. Clearly, a stale notice of pendency should be wholly ineffective for any purpose whatever. By omitting the words “as notice” and leaving the former phrase “shall be effective,” this section is designed to accomplish that objective.
The details in CPA § 121-a for marking a copy of the extended notice for filing, have been deleted. Since the order will recite the particulars of the notice it extends, filing of the order should suffice.
Authority under this section to extend a notice “for good cause shown” for an additional three-year period includes the authority to extend a notice for less than three years.
The last paragraph of CPA § 121-a was a transitional provision, which has had no function since September 1, 1960. It has therefore been deleted.
Amendment History
Add, L 1962, ch 308, eff Sept 1, 1963.