§ 5205.Personal property exempt from application to the satisfaction of money judgments.

(See also Advisory Committee Notes preceding § 5201, under subheading “Exemptions generally.”).

Subd (a) of this section is derived from former §§ 665 and 665-a. The modifications are designed merely to clarify meaning and eliminate repetitive language. No change in substance is intended. The sole function of former § 665-a was to provide that § 665 was applicable to women. The simple insertion of the term “or woman” achieves the same purpose. The reference to the continuation of the exemptions while the property is being transported from one residence to another has been deleted as unnecessary. The contents of subparagraph 8 of former § 665 have been placed in the opening paragraph of this subdivision. Subparagraph 8 did not contain an enumeration of exempt properties as did the other seven subparagraphs but provided exceptions to the entire section. The modification in the language of former subparagraph 8(b) is designed to make it clear that the exemption exception, where the judgment was for the purchase money of an exempt asset, relates only to that asset and not to all of the other exempt properties.

The language in former subparagraph 8(a) has been changed from “a judgment recovered wholly upon one or more demands for work performed in the family as a domestic or work performed by a laboring person or mechanic,” to “where the judgment . . . was recovered by a domestic, laboring person or mechanic for work performed by him in such capacity.” The clause “in the family,” qualifying the “work performed as a domestic” exception, has been deleted. It was apparently not considered essential to add the qualification to the “work performed by a laboring person or mechanic” exception (11 NY Jud Council Rep 261, 267 (1945)), and there appears to be no reason for retaining it in the “domestic” situation. While the former use of the terms “by a” rather than “as a” in the “laboring person or mechanic” exception may be construed as indicating that it was applicable in an action by a contractor or manufacturer for work performed by his employees, it is extremely doubtful that this was intended. This subdivision is designed to avoid this type of misunderstanding. It should be noted that the exemption exception for laboring persons in the New York City Municipal Court Code, § 139, is much more limited. The judgment cannot exceed one hundred dollars and the action must have been “brought within three months after the cause of action accrued.” In recommending the adoption of the “laboring person” exception, the Judicial Council made no reference to the Municipal Court Code provision. The amount of food for a team in subparagraph 7 is reduced from that necessary for ninety days to that necessary for sixty days to conform to the food for other domestic animals and for human beings in subparagraph 4. No other changes have been made in the former language, despite the fact that many of the provisions are inconsistent, illogical and antiquated. See introduction to this article. Some of the more flagrant defects are set forth to emphasize the need for revision:

Subparagraph 1—the “stove” exemption was enacted in 1824 and may have been intended to apply to a heating unit; in present usage, of course, “stove” is usually understood to refer to a cooking unit. A “sewing machine,” under modern living conditions, is frequently not as much a necessity as a washing machine. No limitation on the value of either the stove or the sewing machine exists.

Subparagraph 2—no limit attaches to the value of “family pictures” or “school books,” nor is it clear what “school books” includes.

Subparagraph 3—ownership of pews, common in 1824 when this exemption was enacted, is virtually non-existent today.

Subparagraph 4—it has already been observed that the present provisions provide food for a team for ninety days, while limiting food for the family and domestic animals to sixty days. Proposed subparagraph 7 makes the sixty-day requirement uniform.

Subparagraph 5—this listing omits many essentials, such as medical appliances—e.g., artificial limbs, crutches, eyeglasses, hearing aids, wheel chairs (possibly “furniture”) and dentures. It also set no limit on value other than the loose standard of what are “necessary.” The furniture or the radio apparently may be elaborate, expensive installations, yet no television set or musical instrument is exempt. Moreover, while a mechanical, gas or electric refrigerator is exempt, an old-fashioned ice box is apparently not.

Subparagraph 6—while the “watch” may not exceed $35.00 in value, the “wedding ring” may apparently be of any value. The provision is obviously intended to protect the debtor’s own wedding ring, or that of his wife or mother, but it would seem to permit all of a debtor’s assets to be converted into an expensive wedding band, purchased solely as a means of insulating assets from creditors.

Subparagraph 7—the provision for a “team” dates from 1842; although “farm machinery” was added in 1946, the subparagraph contains little other recognition of modern farming and transportation methods. Cf. Surr Ct Act § 200(3) (“the farm machinery, one motor vehicle and one tractor”).

Subd (b) of this section is derived from CPA § 666. The modifications are identical to those made in subd (a). Similar comment may also be made as to the need for revision. Apparently the contemplation of the statute is that a non-householder lives with a householder. Thus, no separate exemptions appear for his books, furniture, utensils, appliances or food. Yet, unless he is a member of the householder’s “family,” the exemptions for the householder do not cover him. Moreover, a male nonhouseholder would most likely be a person who has never married, but he too may own an exempt wedding ring. If he is well-advised, he too will invest his liquid assets in an expensive wedding ring. While this provision thus serves to encourage matrimony, it seems otherwise difficult to justify.

Subd (c) of this section is derived, with only minor language changes, from CPA § 668.

Subd (d) of this section is based upon CPA § 687-a(8)(b) and part of §§ 792(b) and 1196. While those sections specified “any money, thing in action or other property held in trust,” the term “property” alone would cover the first two categories also. The exemption relates only to the principal of the trust. The income is treated in subd (e)(1).

Subd (e) of this section is derived from parts of CPA §§ 792 and 793 and is designed to replace former §§ 687-a(8)(c), 687-a(8)(d) and part of former § 1196. No change in substance is intended. Although portions of income described in this subdivision might formerly have been reached under the garnishment procedure described in CPA § 684 without a preliminary determination of the reasonable requirements of the judgment debtor, CPLR § 5226 contemplates the elimination of the garnishment procedure. CPA §§ 792 and 793 required a determination of “reasonable requirements” before such income might have been reached. See notes to CPLR § 5226. Subparagraph 1 is derived from part of the first sentence of former § 793. The term “or other payments” has been added to cover payments of principal made from the trust. Subparagraph 2 is derived from CPA §§ 687-a(8)(c), 792(c) and 793. As previously noted, the availability of earnings not required for the reasonable requirements of the debtor was specified in the latter two sections, which were in the supplementary proceeding article, but not in § 687-a(8)(c), in the execution article, which provided for a levy upon debts. Section 687-a(8)(c) must be read with § 684, however, since the latter section provided for a levy upon earnings pursuant to garnishee execution. Subparagraph 3 is based upon parts of former § 687-a(8)(d), 792(d) and 793. Section 792(d) expressly provided for a determination of the extent to which such payments were unnecessary pursuant to § 793, and since § 687-a(8)(d) contained no such exception, and neither it nor § 684 apparently permitted a levy, this income would not have been available under former law without such a determination. The requirement of § 792(d) that the creditor’s claim antedate the award has been deleted since provisions for outstanding debts are usually taken into consideration upon awarding alimony and since the court which made the award is required to determine the amount which should be applied to the judgment.

Subd (f) of this section is derived from CPA § 667. The only modification is the substitution of the phrase “armed forces” for the phrase “military or naval service.” Since the term “military” apparently does not include “naval,” it may also be construed as not including the air force. The term “musician” is undoubtedly archaic; the modern equivalent is apparently “warrant officer.” Similarly, while it is doubtful whether a “bounty,” “land warrant,” “sword” or “horse” are still awarded, the provision operates to protect previous awards; this language, dating from 1864 to 1876, has therefor been left intact.

Subd (g) of this section derives from CPA § 687-a(8)(e), modified. The former law only exempts payment for milk from the provisions of the section which dealt with execution and levy upon debts. See CPA § 687-a(8)(e), added by Laws 1955, c. 216. Thus, while unpaid milk proceeds might not have been levied upon under an execution against the debt, they apparently might have been reached by supplementary proceedings. Cf. CPA § 782. For example, they might have been ordered turned over to the creditor under CPA § 794 or payment of them might have been restrained under CPA § 781. The proceeds were apparently also vulnerable to a judgment creditor’s action. See CPA § 1191. Moreover, once paid to the judgment debtor, milk proceeds might have been seized or ordered paid in the same manner as other assets. Since the milk provision was added as recently as 1955, the Advisory Committee has decided that it should be retained. Because of the integration of execution, supplementary proceedings and judgment creditor’s actions, however, its retention is actually a broadening, since the provision would make unpaid milk proceeds exempt from application to the satisfaction of a judgment, regardless of the enforcement procedure employed.

Add, L 1962, ch 308, eff Sept 1, 1963; amd, L 1965, ch 623, § 1; L 1976, ch 129, §§ 1, 2, eff Sept 1, 1976; L 1976, ch 697, § 1, eff Aug 23, 1976; L 1977, ch 516, § 26, eff July 1, 1977; L 1978, ch 17, § 1, eff March 17, 1978; L 1979, ch 148, § 2; L 1980, ch 116, § 1, eff May 13, 1980; L 1986, ch 404, § 9, eff July 21, 1986; L 1987, ch 108, § 1; L 1989, ch 84, § 1; L 1989, ch 280, §§ 1, 2, eff July 7, 1989; L 1993, ch 638, § 8, eff Aug 4, 1993; L 1994, ch 127, § 1; L 1995, ch 93, §§ 1, 2, eff Sept 1, 1995; L 1997, ch 398, § 61, eff Jan 1, 1998; L 1997, ch 546, § 5, eff Sept 10, 1997; L 1998, ch 206, § 1; L 2001, ch 62, § 11, eff June 25, 2001; L 2001, ch 141, § 1, eff Aug 6, 2001; L 2008, ch 575, § 1; L 2009, ch 24, § 2, eff May 4, 2009; L 2010, ch 568, § 1, eff Jan 21, 2011; L 2011, ch 1, § 1, eff Jan 21, 2011; L 2011, ch 62, § 104 (Part A), eff Oct 3, 2011; L 2019, ch 580, § 3, effective April 4, 2020; L 2021, ch 107, § 1, effective May 13, 2021.