Article 50. Judgments Generally · Last amended 1978 · Last verified July 21, 2026
In one sentenceCPLR 5015 is New York's mechanism for vacating a judgment after entry, letting a party move to set it aside for excusable default, newly discovered evidence, fraud, lack of jurisdiction, or reversal of an underlying judgment, and it is the state's counterpart to Federal Rule 60(b).
(a)On Motion. The court which rendered a judgment or order may relieve a party from it upon such terms as may be just, on motion of any interested person with such notice as the court may direct, upon the ground of:
1. excusable default, if such motion is made within one year after service of a copy of the judgment or order with written notice of its entry upon the moving party, or, if the moving party has entered the judgment or order, within one year after such entry; or 2. newly-discovered evidence which, if introduced at the trial, would probably have produced a different result and which could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under section 4404; or 3. fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; or 4. lack of jurisdiction to render the judgment or order; or 5. reversal, modification or vacatur of a prior judgment or order upon which it is based.
(b)On Stipulation. The clerk of the court may vacate a default judgment entered pursuant to section 3215 upon the filing with him of a stipulation of consent to such vacatur by the parties personally or by their attorneys.
(c)On Application of an Administrative Judge. An administrative judge, upon a showing that default judgments were obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, illegality, unconscionability, lack of due service, violations of law, or other illegalities or where such default judgments were obtained in cases in which those defendants would be uniformly entitled to interpose a defense predicated upon but not limited to the foregoing defenses, and where such default judgments have been obtained in a number deemed sufficient by him to justify such action as set forth herein, and upon appropriate notice to counsel for the respective parties, or to the parties themselves, may bring a proceeding to relieve a party or parties from them upon such terms as may be just. The disposition of any proceeding so instituted shall be determined by a judge other than the administrative judge.
(d)Restitution. Where a judgment or order is set aside or vacated, the court may direct and enforce restitution in like manner and subject to the same conditions as where a judgment is reversed or modified on appeal.
Plain-English Summary
CPLR 5015 is the rule New York litigants reach for when a judgment or order has already been entered but shouldn't stand. It is the state analog to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b): both provisions exist because litigation sometimes produces a result that the record, once fully examined, can't justify, whether because a party never had a fair chance to appear, the evidence available at trial was incomplete, the other side played unfairly, the court never had power to act, or the judgment's foundation has since collapsed. Rather than force every such problem through an appeal, CPLR 5015 lets the party go back to the court that rendered the judgment and ask it to undo its own work.
Subdivision (a) lists five grounds, and a motion has to fit one of them. The first and most frequently invoked is excusable default: a judgment entered while a party wasn't participating, whether through a missed deadline, an unanswered complaint, or a similar lapse, can be vacated if the default itself is excusable. This ground carries its own filing deadline, running one year from when a copy of the judgment or order, along with written notice of its entry, was served on the moving party, or one year from the entry itself if that party was the one who entered the judgment. Second, newly discovered evidence can justify vacatur, but only evidence that would probably have changed the outcome and that couldn't have been found in time to seek a new trial. Third, fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct by an adverse party opens the door regardless of when the misconduct is uncovered, since courts won't let a tainted judgment stand on formal finality grounds alone. Fourth, a judgment or order entered without jurisdiction to render it is vulnerable to vacatur at any point, since a court acting beyond its power hasn't produced a judgment worth defending. Fifth, where the judgment being attacked rests on some earlier judgment or order that has since been reversed, modified, or vacated, the later judgment can fall along with its foundation.
The rest of the section covers who else can set a judgment aside and what happens once it's gone. Subdivision (b) gives the clerk authority, without any motion or judicial order, to vacate a default judgment entered under CPLR 3215 on the filing of a stipulation of consent signed by the parties or their attorneys - a streamlined path when both sides already agree the default judgment should go. Subdivision (c) creates a broader administrative tool: an administrative judge who sees default judgments obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, illegality, unconscionability, lack of due service, violations of law, or other illegalities, or default judgments obtained in cases where those defendants would be uniformly entitled to interpose a defense predicated on those same grounds, in numbers the administrative judge considers sufficient to warrant action, can bring a proceeding to relieve the affected parties after appropriate notice to counsel or the parties themselves. That proceeding, notably, gets decided by a different judge than the administrative judge who initiated it, keeping the administrative and adjudicative roles separate.
Subdivision (d) addresses what follows a successful motion. When a judgment or order is set aside or vacated, the court can direct and enforce restitution, putting the parties back where they stood before the vacated judgment took effect, using the same tools and the same conditions that apply when a judgment is reversed or modified on appeal. That restitution power matters in practice: vacating a judgment does more than erase a piece of paper, it can require unwinding payments, returned property, or other steps already taken in reliance on the judgment that no longer stands.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the New York equivalent of Rule 60(b)?
CPLR 5015 is New York's counterpart to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), providing grounds and procedure for vacating a judgment or order after it has been entered.
How do you vacate a judgment in New York?
A party moves under CPLR 5015(a) on notice, asking the court that rendered the judgment to relieve the party from it on one of the statute's enumerated grounds, such as excusable default, newly discovered evidence, or fraud.
What counts as excusable default under CPLR 5015?
The statute doesn't define the term itself, but it allows vacatur where a judgment or order was entered against a party in default, provided the motion is made within the section's one-year deadline.
How long do you have to move to vacate a default judgment in New York?
A motion based on excusable default must be made within one year after service of a copy of the judgment or order with written notice of its entry, or within one year of entry if the moving party entered it.
Can a New York judgment be vacated for fraud?
Yes. CPLR 5015(a)(3) allows vacatur on the ground of fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party.
Can both sides agree to vacate a default judgment without a court motion?
Yes. Under CPLR 5015(b), the clerk may vacate a default judgment entered under section 3215 upon the filing of a stipulation of consent signed by the parties or their attorneys.
What happens to money already paid once a judgment is vacated?
CPLR 5015(d) lets the court direct and enforce restitution, restoring the parties to their prior positions using the same tools available when a judgment is reversed or modified on appeal.
Can a judgment be vacated for lack of jurisdiction in New York?
Yes. CPLR 5015(a)(4) lists lack of jurisdiction to render the judgment or order as an independent ground for vacatur.
Advisory Committee Notes
Subd. (a) of this rule replaces CPA § 108 and §§ 521 through 529. It is similar in approach to subd (b) of Federal rule 60. The New York sections created the false impression that a final judgment could be set aside only for the grounds therein specified, namely, (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect in connection with default judgments (§ 108); (2) irregularity (§ 521); or (3) error in fact not arising upon the trial (§ 522). Actually, under case law in this state, a final judgment may also be set aside because the court which rendered the judgment lacked jurisdiction (see, e.g., Wavel v Wiles, 24 NY 635 (1862) 7 Carmody-Wait, Cyclopedia of New York Practice 390–92 (1953)), for fraud (see Appleton, New York Practice 273 (5th ed 1957)), and for newly discovered evidence. See Palisi v Yanarella, 76 NYS2d 209 (Sup Ct), affd 272 App Div 1070, 75 NYS2d 520 (2d Dept 1947) (dictum); 7 Carmody-Wait op cit supra at 381. Furthermore, a court possesses inherent discretionary power to vacate its own judgment for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice, and a separate action in equity may be instituted to vacate a judgment upon such grounds as mistake or extrinsic fraud where there is no adequate remedy at law. See 7 Carmody-Wait, op cit supra at 374–380; 3 Bender, New York Practice 600–01 (Warren ed 1954). This subdivision makes specific reference to these additional grounds of setting aside final judgments. In subparagraph 2, the words “which, if introduced at the trial, would probably have produced a different result” have been added to the words of the Federal provision. In the Federal courts, newly discovered evidence is of no importance unless it would probably alter the judgment. Glade v Allied Electric Products, 135 F2d 590 (7th Cir 1943). The New York rule is to the same effect. See, e.g., In re Madden’s Estate, 155 Misc 308, 279 NY Supp 218 (Surr Ct 1935); 7 Carmody-Wait, op cit supra at 162. The “fraud” specified in subparagraph 3 may be either extrinsic or intrinsic. The words “misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party,” appearing in the Federal provision, have been included. The court’s inherent power to relieve a party from the operation of a judgment in the interest of substantial justice is not limited in any way by the new CPLR. “The whole power of the court to relieve from judgments taken through ‘mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect’ is not limited . . .; but in the exercise of its control over its judgments it may open them upon the applications of anyone for sufficient reason, in the furtherance of justice. Its power to do so does not depend upon any statute, but is inherent, . . . .” Ladd v Stevenson, 112 NY 325, 332, 19 NE 842, 844 (1889); see also Carmody, New York Practice 644 (7th ed Forkosch 1956). Included is the power to permit a person not personally served to defend subject to the specific provisions in CPLR § 317 and the power specified in former § 522 which permitted the setting aside of a judgment for errors in fact not arising on the trial. See also CPLR § 5019(a). CPA §§ 523 through 527 dealt with the mechanics of the procedure for setting aside a final judgment for irregularity or error in fact. They were unnecessarily detailed, and yet incomplete, in defining by whom the motion could be made and how notice of motion should have been given. This unnecessary specificity has been eliminated by this subdivision; the opening words of this subdivision make it clear that the motion may be made by any interested person and that the court will prescribe the method of giving notice of the motion. If the court believes that the person requesting the setting aside of the judgment is not a proper person to raise the issue, it may, of course, exercise its discretion and refuse to grant the requested relief. Subparagraph 1 of this subdivision, which deals with the opening of default judgments, is taken from former § 108 without change of substance. The words “excusable default” are substituted for the former words “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect” with no change in meaning intended. Subparagraphs 2 through 5 are based upon Federal rule 60(b). Subparagraph 4 accomplishes the same result as Federal rule 60(b)(3), which uses the words “the judgment is void.” Subparagraph 5 is taken from Federal rule 60(b)(5). The word “satisfied” is omitted because this subject is covered in CPLR § 5018. The subparagraph includes modification of a prior judgment or order. The concluding phrase of the Federal provision which permits relief from a final judgment because “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application” is a restatement of former equitable power which is omitted as unnecessary. See Ladd v Stevenson, supra. Its usual application will be “to a permanent injunction, which while proper when entered, has become of no use or benefit to the one whose rights were protected, or where it would be inequitable to continue it, because of the occurrence of facts and conditions since its rendition.” 7 Moore, Federal Practice 219 (2d ed 1955). No time limitation other than that embodied in subparagraph 1 has been retained. Under former law a motion under the counterpart of subparagraph 4 could be made at any time and a motion under the counterpart of subparagraphs 2, 3 and 5 within a reasonable time. See, e.g., 7 Carmody-Wait, op cit supra at 163, 420. What is a “reasonable time” naturally depends upon the particular reason assigned for relief. 7 Moore, op cit supra at 309–312. That freedom in the court to exercise its discretion has been retained. This result differs in some respects from the provision found in subd. (b) of Federal rule 60. For example, the Federal provision places a one-year time limit on the grounds specified in subparagraphs 2 and 3 of this subdivision. It is believed that the former New York law provided a sounder approach to the problem. CPA § 528, which contained special provisions for extensions for minors and insane and imprisoned persons, has not been carried over into this subdivision. The extension under the former law was five years or to a time one year after the end of the disability. Ample protection is given to these classes by CPLR § 1203 limiting the entry of a default judgment against an infant or incompetent. See also § 1201. No provision equivalent to the fourth sentence of Federal rule 60(b) has been included. New York statutes do not specify the powers of a court in an independent action to vacate a final judgment or order. Nevertheless, our courts have declared that they have inherent power to entertain a separate action attacking a judgment based upon certain restricted grounds—i.e., those of fraud or mistake—where there is no adequate remedy at law, or where fraud has been perpetrated upon the court. See 7 Carmody-Wait, op cit supra at 375–380. Relief is seldom sought by means of an independent action since it may only be granted as to extrinsic fraud and not as to intrinsic fraud (see, e.g., Crouse v McVickar, 207 NY 213, 100 NE 697 (1912); 3 Bender, New York Practice 600–01 (Warren ed 1954)), while relief based upon either type of fraud may be obtained by means of a motion in the original action.
Subd. (b) of this section is taken from CPA § 529. Like the former section, it makes applicable the same rules that govern restitution after an appeal. See CPLR § 5523. The subdivision includes orders which have been set aside by a court.
Amendment History
Add, L 1962, ch 308; amd, by the Judicial Conference, eff Sept 1, 1972; L 1978, ch 156, § 12, eff May 19, 1978.
Source & verification. Provision text, History, and Advisory
Committee Notes are reproduced verbatim from the Consolidated Laws of New York.
Last verified July 21, 2026.
· Official source
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