A judgment is the determination of the rights of the parties in an action or special proceeding and may be either interlocutory or final. A judgment shall refer to, and state the result of, the verdict or decision, or recite the default upon which it is based. A judgment may direct that property be paid into court when the party would not have the benefit or use or control of such property or where special circumstances make it desirable that payment or delivery to the party entitled to it should be withheld. In any case where damages are awarded to an incarcerated individual serving a sentence of imprisonment with the state department of corrections and community supervision or to a prisoner confined at a local correctional facility, the court shall give prompt written notice to the office of victim services, and at the same time shall direct that no payment be made to such incarcerated individual or prisoner for a period of thirty days following the date of entry of the order containing such direction.
§ 5011.Definition and content of judgment.
Article 50. Judgments Generally · Last amended 2021 · Last verified July 21, 2026
In one sentenceCPLR 5011 defines a judgment as the court's determination of the parties' rights, requires it to reference the underlying verdict, decision, or default, and directs a notice-and-delay procedure before certain incarcerated award recipients can be paid.
Full Text of CPLR 5011
Plain-English Summary
CPLR 5011 lays the definitional groundwork for the rest of Article 50. A judgment, under this section, is the court's determination of the rights of the parties in an action or special proceeding, and it can be either interlocutory, meaning it resolves part of the case while leaving something else open, or final. Whichever form it takes, the judgment has to connect back to what happened in the case: it must refer to and state the result of the verdict or decision, or, where no trial occurred, recite the default on which it rests. That linkage matters because a judgment standing alone, without tying back to the verdict or default that produced it, would leave later readers of the record with no way to check its basis.
The section also gives courts flexibility over how property gets paid into the court itself rather than directly to a party. A judgment can direct that funds be deposited with the court when the recipient wouldn't have the benefit, use, or control of the property anyway, or when special circumstances make it better to withhold direct payment or delivery for a time.
A more targeted provision addresses damages awarded to someone currently incarcerated, whether serving a state prison sentence or held in a local correctional facility. When that happens, the court has to give prompt written notice to the office of victim services, and the judgment must direct that no payment reach the incarcerated person for thirty days after the order is entered. That delay gives crime victims an opportunity to pursue restitution or other claims against the award before the incarcerated recipient can access the money.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the legal definition of a judgment under New York law?
CPLR 5011 defines a judgment as the court's determination of the rights of the parties in an action or special proceeding, and it may be interlocutory or final.
Does a judgment have to reference the verdict or decision it's based on?
Yes. The judgment must refer to and state the result of the verdict or decision, or recite the default it's based on if there was no trial.
Can a court order that money be paid into court instead of to a party?
Yes. CPLR 5011 allows this when the party wouldn't have the benefit, use, or control of the property anyway, or when special circumstances favor withholding direct payment.
Why does a judgment for an incarcerated person face a payment delay?
The statute requires a thirty-day hold on payment to an incarcerated individual or local jail prisoner, along with prompt notice to the office of victim services, to give crime victims a chance to assert claims against the award.
Does the thirty-day payment delay apply to every incarcerated recipient?
It applies to damages awarded to an individual serving a sentence with the state department of corrections and community supervision or confined at a local correctional facility.
Advisory Committee Notes
This section condenses and restates former provisions but makes no change in the law.
The first sentence is derived from CPA § 472 and subd. 1 of CPA § 474. It includes determinations in special proceedings as well as in sections. The first two sentences of subd. 1 of § 474, which stated, in effect, that the judgment might provide appropriate relief among all the parties, has been omitted as unnecessary.
The last sentence, which is new, is designed to clarify the treatment in the new CPLR of the last two sentences of subd. 1 of § 474 and the last two sentences of CPA § 978. Those provisions were added to the act in 1939 (Laws 1939, c 672); their purpose, as explained in a note accompanying the bill, was “to authorize the deposit of moneys or property in court in cases where the transmission or payment to a party . . . resident in a foreign country might be circumvented in whole or in part.” See also, as to the similar amendment to Surrogate’s Court Act § 269, Matter of Bold, 173 Misc 545, 18 NYS2d 291 (Surr Ct 1940); Matter of Weidberg, 172 Misc 524, 15 NYS2d 252 (Surr Ct 1939) (explaining that confiscation was feared in certain foreign countries).
Although the provisions were not altogether clear on the point, it seemed that § 978 applied to specific property which was the subject of the litigation while 474(1) applied to the ordinary proceeds of any judgment. Thus, § 978 spoke of money or property which “a party . . . has in his possession or under his control” and which “belongs or is due to” another party, while 474(1) said only “[w]here . . . a party is entitled to money or other personal property . . . .” The fact that the former was placed in the article governing “Disposition of Property in Litigation” and the latter in the “Judgment” article supports this interpretation. Also, § 474(1) referred only to a judgment while § 978 apparently allowed an order at any stage of an action.
CPA § 477 is omitted as unnecessary. The corresponding Throop Code provisions (Code Civ Proc §§ 503, 504) were omitted in the proposed revision of the Rodenbeck Board. See 1 Report of the Board of Statutory Consolidation on the Simplification of the Civil Practice of New York 379 (1915). The first three sentences of former § 477 were originally derived from a title in the Revised Statutes dealing with setoffs, the fifth sentence from part of Field Code § 263 and the fourth sentence was added as new by Throop. See Code Civ Proc §§ 503, 504, notes (Throop ed 1880). The results they express are obvious and would be reached without specific statement under the new CPLR. Cf. CPLR § 3019(f) and notes. The phrase “and may be either interlocutory or final” has been added. No change in meaning is effected. The basic definition of a “judgment” in § 105(i) includes interlocutory judgments. The addition to the first sentence accords with the new definition of § 105(i) and with the corresponding former provision (CPA § 472).
Amendment History
Add, L 1962, ch 308; amd, L 1962, ch 318, § 21; L 2001, ch 62, § 10, eff June 25, 2001; L 2010, ch 56, § 50 (Part A–1), eff June 22, 2010; L 2011, ch 62, § 52 (Part C, Subpart B), eff March 31, 2011; L 2021, ch 322, § 250, effective August 2, 2021.
Source & verification. Provision text, History, and Advisory
Committee Notes are reproduced verbatim from the Consolidated Laws of New York.
Last verified July 21, 2026.
· Official source
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