§ 4501.Self-incrimination
Article 45. Evidence · Last amended 1963 · Last verified July 21, 2026
Full Text of CPLR 4501
Plain-English Summary
CPLR 4501 closes off one excuse for silence while leaving another intact. A witness cannot dodge a relevant question just because the truthful answer might show he owes money or could be sued over it. New York decided that fear of civil liability, standing alone, is not reason enough to let a witness stonewall.
The privilege against self-incrimination survives untouched. Nothing in this section forces a witness to answer a question that would tend to prove he committed a crime or expose him to a penalty or forfeiture. The section also leaves every other rule about examining witnesses exactly where it found it; it narrows only the debt-and-civil-suit excuse, nothing more.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can a witness refuse to answer because the answer might show he owes a debt?
No. CPLR 4501 requires a witness to answer a relevant question even if the truthful answer would tend to show he owes a debt or could be sued over it.
Does CPLR 4501 eliminate the privilege against self-incrimination?
No. The section preserves it: a witness still cannot be forced to answer a question that would tend to accuse him of a crime or expose him to a penalty or forfeiture.
What kind of question does CPLR 4501 address?
One where the honest answer might reveal that the witness owes a debt or could be sued over it; the statute removes that excuse for refusing to answer.
Does this section change how witnesses are otherwise examined?
No. CPLR 4501 says it does not vary any other rule respecting the examination of a witness; it addresses only the debt and civil-suit excuse.
Where did CPLR 4501 come from?
It replaced former Civil Practice Act section 355, dropping an older provision about traffic infractions that had become unnecessary once the Vehicle and Traffic Law addressed the same ground.
Advisory Committee Notes
This section is the same as CPA § 355 except that the title has been changed from “Personal privilege of witness” and the final phrase which dealt with traffic infractions has been eliminated. The former title seemed to include other personal privileges, such as that of the client or patient, which were covered by other sections.
The final phrase of former § 355 was added in 1934. It read, “nor shall any witness be required to disclose a conviction for a traffic infraction, as defined by the vehicle and traffic law, nor shall conviction therefor affect the credibility of such witness in any action or proceeding.” Insofar as this phrase made conviction of a traffic infraction inadmissible on the issue of credibility, it was unnecessary since subd 29 of § 2 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law provides, in part, that “a traffic infraction is not a crime, and the penalty or punishment imposed therefor shall not . . . affect or impair the credibility as a witness, or otherwise, of any person convicted thereof.” That portion which stated that the witness need not disclose the infraction made little sense. If the infraction is relevant for any purpose other than on the issue of credibility it is admissible for that other purpose (cf. Hart v Mealey, 287 NY 39, 42–43, 38 NE2d 121, 123 (1941)) and it could be proved by an official record. Where it is more convenient to prove it by the witness himself no good reason for requiring the official record is apparent. It should be noted that the rule in criminal cases will remain the same as it was since the stricken phrase also appears as § 2444 of the Penal Law. Since § 2444 referred to both civil and criminal proceedings, that section has been amended to read “a witness in a criminal cause or proceeding shall not be required to disclose”; it formerly read “such witness shall not be required to disclose.”
Amendment History
Add, L 1962, ch 308; amd, L 1963, ch 532, § 21, eff Sept 1, 1963.