§ 3013.Particularity of statements generally.
Article 30. Remedies and Pleading · Last amended 1963 · Last verified July 21, 2026
Full Text of CPLR 3013
Plain-English Summary
CPLR 3013 is the standard against which every other pleading rule in Article 30 gets measured. A statement in a pleading has to be particular enough to notify the court and the opposing party of the transactions or occurrences the pleader intends to prove, and of the material elements of whatever cause of action or defense is being asserted. Nothing more is demanded, and nothing less will do.
That standard replaced an older and less workable one. New York's pre-CPLR code required a pleading to state “material facts” while forbidding it from pleading “evidence,” and courts spent years struggling to draw a clean line between a fact, a conclusion, and evidence — a line nobody could draw with any consistency. CPLR 3013 dropped that fight in favor of a functional question: does the pleading tell the other side, and the court, what happened and what legal theory rests on it? A pleading can state its legal theory outright, so long as it also lays out the underlying transaction the theory depends on.
In practice, 3013 sits below the heightened rules that follow it in this article. CPLR 3016 demands more detail for particular claims — fraud, defamation, and a handful of others — and CPLR 3015 fixes special rules for a handful of recurring topics. CPLR 3013 is the floor everything else builds on: a complaint that clears it but still omits an essential element of the claim risks dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7), while one that's merely worded poorly or ambiguously is better addressed through CPLR 3024's motion for a more definite statement.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the pleading standard in New York state court?
Under CPLR 3013, a pleading must be particular enough to give the court and the other side notice of the transactions or occurrences the pleader intends to prove and the material elements of each claim or defense — no more, no less.
Is New York a “notice pleading” or a “fact pleading” state?
Neither label fits exactly. CPLR 3013 asks for more detail than bare notice pleading under the federal rules but doesn't require the older “material facts” standard New York once used, focusing instead on whether the pleading identifies the transaction and the theory of recovery.
Do I need to plead detailed facts, or is a general theory enough?
A pleading needs enough particularity to identify the specific transaction or occurrence at issue and the material elements of the claim; a theory stated without any grounding in a particular transaction won't satisfy CPLR 3013.
What happens if my complaint isn't particular enough under CPLR 3013?
Does CPLR 3013 require me to plead the evidence I plan to use at trial?
No. CPLR 3013 abandoned the older rule against pleading evidence along with the requirement to plead “material facts,” asking only whether the pleading gives fair notice of the transaction and the claim.
How is a CPLR 3013 problem different from a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action?
A CPLR 3013 defect is about the level of detail or clarity in describing a claim that may otherwise exist, while a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7) argues that no viable cause of action exists at all, even accepting every alleged fact as true.
Can I state my legal theory directly instead of just describing what happened?
Yes. CPLR 3013 allows a pleader to state a legal theory explicitly, as long as the facts supporting that theory are also stated.
Advisory Committee Notes
This section is the heart of the pleading requirement and represents an attempt to set up a realistic requirement of pleading. The viewpoint that has been taken is one of particularity of description. The former requirement of CPA § 241 that a pleading state “material facts” as well as the prohibition of § 241 against pleading “evidence” have been abandoned.
It has been amply demonstrated that it is difficult, if not impossible, to make distinctions among “evidence,” “facts” and “conclusions.” Further, where it is found that “conclusions” are alleged, the result is seldom serious; at worst the court allows free amendment or repleader. It is only where the court is satisfied that no cause of action can be stated because none exists that failing to state the “material facts” has serious consequences. Moreover, no case has been reported in the past five years when pleading “evidence” was fatal. At best, the objectionable allegations were stricken and the residue was sufficient to withstand attack. When characterizing specific language, the courts are correctly concerned only with the right of the adverse party to be advised of the pleader’s contentions and whether he has any cause of action or defense. Accordingly, the basic requirement of this section is that the pleadings identify the transaction and indicate the theory of recovery with sufficient precision to enable the court to control the case and the opponent to prepare. Normally—as formerly—the theory will be revealed by implication from a reading of the statement of facts. There is no objection under this section, however, to stating legal theories explicitly if the facts upon which the pleader relies are also stated.
Amendment History
Add, L 1962, ch 308, § 1, eff Sept 1, 1963.