§ 301.Jurisdiction over persons, property or status.
Article 3. Jurisdiction and Service, Appearance and Choice of Court · Last amended 1963 · Last verified July 21, 2026
Full Text of CPLR 301
Plain-English Summary
CPLR 301 does not hand courts any new power. It carries forward whatever jurisdiction New York courts already had before the CPLR replaced the old Civil Practice Act in 1963. That includes the oldest bases the law recognizes: a defendant's domicile in New York, a defendant's physical presence in the state when served, a corporation's home base here, and a defendant's own consent to be sued in New York courts.
Lawyers usually call this "general jurisdiction," and it stands apart from the long-arm jurisdiction created by CPLR 302. Under Section 301, a court can hear any claim against the defendant, whether or not the claim has anything to do with New York, so long as the defendant's connection to the state runs deep enough -- think of a corporation headquartered here or a person who calls New York home. CPLR 302 works the opposite way: it reaches non-domiciliaries only for claims tied to specific in-state conduct.
In practice, Section 301 covers individuals domiciled in New York, corporations incorporated here or run from a New York headquarters, and out-of-state visitors served with a summons while physically present in the state, even on a claim with no New York connection at all. Businesses that keep an ongoing, substantial presence in New York -- not just a stray sale or a single visit -- can also fall under this general jurisdiction.
Because Section 301 depends on case-by-case tests developed by the courts rather than a checklist in the statute, litigants often pair a Section 301 argument with a Section 302 long-arm argument when jurisdiction is contested, so the court can rule on whichever ground fits the facts.
Frequently Asked Questions
What does CPLR 301 do?
It preserves the jurisdiction New York courts already had before the CPLR took effect in 1963, covering traditional bases like domicile, physical presence, and consent. It does not create any new jurisdictional power on its own.
Does CPLR 301 create a new basis for jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants?
No. It keeps the pre-1963 common-law bases of jurisdiction in place. New reach over non-domiciliaries for New York-connected conduct comes from the long-arm statute, CPLR 302.
What's the difference between CPLR 301 and CPLR 302?
Section 301 supports general jurisdiction, letting a court hear any claim against a defendant with deep enough ties to New York, such as domicile or corporate headquarters. Section 302 supports long-arm jurisdiction, reaching non-domiciliaries only for claims arising from specific acts connected to the state.
Can a New York court get jurisdiction over someone served here while just visiting?
Physical presence in the state at the time of service has long supported jurisdiction under the bases Section 301 preserves, even for a claim unrelated to the visit. Courts call this transient jurisdiction.
Does a corporation's presence in New York subject it to general jurisdiction under CPLR 301?
A corporation incorporated in New York or run from a New York headquarters falls under general jurisdiction. A more limited or occasional business presence may instead call for a long-arm analysis under CPLR 302.
Is consent a basis for jurisdiction under CPLR 301?
Yes. Consent has long supported personal jurisdiction, and Section 301 carries that basis forward along with domicile and presence.
Advisory Committee Notes
This section is designed to make it clear that neither § 302 nor any similar provision which deals with acquisition of jurisdiction in particular situations supersedes or operates as a limitation upon acquisition of jurisdiction over persons, property or status as previously permitted by law and judicial decision. Thus, personal jurisdiction may still be acquired over a foreign corporation “doing business” in New York in accordance with present case law or over a natural person as formerly acquired under § 229-b of the CPA. If a corporation which has submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the New York courts by acts performed within the state, as provided in § 302, is sued on a cause of action that did not arise from any of the acts, it would be necessary to determine from prior law whether there is personal jurisdiction because § 302 limits the jurisdiction acquired under it to a cause of action arising from the performance of the acts. In Tauza v Susquehanna Coal Co. 220 NY 259, 115 NE 915 (1917), jurisdiction over a foreign corporation was sustained even though the cause of action sued upon did not originate in the business transacted in New York, because the corporation was “doing business” in New York.
There has been no attempt to restate the principles of jurisdiction in the former law. Omitted from the article are CPA §§ 483 and 520 providing that where jurisdiction over the person is not obtained but the court’s power to act is predicated on jurisdiction quasi in rem, the judgment can only be enforced against attached property. These sections restate only one of the fundamentals of jurisdiction and are unnecessary since the same result is required by procedural and substantive due process principles enforceable under both Federal and state constitutions. Provisions such as § 59-a of the Insurance Law and § 52 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law will continue in force.
In a situation where personal jurisdiction over a defendant rests solely upon § 302, an amendment or supplementation of a pleading to assert other causes of action not within § 302 would not be permissible even though the defendant defends the action on the merits. But where there is another basis for personal jurisdiction, as where a foreign corporation can be found to be “doing business” within the state, the pleadings may be amended or supplemented without regard to the limitations of § 302.
Amendment History
Add, L 1962, ch 308, § 1, eff Sept 1, 1963.