R 2221.Motion affecting prior order.
Article 22. Stay, Motions, Orders and Mandates · Last amended 1999 · Last verified July 21, 2026
Full Text of CPLR 2221
Plain-English Summary
When a party wants a second look at an order, CPLR 2221 controls both who hears the request and what the request has to show. As a general rule, a motion for leave to renew or reargue, or to stay, vacate, or modify an order, goes to the judge who signed it, since that judge is best positioned to evaluate whether a second look is warranted. Two exceptions loosen that rule: an order made on a party's default can be brought before any judge of the court, and a motion attacking an order made without notice can go, without notice, to the judge who signed it, or, on notice, to any other judge.
Subdivisions (d) and (e) draw the line between reargument and renewal that courts had struggled with for years under case law alone. A motion to reargue has to say so explicitly, rest only on facts or law the court is claimed to have overlooked or misunderstood on the prior motion, not introduce new facts, and be made within thirty days of service of the order with notice of entry. A motion to renew, by contrast, has to be based on new facts that weren't offered before, or a change in the law, that would change the outcome, and it has to justify why those facts weren't presented the first time around.
A party can combine both kinds of motion, but subdivision (f) requires each branch to be identified and supported separately, and the court has to decide each branch as though it had been made on its own. Granting either kind of motion doesn't require the court to change its mind; it can reargue or renew and still adhere to the original result.
Frequently Asked Questions
Which judge do I bring a motion to reargue or renew before in New York?
The judge who signed the original order, under CPLR 2221(a), unless the order was made on a default (any judge) or without notice (that judge without notice, or another judge on notice).
What's the deadline to move for reargument in New York?
Thirty days after service of a copy of the order with written notice of its entry, under CPLR 2221(d). That deadline doesn't apply to motions to reargue a decision of the Appellate Division or the Court of Appeals.
What's the difference between a motion to renew and a motion to reargue in New York?
A motion to reargue points to facts or law the court overlooked or misunderstood, using only what was already on the record; a motion to renew introduces new facts, or points to a change in the law, and has to explain why those facts weren't offered before, under CPLR 2221(d) and (e).
Can I combine a motion to reargue and a motion to renew in one filing?
Yes, but CPLR 2221(f) requires you to identify and support each branch separately, and the court decides each branch as if it had been made on its own.
If the court grants my motion to reargue, does it have to change its ruling?
No. CPLR 2221(f) allows the court, after granting leave to reargue or renew, to adhere to its original determination or to alter it.
What happens if a motion to vacate or modify an order is brought to the wrong judge?
CPLR 2221(c) requires it to be transferred to the proper judge rather than decided by the judge it was mistakenly brought before.
Advisory Committee Notes
Matters such as resettlement, amendment, vacation and modification of orders were formerly governed by case law (see 1 Carmody-Wait, Cyclopedia of New York Practice 717–726 (1952) except for the provisions of CPA §§ 131 and 132).
CPA § 132, authorizing the Appellate Division, an appellate term, or a justice thereof to vacate ex parte Supreme Court orders, originally appeared in § 1348 of the Throop Code, together with the forerunner of CPA § 66, which allows the Appellate Division to grant ex parte orders refused by the Supreme Court.
CPA § 131 applies only to orders made out of court and without notice, since the word “such” refers to order specified in subd 2 of § 130. These provisions appeared consecutively in § 772 of the Throop Code. The purpose of § 131 is apparently to allow a greater latitude in making motions to vacate ex parte orders, since such orders cannot be appealed and vacatur is the only remedy. The notice requirement applies only if the motion to vacate is made to the court, in which case a judge other than the one who made the order may hear the motion.
The substance of CPA § 131 is retained by subparagraph 2 of the new rule. For the sake of completeness, the new rule states the general case law doctrine that all motions to vacate or modify must be heard by the judge who made the order or presided at the term where it was made. See, e.g., Platt v New York & Sea Beach Ry. 170 NY 451, 63 NE 532 (1902); 1 Carmody-Wait, Cyclopedia of New York Practice 719 (1952). “By a long-continued course of practice, recognized and enforced by the courts, it is settled as a rule of law that one judge should not vacate an order made by a court held by another judge except in cases expressly provided for . . . .” Willard v Willard, 194 App Div 123, 125, 185 NY Supp 569, 571 (2d Dept 1920). This doctrine is sometimes overlooked in exceptional cases, such as “[w]here new elements, like fraud or collusion, are shown and it is not possible to send the matter to the judge who made the original order.” Ibid. The new rule is not intended to inhibit the courts in such exceptional cases.
Subparagraph 1 of the new rule expressly covers the exception for orders made upon a default which is made by the decisions. See 1 Carmody-Wait, Cyclopedia of New York Practice 720 (1952).
Another exception relates to orders made without jurisdiction, but these are not covered by the rule; such orders may not only be set aside by any judge but may be attacked collaterally or disregarded entirely, since they are void. See ibid; see also Kamp v Kamp, 59 NY 212 (1874).
The provison in CPA § 131, that an order granting a provisional remedy may be vacated only in the mode specially prescribed by law, is unnecessary. Throughout the new CPLR such specific provisions govern general ones.
The Committee, in response to a suggestion from the Suffolk County Bar Association, recommends the amendment of CPLR 2221 and 5701(a)(2) to clarify confusing provisions of law governing motions addressed to prior orders.
Currently, the law governing motions to reargue and renew is based primarily on court decisions, which address the area piecemeal and do not provide a coherent structure for the treatment of these motions. There is much confusion among bench and bar as to the nature of these motions, their purpose, when they are appropriate and when appeals can be taken. The Committee recommends that the CPLR contain provisions to govern these motions that will distinguish clearly between motions for leave to reargue and leave to renew, and that will specify time limitations for the making of these motions and rights of appeal. See also, Pahl Equipment Corp. v. Kassis 182 A.D.2d 22 (1st Dept. 1992); Schneider v. Solowey, 141 A.D.2d 813 (2d Dept. 1988) This measure would implement its recommendation.
Previously, the Committee’s recommendations included changes to CPLR 2221 requiring motions to renew and to reargue to be assigned to the judge who determined the prior order. Various groups expressed their concern that such language might conflict with judicial assignment practices around the state.
This year the Advisory Committee has decided to eliminate any change in the current language of Rule 2221 relating to the judge to whom such motions are made. This modified proposal sets forth only the parameters of motions to reargue and renew in the trial court context, what they are, when they are appropriate, and the proper time frames for their use. Last year’s proposal has also been amended to make the bill effective immediately upon its passage.
Amendment History
Add, L 1962, ch 308, § 1; amd, L 1986, ch 355, § 5; L 1999, ch 281, § 1, eff July 20, 1999.