(a) If a person entitled to commence an action is under a disability because of infancy or insanity at the time the cause of action accrues, and the time otherwise limited for commencing the action is three years or more and expires no later than three years after the disability ceases, or the person under the disability dies, the time within which the action must be commenced shall be extended to three years after the disability ceases or the person under the disability dies, whichever event first occurs; if the time otherwise limited is less than three years, the time shall be extended by the period of disability. The time within which the action must be commenced shall not be extended by this provision beyond ten years after the cause of action accrues, except, in any action other than for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, where the person was under a disability due to infancy. This section shall not apply to an action to recover a penalty or forfeiture, or against a sheriff or other officer for an escape.
§ 208.Infancy, insanity.
Article 2. Limitations of Time · Last amended 2019 · Last verified July 21, 2026
In one sentenceExtends limitations periods for people under a disability of infancy or insanity at accrual, tolling the clock during the disability up to a ten-year outer cap, and separately lets adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse sue until age fifty-five.
Full Text of CPLR 208
(b) Notwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the contrary and the provisions of any other law pertaining to the filing of a notice of claim or a notice of intention to file a claim as a condition precedent to commencement of an action or special proceeding, with respect to all civil claims or causes of action brought by any person for physical, psychological or other injury or condition suffered by such person as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law committed against such person who was less than eighteen years of age, incest as defined in section 255.27, 255.26 or 255.25 of the penal law committed against such person who was less than eighteen years of age, or the use of such person in a sexual performance as defined in section 263.05 of the penal law, or a predecessor statute that prohibited such conduct at the time of the act, which conduct was committed against such person who was less than eighteen years of age, such action may be commenced, against any party whose intentional or negligent acts or omissions are alleged to have resulted in the commission of said conduct, on or before the plaintiff or infant plaintiff reaches the age of fifty-five years. In any such claim or action, in addition to any other defense and affirmative defense that may be available in accordance with law, rule or the common law, to the extent that the acts alleged in such action are of the type described in subdivision one of section 130.30 of the penal law or subdivision one of section 130.45 of the penal law, the affirmative defenses set forth, respectively, in the closing paragraph of such sections of the penal law shall apply.
Plain-English Summary
CPLR 208(a) protects people who can't reasonably be expected to act on their own behalf: someone who is a minor or legally insane when a cause of action accrues gets the benefit of a tolled clock. If the ordinary limitations period is three years or longer, the disabled person gets three years after the disability ends, or after death if that comes first, to sue; if the ordinary period is shorter than three years, the disability extends it by however long the disability lasted. Either way, the extension can't push the deadline more than ten years past accrual — except, for actions other than medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice, where the disability is infancy, which carries no ten-year outer limit. The section doesn't apply to penalty or forfeiture actions, or to claims against a sheriff for allowing an escape.
The tolling reflects a practical judgment rather than a sympathetic one: a child depends on a parent or guardian to bring a claim, and someone found legally insane is, for these purposes, in no better position to protect their own rights than a child is. Capping the extension at ten years balances that protection against a defendant's interest in not facing stale claims indefinitely.
Subdivision (b) addresses an entirely different problem: survivors of childhood sexual abuse, incest, or use in a sexual performance, whose claims arise from conduct that was illegal when it occurred, can sue any party whose intentional or negligent conduct is alleged to have caused the abuse until they turn fifty-five, regardless of any other limitations period or notice-of-claim deadline that would otherwise apply. That extended window reflects how long it can take a survivor to come forward, a recognition that arrived decades after the tolling rules in subdivision (a) were written for more conventional forms of legal disability.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does being a minor pause the statute of limitations in New York?
Yes. CPLR 208(a) tolls the limitations period for someone who was an infant when the cause of action accrued, generally giving them three years after the disability ends, or an equivalent extension for shorter periods, up to the caps described in the section.
Is there a maximum extension for someone who was legally insane when a claim accrued?
Yes. CPLR 208(a) caps the extension at ten years past accrual for insanity, a limit that also applies to infancy in medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice actions.
Until what age can a childhood sexual abuse survivor sue their abuser in New York?
CPLR 208(b) lets a survivor of specified sexual offenses, incest, or use in a sexual performance committed against them as a minor sue any responsible party until they turn fifty-five, regardless of any other limitations period that would otherwise apply.
Does CPLR 208 apply to actions against a sheriff for an escape?
No. The section excludes actions to recover a penalty or forfeiture, and actions against a sheriff or other officer for an escape.
Does the infancy toll under CPLR 208 apply the same way to medical malpractice claims?
Not entirely — the section's general infancy extension has no ten-year outer limit for most actions, but that unlimited extension doesn't apply to medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice claims, which remain subject to the ten-year cap.
Advisory Committee Notes
This section consolidates CPA §§ 43 and 60 and includes several substantive changes. Sections 43 and 60 were the basic sections governing extension of the statutes of limitation on the ground that the plaintiff at the time of accrual of a cause of action was under a prescribed disability. The disabilities prescribed were: (1) infancy, (2) insanity, and (3) imprisonment on a criminal charge, or in execution upon conviction of a criminal offense, for a term less than for life. In addition to these stated disabilities, there are war provisions (see new CPLR § 209) and military service provisions (see Military L § 308) which have a similar purpose.
The provisions for extension because of the existence of the stated disabilities present controversial policy questions, but the committee concluded that no change should presently be made in the grounds for extension. An infant should not be penalized for the inaction of his parent or guardian. An insane person, adjudicated or nonadjudicated, is, as a practical matter, in no better position than an infant. As to a person imprisoned, legal capacity to sue, if it exists, is only a theoretical right. Litigants have difficulty enough, though they be at large, tracking down their obligors and determining the nature of the liability and where, when and whether to sue. But, while these disabilities should continue to be recognized as grounds for extending the statutes of limitation, the extension periods should be kept to a minimum, reasonably adequate to protect the person under a disability and yet not to harass an obligor unduly.
CPA § 43 fixes the extension of time in an action to recover real property. Section 60 fixes the extension of time in other actions. Both sections were revised in 1951 on recommendation of the Law Revision Commission. NY Law Rev Comm’n Rep 549 (1951). Notwithstanding this comparatively recent revision, it is desirable that changes be made to simplify and integrate them.
The 1951 revision of CPA §§ 43 and 60 modified the allowable extensions in consequence of the stated disabilities. One aspect of the revision was to impose ceilings upon extension of the statute under §§ 43 and 60 in the case of insanity or imprisonment. The intended effect of the revision was to place a maximum limitation of thirty years after accrual under § 43 and of fifteen years under § 60, irrespective of the specifically applicable period of limitation. See NY Law Rev Comm’n Rep 556 (1951). If the limitation period is one year, the net allowable extension would be fourteen years; if the limitation period is ten years, the net allowable extension would be five years. See Matter of Reilly, 156 NYS2d 478, 480 (Sup Ct 1956), affd without opinion, 3 AD2d 1001, 165 NYS2d 431 (1st Dept), leave to appeal denied, 166 NYS2d 299 (1957).
This section reduces the extension periods prescribed in CPA §§ 43 and 60 for commencing an action after a disability ceases from five to three years, if the normal period of limitation is three years or more. If the normal period is less than three years, the period of extension is the period of disability. Practically all cases would fall within the former group. See new CPLR §§ 211–214. The effect of the stated disabilities is differently treated in CPA §§ 43 and 60. While actions for the recovery of real property are subject to a comparatively long period of limitation, different treatment does not appear warranted. In § 22 of the English Limitation Act, 1939, both aspects of the disability problem are treated in the same provision. The new section requires uniform treatment.
Under this section the time otherwise limited may not be extended by more than ten years after the cause of action accrues, except where the plaintiff was under the age of twenty-one at the time of accrual. This maximum period provides ample time to protect the rights of prisoners and insane persons.
It was not possible to substitute the phrase “mental illness” for the phrase “insanity,” as had been suggested, since, in this context, the phrase “mental illness” is too broad and might result in an unwarranted extension of the time to commence an action.
Amendment History
Add, L 1962, ch 308, § 1; amd, L 1973, ch 687, § 3; L 1974, ch 924, § 2; L 1975, ch 109, § 7; L 1985, ch 760, § 1; L 1986, ch 485, § 1, eff July 21, 1986; L 2019, ch 11, § 2, effective February 14, 2019.
Source & verification. Provision text, History, and Advisory
Committee Notes are reproduced verbatim from the Consolidated Laws of New York.
Last verified July 21, 2026.
· Official source
Also known as: statute of limitations minor New Yorkinfancy toll statute of limitations New YorkNew York age 55 childhood sexual abuse lawsuitinsanity tolling statute of limitations New York