§ 2004.Extensions of time generally.
Article 20. Mistakes, Defects, Irregularities and Extensions of Time · Last amended 1963 · Last verified July 21, 2026
Full Text of CPLR 2004
Plain-English Summary
Deadlines run through every stage of civil litigation, and CPLR 2004 gives courts a general tool to extend them. Except where some other law expressly says otherwise, the court can extend the time fixed by any statute, rule, or order for doing an act, on terms that are just and for good cause shown.
What sets this section apart from many extension rules is that it works both ways in time: the application can be made before the deadline runs, which is the ordinary case, or after it has already expired. That second option matters most in practice, since it lets a court forgive a missed deadline outright rather than forcing a party into a formal motion to vacate a default. Good cause still has to be shown either way -- the statute doesn't grant extensions automatically.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can a New York court extend a deadline after it has already passed?
Yes. CPLR 2004 allows an application for an extension of time either before or after the time fixed has expired.
What must a party show to get an extension of time under CPLR 2004?
Good cause, and the extension must be granted on terms the court considers just.
Does CPLR 2004 apply to every deadline in a New York case?
It applies broadly to time fixed by statute, rule, or court order, except where another law expressly prescribes otherwise.
What's the difference between CPLR 2004 and CPLR 2005?
CPLR 2004 is the general power to extend a deadline for good cause, while CPLR 2005 specifically confirms a court's discretion to excuse delay or default caused by law office failure.
Is an extension of time automatic once a party asks for one?
No. CPLR 2004 requires good cause to be shown, and the decision rests in the court's discretion.
Advisory Committee Notes
This section is derived from CPA § 98, where it was added as new from the English practice rules. See Eng Rules of the Sup Ct O 64, r 7 (The Annual Practice 1959). The new provision omits the words “after the commencement of an action or a special proceeding.” It applies to any order fixing time rather than being limited, as is the CPA section, to an “order enlarging time.” CPA § 99 sets forth certain limitations on the power granted by § 98. Subdivisions 2 and 3 of § 99 have been covered in new CPLR §§ 1022 and 5514(b), respectively, and the portions of subdivision 1 of § 99 relating to extension of statutes of limitation or of the time to take an appeal are covered in new CPLR §§ 201 and 5514(c).
The remainder of subdivision 1 of CPA § 99 is omitted as unnecessary. It was originally inserted by the authors of the Throop Code to embody the results of certain cases decided under § 121 of the Field Code. Coon v Knapp, 13 How Pr 175 (NY Sup Ct 1856); Green v Bates, 7 How Pr 296 (NY Sup Ct 1852). That section provided that upon the death, marriage or other disability of a party, the court may allow the action to continue upon motion made within one year, but that after one year a supplemental complaint would be required. The Coon case held that a court could not extend the time for the motion beyond one year, since that would circumvent the intention of the statute that the supplemental complaint procedure must be used after a year has passed. The authors of the Throop Code extended the decision also to the motion provided for by the last sentence of Field Code § 121–a motion to abate the action unless continued within a time, fixed by the court, not less than six months nor more than one year from the granting of the order. See NY Code Civ Proc § 784, note (Throop ed 1880). The pertinent portions of Field Code § 121 were transposed to Throop Code §§ 757 and 761, and from there to civil practice act §§ 84 and 88. Even in the Throop Code section, however, the requirement of a supplemental complaint after one year was dropped.
The new CPLR sections replacing these sections provide for a uniform substitution procedure upon motion (see §§ 1015–1019); and they allow the court to dismiss if substitution is not made within a reasonable time. Since no specific time is specified, a provision prohibiting the court from extending the time would make little sense.
Amendment History
Add, L 1962, ch 308, § 1, eff Sept 1, 1963.