A judgment rendered in accordance with Civil Code Article 102 shall be an absolute nullity when:
Art. 3953.Nullity of Judgment
Book VII. Special Proceedings · Title IV. Divorce and Annulment of Marriage · Chapter 2. Divorce Under Civil Code Article 102 · Last amended 2007 · Last verified July 30, 2026
In one sentenceArticle 3953 declares a judgment rendered under Civil Code Article 102 an absolute nullity when too little time elapsed between service of the petition and the rule to show cause, too little time elapsed between the start of the separation and that rule, or the jurisdiction and venue requirements were not met.
Full Text of Art. 3953
(1) Less than the requisite period of time, in accordance with Article 103.1, has elapsed between service of the petition, or between execution of written waiver of service of the petition, and filing of the rule to show cause.
(2) Less than the requisite period of time, in accordance with Article 103.1, has elapsed between the date the parties commenced living separate and apart and filing of the rule to show cause.
(3) The requirements of this Title with respect to jurisdiction and venue have not been met.
Amendment History
Acts 1990, No. 1009, §5, eff. 1/1/1991; Acts 1991, No. 367, §2; Acts 1995, No. 386, §2; Acts 2006, No. 743, §2, eff. 1/1/2007.
Plain-English Summary
Article 3953 attaches the same severe consequence to a defective Article 102 divorce judgment that Article 3941 attaches to a judgment from a court of improper venue: absolute nullity. A judgment with one of the three defects this article lists is void rather than merely voidable, so it remains open to challenge even after it appears to have become final.
The first two grounds involve two distinct timing checks that both have to be satisfied. Ground one measures the interval between service of the original petition, or execution of a written waiver of that service, and the filing of the rule to show cause; filing the rule before the period Article 103.1 requires has run voids the eventual judgment. Ground two runs a separate clock on the parties' actual separation, measuring the time between when the spouses began living separate and apart and the filing of that same rule.
The third ground reaches back to the requirements this Title imposes on jurisdiction and venue generally, tying Article 3953 to Article 3941's rule that a divorce judgment from a court of improper venue cannot stand. Because an Article 102 divorce moves on a fixed statutory timetable, the greatest risk in practice is filing the rule to show cause too soon, and Article 3953 makes clear that courts treat the waiting periods as more than a formality.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can an Article 102 divorce judgment be challenged after it becomes final?
Yes, if one of Article 3953's three defects existed when the judgment was rendered, because an absolute nullity remains open to challenge at any time.
What if the rule to show cause was filed before the separation period had run?
The resulting judgment risks absolute nullity under Article 3953's second ground, which requires the requisite period to have elapsed since the spouses began living separately.
What are the two separate timing requirements under Article 3953?
One measures the time between service of the petition (or waiver of service) and the rule to show cause; the other measures the time between the start of the spouses' separation and that same rule. Both must independently satisfy the period Civil Code Article 103.1 requires.
Does an improper-venue divorce judgment also risk nullity under Article 3953?
Yes. The third ground voids a judgment where this Title's jurisdiction and venue requirements were not met, consistent with Article 3941's separate venue rule.
Source & verification. Article text is reproduced verbatim from
the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure (legis.la.gov). Enacted by the Louisiana Legislature.
Last verified July 30, 2026.
· Official source
Also known as: nullity of Louisiana divorce judgmentArticle 3953 Louisianafiled rule to show cause too earlyvoid Article 102 divorce judgmentArticle 103.1 waiting period nullity